The social value of public information with costly information acquisition

In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.     

Walras’ theory of capital formation: an intertemporal equilibrium reformulation

We develop a mainstream reformulation of the original Walras?? model of capital accumulation. We overcome the shortcomings of the original model. First, we prove the existence of intertemporal competitive equilibria. Our proof combines a well known theorem due to Yannelis and Prabhakar (J Math Econ 12:233?C245, 1983) with a lemma due to Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 21:585?C603, 2003). Secondly, we remedy the indeterminacy of allocation of savings across multiple types of capital goods by introducing a storage technology. Finally, we show that, for stored capital goods, the equality of rates of returns emerges endogenously in equilibrium, while it was imposed by Walras from the outset in his original contribution.     

R&D financing and growth

ABSTRACT

R&D investment are an important engine of growth and development. Yet economists have often claimed underinvestment, based on the consideration that these projects are more costly to finance, especially, due to the asymmetric information between inside and outside investors. Coherently, a recent empirical evidence has shown that firms intensively active in R&D are less leveraged and rely more heavily on internal finance. Motivated by this evidence, we study the effects of asymmetric information and financial frictions within a GE economy of Schumpeterian tradition. The model and equilibrium concept are rich enough to represent investment and innovation decisions, technology adoption/diffusion through patent licensing and, most importantly, firms' financial decisions. In this representation, R&D-intensive firms might effectively rely more on internal sources and equity than on debt financing, relative to what would happen in frictionless markets. Further, financial decisions affect aggregate investment and income dynamics.     

Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis

We analyze social dynamics in a continuous population where randomly matched individuals have to choose between two pure strategies only ('cooperate' (C) and 'not cooperate' (NC)). Individual payoffs associated with the possible outcomes of each interaction may differ across groups, depending on the specific social and cultural context to which each agent belongs. In particular, it is assumed that three sub-populations are initially present, 'framing' the game according to the prisoner's dilemma (PD), assurance game (AG) and other regarding (OR) payoff configurations, respectively. In other words, we assume that common knowledge about the payoffs of the game is 'culturally-specific'. In this context, we examine both the adoption process of strategies C and NC within each sub-population and the diffusion process of 'types' (PD, AG and OR) within the overall community. On the basis of an evolutionary game-theoretic approach, the paper focuses on the problem of coexistence of PD, AG and OR groups as well as of 'nice' (C) and 'mean' (NC) strategies. We show that coexistence between C and NC is possible in the heterogeneous community under examination, even if it is ruled out in homogeneous communities where only one of the three types is present. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Corruption in transition economies: Socialist,Ottoman or structural?

Using data from 64 countries in Eastern Europe and MENA, I study the long-run effects of Ottoman and socialist rule on the incidence of corruption. To proxy Ottoman legacies, I estimate the length of Ottoman rule across all Ottoman successor states. Conditioning on income per capita, I find a robust adverse effect of both socialist and Ottoman legacies on present day corruption – a finding which reconciles two rival accounts of post-socialist corruption from the transition literature. The results are robust to controlling for potential confounders and instrumenting for both per capita income and the length of Ottoman rule. However, the explanatory power of long-run historical determinants of corruption is lower than the contribution of short-run factors. While present day income explains about half of the total variation in corruption across post-socialist countries, Ottoman and socialist legacies jointly account for about one third. Although history does matter, these findings suggest that most of the corruption observed in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Balkans today may not be inherently ‘eastern’ or socialist. Rather, the data are consistent with an interpretation of corruption predominantly as a manifestation of persistent economic under-development.     

Monetary Policy Indeterminacy and Identification Failures in the U.S.: Results from A Robust Test

We propose a novel identification‐robust test for the null hypothesis that an estimated New Keynesian model has a reduced form consistent with the unique stable solution against the alternative of sunspot‐driven multiple equilibria. Our strategy is designed to handle identification failures as well as the misspecification of the relevant propagation mechanisms. We invert a likelihood ratio test for the cross‐equation restrictions (CER) that the New Keynesian system places on its reduced‐form solution under determinacy. If the CER are not rejected, sunspot‐driven expectations can be ruled out from the model equilibrium and we accept the structural model. Otherwise, we move to a second‐step and invert an Anderson and Rubin‐type test for the orthogonality restrictions (OR) implied by the system of structural Euler equations. The hypothesis of indeterminacy and the structural model are accepted if the OR are not rejected. We investigate the finite‐sample performance of the suggested identification‐robust two‐step testing strategy by some Monte Carlo experiments and then apply it to a New Keynesian AD/AS model estimated with actual US data. In spite of some evidence of weak identification as for the ‘Great Moderation’ period, our results offer formal support to the hypothesis of a switch from indeterminacy to a scenario consistent with uniqueness occurring in the late 1970s. Our identification‐robust full‐information confidence set for the structural parameters computed on the ‘Great Moderation’ regime turns out to be more precise than the intervals previously reported in the literature through ‘limited‐information’ methods. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fish market integration and demand analysis: a Mediterranean case study

This study discusses the importance of delineating market boundaries prior to undertaking demand analysis. The Northern Adriatic Sea is considered a good case study by which to test this approach, given the richness of species landed there and their heterogeneous distribution across the space involved. Three groups of demersal species (whitefish, cephalopods, and crustaceans) are chosen for the study. First, geographical market boundaries are defined for each product (species) using price–price relations between market places. Second, demand is analyzed inside the defined market area through the linear approximation of the inverse almost ideal demand system. Geographical market integration bears several patterns of complete or partial integration, depending on the species. It could be said that integration is higher for species of high economic relevance among regions where large quantities are landed. For all product groups, our estimations suggest that moderate substitution effects do exist among species. The characteristics of the fleets and of the buyers, as well as the biophysical attributes of the sea basin (i.e., species richness and heterogeneous spatial distribution) are discussed as explanatory variables of market integration/segmentation.     

Induced Innovation,Endogenous Technical Change and Income Distribution in a Labor‐Constrained Model of Classical Growth

We present a steady state analysis of a labor‐constrained classical growth model with endogenous direction and intensity of technical change. Firms use retained profits to raise their productive capacity and to improve labor and capital productivities. Investments are planned to maximize instantaneous profits. Comparative dynamics exercises show that (1) an increase in the saving rate and in R&D subsidies raises the steady state labor share, labor productivity growth and the employment rate, and (2) a rise in workers' bargaining power reduces the employment rate while leaving productivity growth and distribution unaffected.     

MODELING INVESTMENT‐SECTOR EFFICIENCY SHOCKS: WHEN DOES DISAGGREGATION MATTER?

The most straightforward way to analyze investment‐sector productivity developments is to construct a two‐sector model with a sector‐specific productivity shock. An often used modeling shortcut accounts for such developments using a one‐sector model with shocks to the efficiency of investment in a capital accumulation equation. This shortcut is theoretically justified when some stringent conditions are satisfied. Using a two‐sector model, we consider the implications of relaxing several of the conditions that are at odds with the U.S. Input–Output Tables, including equal factor shares across sectors. The effects of productivity shocks to an investment‐producing sector of our two‐sector model differ from those of efficiency shocks to investment in a one‐sector model. Notably, expansionary productivity shocks boost consumption in every period, whereas expansionary efficiency shocks cause consumption to fall substantially for many periods.