Statistical analysis of under- and overinvoicing of imports

This paper uses trading partners' data comparisons at three different levels of refinement to verify whether the elimination of an over-valued exchange rate, which itself has been claimed to lead to over-valuation of imports, affects the valuation practice of importers. The advantages of correcting the import and export data of trading partners for eventual discrepancies in the volume of these trade flows is highlighted. Data for Turkey, Pakistan and The Netherlands are used. Turkey devalued in 1970, while Pakistan devalued in 1972. Data availability and the large discrepancy between reported exports to and imports from The Netherlands suggested the analysis of the data for this country.     

Just about money? CEO satisfaction and firm performance in small family firms

This paper examines how family ownership and family ties influence the relative importance of economic and non-economic goals on the CEO’s satisfaction with the firm. Using a sample of small high-tech family and non-family firms, we show that the influence of past firm economic performance on CEO satisfaction is weaker in the case of CEOs leading a family firm. Our results also suggest that this influence becomes weaker as the family firm transitions into subsequent generations. However, contrary to our expectations, we were not able to find a differential effect of firm performance on CEO satisfaction between CEOs who belong to the controlling family and those who do not.     

PRACTICES OF TREASURY MANAGEMENT IN A SMALL OPEN TRADING ECONOMY: THE BELGIAN CASE

There is little systematic information available on the current practices in the area of treasury management among companies outside the US. The purpose of this study is to investigate management practices in the areas of treasury management for companies located in a small open trading economy: Belgium. This article analyses and compares corporate responses in three important areas of treasury management, i. e. managing banking relations, domestic cash management, and foreign exchange management. The results presented in this article indicate that corporate practice in these areas could be much more sophisticated.     

税收竞争还是税收输出?

原载:Journal of Urban Economics,第54卷,(2003)第639-647页一、引言在税收竞争基本模型①里,两个独立辖区政府为了相互竞争流动税基,把税率设计得很低,结果产生了无效率问题。典型税收竞争模型通常研究的是一系列独立辖区,其中每个辖区都在本区范围内对流动资本征税。征来的税款用来支持公共提供品,而这个公共提供品可能具有或不具有公共产品的那些特征。增加税收会带来资本的外流,而这种资本外流是提供公共提供品的一部分成本,尽管如此,我们并不考虑其他辖区拓宽税基这一有益的情况。由于所有辖区政府都采取相同的行为方式,所以,就会出…     

The price of ethics and stakeholder governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds

Do investors pay a price for investing in socially responsible investments (SRI) funds, or do they obtain superior returns? This paper investigates these under- and overperformance hypotheses for all SRI funds across the world. Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in the US, the UK, and in many continental European and Asia-Pacific countries underperform their domestic benchmarks by − 2.2% to − 6.5%. However, with the exception of some countries such as France, Japan and Sweden, the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds are not statistically different from the performance of conventional funds. We also find that the underperformance of SRI funds is not driven by loadings on an ethics style factor. There is mixed evidence of a smart money effect: SRI investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the future, whereas they show some fund-selection ability in identifying funds that will perform poorly. Finally, corporate governance and social screens yield lower risk-adjusted returns.     

Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive remuneration

This paper offers a new explanation of the gender pay gap in leadership positions by examining the relationship between managerial bonuses and company performance. Drawing on findings of gender studies, agency theory, and the leadership literature, we argue that the gender pay gap is a context‐specific phenomenon that results partly from the fact that company performance has a moderating impact on pay inequalities. Employing a matched sample of 192 female and male executive directors of U.K.‐listed firms, we corroborate the existence of the gender pay disparities in corporate boardrooms. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that bonuses awarded to men are not only larger than those allocated to women, but also that managerial compensation of male executive directors is much more performance‐sensitive than that of female executives. The contribution of attributional and expectancy‐related dynamics to these patterns is highlighted in line with previous work on gender stereotypes and implicit leadership theories such as the romance of leadership. Gender differences in risk taking and confidence are also considered as potential explanations for the observed pay disparities. The implications of organizations' indifference to women's performance are examined in relation to issues surrounding the recognition and retention of female talent. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An export model for the Belgian industry

A two-equation model for the export volume and the export price of the Belgian industry is specified as a convex combination of demand and supply determinants and estimated using Bayesian inference methods. The results indicate that, in the medium run, industrial exports are mainly explained by the behaviour of price taking suppliers.     

Non-dictatorial extensive social choice

Summary. Different social planners may have different opinions on the well-being of individuals under different social options (Roberts, 1980). If utilities are translation- or ratio-scale measurable, or if the social ranking might be incomplete, or if interplanner comparability is allowed; then there exist non-dictatorial aggregation rules. We propose extensions, intersections, and mixtures of the Pareto, utilitarian, leximin, Kolm-Pollak, and iso-elastic rules.Received: 16 May 2001, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D63, D71. Correspondence to: Erwin OogheErwin Ooghe, Luc Lauwers: We are extremely grateful to the referee who was willing to review this paper many times. Her/his extensive and in-depth comments had a strong impact. Further thanks are due to Bart Capéau, Marc Fleurbaey, Maurice Salles, Erik Schokkaert, and Alain Trannoy. The first author gratefully acknowledges the financial support by the TMR network Living Standards, Inequality and Taxation (ERBFMRXCT 980248) of the European Communities.     

A dynamic game for fiscal federalism with non-local externalities

We address the questions of the patterns and the efficiency of public intervention in a dynamic game model between public agencies in charge of a non-local externality. We give two examples: pollution spreading between water basins (negative externality), and non-uniform contributions from the elite and from the mass to a cultural background (positive externality). We define two extreme cases, depending on whether or not the receiving end of the externality balances the transmitting end. When both balance, the reactivity of the agency structure is strong and the need for redistribution between them is weak. When they do not balance, the externality is more markedly non-local and redistribution is required to balance the fiscal burden (or product) from pigouvian instruments among all beneficiaries. We show that, with a static rule of redistribution that allows them to compute transfers between them as a function of their own strategies, the decentralized agencies' reactivity is somewhat slowed, but they still react faster and more efficiently than a static central agency.