Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets

This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations.JEL Classification No.: L13, G22     

The Dynamics of Household Wealth Accumulation in Italy

We examine the dynamics of wealth accumulation distribution in Italy using data drawn from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a representative survey of the Italian population conducted by the Bank of Italy. We compare survey data with National Accounts data and discuss sample representativeness, attrition and measurement issues. We then look at wealth inequality (the cross‐sectional dispersion of wealth) and wealth mobility (individual transitions across the wealth distribution) and examine the age profile of wealth using repeated cross‐sectional data. Finally, we consider various explanations for the pattern of wealth accumulation in Italy, focusing on retirement, bequests, income risk, health shocks and credit market imperfections.     

Does the nano-patent ‘Gold rush’ lead to entrepreneurial-driven growth? Some policy lessons from China and Japan

In this study we compare the nano-patent landscapes of China and Japan in order to assess how their structures (type, fragmentation and concentration of patent ownership) affect the organization of the nanotechnology industry. We also analyze technology policy in order to assess how these interventions support technology transfer and nano-exploitation through university–industry collaboration and technology entrepreneurship. Drawing upon 20,365 patent families related to carbon nanotubes from 1994 to present, we found that two dissimilar technology policies boosting national innovation system emerged: China is more focused on forging an anchor-tenant model, while Japan exhibits a more industry-oriented model through demand-side policy intervention. Implications for firms? strategies and policy makers are discussed.     

Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense

We analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations. Secrecy has no fixed term but does not preclude accidental disclosure nor independent creation by other inventors. We derive the optimal scope of the rights conferred to such second inventors, showing that if the patent life is set optimally, second inventors should be allowed to patent and to exclude first inventors who have relied on secrecy. We then identify conditions under which it is socially desirable to increase patent life as much as is necessary to induce first inventors to patent. The circumstances in which it is preferable that they rely on secrecy seem rather limited .     

Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis

Using a large database of private firms in Italy, we analyze the determinants of initial public offerings (IPOs) by comparing the ex ante and ex post characteristics of IPOs with those of private firms. The likelihood of an IPO is increasing in the company's size and the industry's market-to-book ratio. Companies appear to go public not to finance future investments and growth, but to rebalance their accounts after high investment and growth. IPOs are also followed by lower cost of credit and increased turnover in control.     

The effects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions under Choquet–Brownian uncertainty

The effects of two environmental policy options for the reduction of pollution emissions, i.e. taxes and non-tradable quotas, are analyzed. In contrast to the prior literature this work endogenously takes into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the new environmental policy. The level of emissions is determined by solving the firm's profit maximization problem under taxes and fixed quotas. We find that the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is always larger than the adoption threshold under fixed quota, even in a setting characterized by ecological uncertainty and ambiguity – in the form of Choquet–Brownian motions – on future costs and benefits over adopting environmental policies.     

The role of trust in the 2008 financial crisis

Financial transactions require trust. This paper analyzes the role of trust in the context of the 2008 financial crisis. In order to find a role for trust, we need to find a role for trust in a standard economic model which differs from the rational expectation of the equilibrium outcome. It is argued that trust dropped dramatically in the Fall of 2008. The consequences and effects of this drop in trust are discussed.