Peer pressure,social spillovers,and reciprocity: an experimental analysis

This study examines whether reciprocity is affected by what others know and do. Two types of social effects are investigated within the framework of a modified investment game. On the one hand, we assess the role played by the awareness that own choices are observed by another trustee—i.e., peer pressure. On the other hand, we measure the interaction between trustees’ choices—i.e., social spillovers. We find that peer pressure fosters reciprocity and, to a lesser extent, so do social spillovers.     

Turning to Adam Smith Ian Simpson Ross Oxford University Press, 1995, 495 pp.

The Glasgow edition of the works and correspondence of Adam Smith, published by Oxford University Press since 1976, must be rated among the great editorial enterprises of the 20th century as far as political economy is concerned. The edition is now complete after the publication of the second (and last) associated volume devoted to the life of Adam Smith. Ian Simpson Ross's biographical work is the object of the present paper. Ross's book is discussed in connection with the ongoing debate on Smithian political economy. It is the purpose of this paper to show in what ways this biography can help readers of Smith to bring some of the main issues of the debate into proper focus.A preliminary draft of this paper was presented at the first conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought in Marseilles, France, February 27-March 2, 1997.     

Growth and employment differentials under alternative wage-setting institutions and integrated capital markets

This paper compares the effects of different labor market institutions on economic growth and employment. In the general equilibrium model here presented, a mechanism causing persistence (on-the-job training) interacts with the strategic complementary between investors’ decisions on capital accumulation and workers’ decisions on labor-market participation. Within this framework (i) structurally and institutionally similar economies preserve forever their differences in output and employment levels, (ii) the steady-state growth rate is higher in an economy with competitive wage determination than in an unionized economy, (iii) this growth differential enlarges when the product and the capital markets of these two economies are integrated.     

The Relevance of Precautionary Saving

Abstract. This paper develops a model of personal saving that includes, unlike previous models appearing in the literature, an explicit role for the Leland–Kimball measure of prudence. Estimation of the model using Bank of Italy survey data suggests that about 20 per cent of total saving is driven by precautionary reasons.     

Financial Systems, Industrial Structure, and Growth

How does the development of the financial sector affect industrialgrowth? What effect does it have on the composition of industry,and the size distribution of firms? What is the relative importanceof financial institutions and financial markets, and does itdepend on the stage of economic growth? How do financial systemsdiffer in their vulnerability to crisis? This paper attemptsto provide an answer to these questions based on the currentstate of empirical research.     

Leapfrogging in a Vertical Product Differentiation Model

The model considers a two-period duopoly game where in the first period the leader produces a good with a given quality and the other firm can only imitate it. It is the Stackelberg case where, in addition, the leader has the choice of the quality of the good and the imitation is costly, but not prohibitively so. Under this assumption quantities and profits in terms of the quality are derived as subgame perfect equilibrium. In the second period there exists the possibility for the leader and/or the follower to make an investment. The outcome of this is uncertain: it could either be the case that a good of better quality can be introduced, or that a cost-reduction in producing the existing good is attained. The former case is a product innovation, whereas the latter case is a process innovation. By solving the game backwards as a function of the quality of the first period, there exists the possibility of an equilibrium where the follower chooses to invest and the leader does not invest .     

The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment

We model the distortions that internal power struggles can generate in the allocation of resources between divisions of a diversified firm. The model predicts that if divisions are similar in the level of their resources and opportunities, funds will be transferred from divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good opportunities. When diversity in resources and opportunities increases, however, resources can flow toward the most inefficient division, leading to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms. We test these predictions on a panel of diversified U.S. firms during the period from 1980 to 1993 and find evidence consistent with them.     

THE MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES AS AN EFFECT OF THE DEPLETION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL ASSETS

In this paper, the growth process is not fed by the accumulation of productive assets (physical and/or human capital, knowledge etc.), but by the depletion of environmental or social resources, which induces individuals to increase their labor supply in order to consume more of the market goods that substitute for the depleted resources. Hence, production is expanded, thus eroding the resources’ ability to regenerate, which decreases with aggregate production. Within this context, the ‘green’ net national product is derived and it is shown how a regulatory authority should manage the resources for achieving Pareto‐optimality.