Interest Rate Derivatives in a Duffie and Kan Model with Stochastic Volatility: An Arrow-Debreu Pricing Approach

Simple analytical pricing formulae have been derived, by different authors and for several derivatives, under the Gaussian Langetieg (1980) model. The purpose of this paper is to use such exact Gaussian solutions in order to obtain approximate analytical pricing formulas under the most general stochastic volatility specification of the Duffie and Kan (1996) model. Using Gaussian Arrow-Debreu state prices, first order stochastic volatility approximate pricing solutions will be derived only involving one integral with respect to the time-to-maturity of the contingent claim under valuation. Such approximations will be shown to be much faster than the existing exact numerical solutions, as well as accurate.     

A Social Contract Account for CSR as an Extended Model of Corporate Governance (II): Compliance,Reputation and Reciprocity

This essay seeks to give a contractarian foundation to the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), meant as an extended model of corporate governance of the firm. Whereas, justificatory issues have been discussed in a related paper (Sacconi, L.: 2006b, this journal), in this essay I focus on the implementation of and compliance with this normative model. The theory of reputation games, with reference to the basic game of trust, is introduced in order to make sense of self-regulation as a way to implement the social contract on the multi-fiduciary model of corporate governance. This affords understanding of why self-regulation, meant as mere recourse to a long-run strategy in a repeated trust game, fails. Two basic problems for the functioning of the reputation mechanism are examined: the cognitive fragility problem, and the motivational problem. As regards the cognitive fragilities of reputation (which result from the impact of unforeseen contingencies and from bounded rationality), the paper develops the logic and the structure that self-regulatory norms must satisfy if they are to serve as gap-filling tools with which to remedy cognitive limitations in the reputation mechanism. The motivation problem then arises from the possibility of sophisticated abuse by the firm. Developed in this case is an entirely new application of the theory of conformism-and-reciprocity-based preferences, the result of which is that the stakeholders refuse to acquiesce to sophisticated abuse on the part of the firm. Lorenzo Sacconi is professor of economics and Unicredit Chair in economic ethics and corporate social responsibility at the Department of Economics of the University of Trento, where he leads the LaSER - Laboratory of research in Social responsibility, Ethics and Rationality, and head of the graduate program (laurea magistralis) in “economic decisions, enterprise and corporate social responsibility”. He is also director of EconomEtica, the interuniversity centre for economic ethics and corporate social responsibility joining over 20 Italian Universities placed at the Milano-Bicocca University. Past president of tthe Italian Business Ethics Network and past member of the EBEN executive committtee, currrently he is a member of the executive committee of the Italian chapter of EBEN (EBEN Italy). On related subjects, he is author of the book: The social contract of the firm, Springer, 2000     

The time-varying integration of euro area government bond markets

We derive a model in which a standard international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) for government bonds is nested within an ICAPM with impediments to invest in the local government bond markets. Excess returns or risk premiums are then driven by a country-specific or idiosyncratic stochastic factor on top of the common factor which has a time-varying idiosyncratic impact on the premiums. With this model we investigate the financial integration of government bond markets over time through two channels. First, we allow for gradual convergence from the full ICAPM with impediments to the standard model through the vanishing of the idiosyncratic factors. Second, we allow for gradual equalization of the country-specific impacts of the common factor. State space methods are used to estimate the model with weekly government bond risk premiums for Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands over the period 1995–2009. Our results suggest, first, that the idiosyncratic factors were almost eliminated by 2006 in all countries but Italy but then reappeared due to the financial crisis that started in 2007. Second, the country-specific exposures to the common international risk factor have converged across countries, with no setback during the crisis.     

Strategic accessibility competition

We analyze the effect of competition in market-accessibility enhancement among quality-differentiated firms. Firms are located in regions with different ex-ante transport costs to reach the final market. We characterize the equilibrium of the two-stage game in which firms first invest to improve market accessibility and then compete in prices. Efforts in accessibility improvement crucially depend on the interplay between the willingness to pay for the quality premium of the median consumer and the ex-ante difference in accessibility between regions. From the social standpoint, also the accessibility investment depends on such a comparison. Finally, we endogenize quality choice and check the robustness of the result to some natural modifications of our assumptions.     

The opportunity cost of social relations: On the effectiveness of small worlds

The aim of this paper is to extend the theoretical literature on knowledge and network structure by studying the use of social networks as a learning mechanism. The novelty of this approach is suggested by the empirical evidence on informal trading of know-how. In the model, we consider a set of actors who create and diffuse knowledge with the aim of increasing their own personal knowledge. They are located on a lattice (identifying the social space) and are directly connected to a small number of other individuals. We assume that individuals can learn individually or socially, and that individuals choose how to learn on the basis of a cost-benefit comparison. Within this framework, we compare network structures in terms of efficiency and equity. We find that the opportunity cost of using the network affects its optimal structure in terms of aggregate performance and that the small world does not emerge unambiguously as being the most efficient.     

Intergenerational Altruism and the Environment

We construct an overlapping generations model of pollution externality in which individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady-state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite individuals' altruism, the competitive equilibrium is not optimal. We thus study the social optimum and show that it can be decentralized.
JEL classification: D 62; D 64; D 91     

Mail survey abroad with an alternative web survey

The large decline in cooperation in surveys experienced in the first decade of the twenty first century has placed representative surveys in a veritable quagmire, although numerous researchers have shown that the decline in the total nonresponse has been much higher in administered surveys (face-to-face and telephone) than in self-administered (mail and web surveys). The move from the “traditional” mail survey to the internet survey has brought important changes, but, at the same time, new challenges have arisen related to the lower coverage and the reduced visibility, the need for certain skills to fill out a questionnaire, changes in response rates, etc. This is a self-administered survey that informs the addressees by mail that they have been selected to participate in a research survey to which they can respond either by using the paper questionnaire (in the letter there is a prepaid envelope), by means of a web questionnaire (accessing a link and using a password), or by telephone (the respondent provided a contact time telephone number via a prepaid envelope or by calling an answering machine). The respondents themselves, therefore, choose the mode of response. An analysis of the responses achieved by each modality shows that the majority of the questionnaires were received by ordinary mail (83.6 %), 359 by internet (14.4 %), and 51 were answered by telephone (2.0 %).     

Uncovered Interest Parity at Long Horizons: Evidence on Emerging Economies*

This paper estimates uncovered interest parity (UIP) at long horizons using bilateral US dollar rates vis‐à‐vis mature economy and emerging market currencies. The paper finds support in favor of UIP for dollar rates vis‐à‐vis major mature economy currencies, but far less against emerging market currencies. There are also signs that political risk and the exchange risk premium help explain the empirical failure of UIP for these latter currencies. This suggests that whether UIP holds depends more on the currency than on the horizon.