Panel data and descriptor for energy econometrics – an efficiency,resilience and innovation analysis

Quality & Quantity - The work at hand presents a new extensive panel dataset for energy economics, econometrics and policy. The referred dataset is made of 5000 observations circa, including 6...     

Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement

This paper shows that, in a repeated competitive procurement, a buyer can use the reserve price in a low-price auction as a “public”—hence nondiscriminatory—incentive device to elicit unverifiable quality. We study a model with many firms and one buyer, who is imperfectly informed on the firms' costs. When firms are ex ante identical, the provision of quality is sustained by a sufficiently high reserve price to reward firms for the quality provision and by the threat of setting a low reserve price forever, if quality is not delivered. The buyer can elicit the desired level of unverifiable quality provided her baseline valuation of the project is not too high and the net benefit from unverifiable quality is not too low. These results are robust to firms' heterogeneity in their time preferences when the punishment for a deviation is finite but sufficiently long.     

Reading cases of local quality of life assessment as incomplete and socio-politically contentious practices

Quality & Quantity - Quality of life represents one of the most relevant and controversial issues in the contemporary socio-economic and political scene. This paper examines local quality of...