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21.
22.
Luigi Bonatti 《Economic Notes》2002,31(1):109-123
In a unionized economy with nominal-wage contracts, the 'natural' (rational-expectations equilibrium) employment level is not invariant with respect to the stabilization rule followed by the monetary authority. This is because alternative monetary policies change the variance of the inflation rate (price level) relatively to the variance of some measure of economic activity (employment level), thereby influencing the trade-off desired by union members between the real wage and the probability of employment. Indeed, a more volatile employment level induces the (risk-neutral) union members to prefer a higher expected real wage.
(J.E.L: E5, J5). 相似文献
(J.E.L: E5, J5). 相似文献
23.
As a result of the Asian crisis, relationship-based economic systems are now under attack for corruption and inefficiency. Yet, until recently, they were held up as an alternative (and in some respects superior) form of capitalism to the arm's-length, market-based, Anglo-Saxon systems of the U.S. and the U.K. What went wrong? This paper suggests that relationship-based systems work well when contracts are poorly enforced and capital is scarce. Power relationships substitute for contracts, and can achieve better outcomes than a primitive contractual system. But a relationship-based system suppresses the price system and the signals it provides. As a result, relationship-based systems are likely to misallocate capital when presented with large external capital inflows. Since the external capital comes from arm's length investors who typically have few contractual rights or little power in a relationship system, and since these investors are aware of the potential for misallocation, they rationally choose to maintain control over borrowers by keeping their claims short term. Thus, the contact between the two systems creates a fragile hybrid that, while mutually beneficial to relationship borrowers and arm's length investors in normal times, is excessively prone to shocks. Where do we go from here? The authors suggest that while there may be some short-term benefits for emerging economies from reverting to the pure relationship-based system, in the long run such economies will be held back unless they develop the greater disclosure, contract enforcement, and competition of the arm's-length system. The current Asian crisis may be the most opportune moment for these economies to effect the transition between systems. 相似文献
24.
A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who violate norms are often
targeted by their peers for punishment. In an experiment with small teams we examine whether subjects treat punishment itself
as a second-order public good. Results do not support this view and rather suggest a hard-wired taste for punishment; subjects
are engaged in a cooperative task but ignore the public good characteristics of punishment. 相似文献
25.
Christian Garavaglia Franco Malerba Luigi Orsenigo Michele Pezzoni 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2012,22(4):677-709
This paper examines how the nature of the technological regime governing innovative activities and the structure of demand interact in determining market structure, with specific reference to the pharmaceutical industry. The key question concerns the observation that—despite high degrees of R&D and marketing-intensity—concentration has been consistently low during the whole evolution of the industry. Standard explanations of this phenomenon refer to the random nature of the innovative process, the patterns of imitation, and the fragmented nature of the market into multiple, independent submarkets. We delve deeper into this issue by using an improved version of our previous “history-friendly” model of the evolution of pharmaceuticals. Thus, we explore the way in which changes in the technological regime and/or in the structure of demand may generate or not substantially higher degrees of concentration. The main results are that, while technological regimes remain fundamental determinants of the patterns of innovation, the demand structure plays a crucial role in preventing the emergence of concentration through a partially endogenous process of discovery of new submarkets. However, it is not simply market fragmentation as such that produces this result, but rather the entity of the “prize” that innovators can gain relative to the overall size of the market. Further, the model shows that emerging industry leaders are innovative early entrants in large submarkets. 相似文献
26.
Luigi Bonatti 《Review of International Economics》2006,14(5):773-796
In an endogenous growth framework, a two‐country economy is modeled with an integrated product and asset markets. The countries differ with respect to the share of their GDP that is redistributed through the fiscal system, and the country where this share is smaller tends to grow faster. This high‐growth country finances a portion of its investment expenditures by attracting funds from the low‐growth country, whose growth rate is depressed by this outflow. The high‐growth country runs ever‐increasing current account deficits and its negative net international investment position rises without bounds. This notwithstanding, sustainability is guaranteed. 相似文献
27.
28.
We prove that the policy function, obtained by optimizing a discounted infinite sum of stationary return functions, is Lipschitz continuous when the instantaneous function is strongly concave. Moreover, by using the notion of α-concavity, we provide an estimate of the Lipschitz constant which turns out to be a decreasing function of the discount factor. 相似文献
29.
Luigi Vannucci 《Decisions in Economics and Finance》1979,2(2):113-126
A generalization of an inequality on binomial coefficients solved by E. L. Johnson, D. Newman, K. Winston [1] is analyzed
and at the worst the problem is reduced into the choice between two alternatives for the solutions.
Supported by G.N.A.F.A. of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche. 相似文献
30.
Giovanni Dosi Marco Grazzi Luigi Marengo Simona Settepanella 《The Journal of industrial economics》2016,64(4):875-907
The paper presents a new framework to assess firm level heterogeneity and to study the rate and direction of technical change. Building on the analysis of revealed short‐run production functions by Hildenbrand ( 1981 ), we propose the (normalized) volume of the zonotope composed by vectors‐firms as indicator of inter‐firm heterogeneity. Moreover, the angles that the zonotope's main diagonal form with the axes provide a measure of the rates and directions of productivity change. The proposed framework also accounts for n‐inputs and m‐outputs and, crucially, the measures of heterogeneity and technical change do not require many of the standard assumptions from production theory. 相似文献