Product Standards and the Economics of Time

It is increasingly common for policy makers to evaluate product standards in cost-benefit terms. However, such evaluations focus on the product itself rather than the product in use. The possible impact of the standard on consumers’ use of time is therefore overlooked. As a result, cost-benefit relationships could be systematically misrepresented.     

Validating the international tourist role scale

This study was designed to validate the international tourist role scale and the three dimensions it revealed. The purpose of this attitudinal scale was to measure the tourist role typology. United States adult outbound tourists flying with 11 major airlines returned useful questionnaires. This study validated the role scale as a reliable one that properly identified three conceptual dimensions of international tourist typology and successfully provided measures of tourists’ novelty-seeking preferences on the three dimensions. The study demonstrated, however, that the scale would measure the novelty-seeking preferences of international tourists more effectively if it were supplemented by other measures.     

Preventives Versus Treatments Redux: Tighter Bounds on Distortions in Innovation Incentives with an Application to the Global Demand for HIV Pharmaceuticals

Kremer and Snyder (Q J Econ 130:1167–1239, 2015) show that demand curves for a preventive and treatment may have different shapes though they target the same disease, biasing the pharmaceutical manufacturer toward developing the lucrative rather than the socially desirable product. This paper tightens the theoretical bounds on the potential deadweight loss from such biases. Using a calibration of the global demand for HIV pharmaceuticals, we demonstrate the dramatically sharper analysis achievable with the new bounds, allowing us to pinpoint potential deadweight loss at 62% of the global gain from curing HIV. We use the calibration to perform policy counterfactuals, assessing welfare effects of government policies such as a subsidy, reference pricing, and price-discrimination ban. The fit of our calibration is good: we find that a hypothetical drug monopolist would price an HIV drug so high that only 4% of the infected population worldwide would purchase, matching actual drug prices and quantities in the early 2000s before subsidies in low-income countries ramped up.