Do Expected Shifts in Inflation Affect Estimates of the Long-Run Fisher Relation?

Recent empirical studies suggest that nominal interest rates and expected inflation do not move together one-for-one in the long run, a finding at odds with many theoretical models. This article shows that these results can be deceptive when the process followed by inflation shifts infrequently. We characterize the shifts in inflation by a Markov switching model. Based upon this model's forecasts, we reexamine the long-run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation. Interestingly, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that in the long run nominal interest rates reflect expected inflation one-for-one.     

The Under-Exploitation of Natural Resources: A Model with Overlapping Generations*

It is well known that competitive markets may fail to generate an optimal rate of extraction of a natural resource-stock. The barrier to optimality may be uncertainty about tenure, commonality of property rights in the resource, or uncertainty about the extent of the resource. In all these cases, suboptimality takes the form of over-extraction. We draw attention to an additional source of suboptimality. In an economy with overlapping generations, the resource-stock plays the double role of repository of savings and source of productive inputs. The decline in the supply of the resource-stock may eventually force its price so high that it ceases to perform its second function. Extraction comes to an end even though the resource has a positive marginal productivity in producing consumption goods. This is inefficient, hence suboptimal. This time, however, suboptimality takes the form of under-extraction.     

Value Cores for Finite Agents*

The standard definition of the competitive equilibrium, at given prices, presents the difficulty that finite agents (i.e. agents with finite budget and production sets), and a fortiori coalitions of such agents, need not be price takers and will upset the equilibrium. Since 1963 an extensive literature has sprung up, which has dealt with the problem, essentially by considering infinite numbers of infinitesimal agents. The present article outlines two alternative approaches to deal with this problem, both of which, realistically, admit (a finite number of) finite agents and redefine the core in terms of the value structure of the economy, viz. prices in the presence of controls, and cost and revenue functions in their absence. It is shown that the notion of value core, here introduced, coincides with that of competitive equilibrium, which is formulated as a characteristic-function game.     

Labour migration and economic performance: London and the Randstad,c. 1600–18001

In most studies of early modern north‐western Europe, England is regarded as the successor of the Netherlands in terms of economic leadership. Whereas related topics like institutional and technological change or changes in trade and capital flows have been incorporated into the research on the comparison of these two rival states, labour migration is usually omitted. This article aims to fill this lacuna by focusing on labour migration to the two core regions of the Netherlands and England: the Randstad and London. Two main research questions are raised in this article. First of all, in what way did the two cores and their hinterlands differ with regard to their demographic, economic, and spatial structures, and how did this contribute to different trends in labour migration over time? Secondly, what was the effect of the configuration of the demand and supply factors of London and the Randstad for their economies and for those who lived in them? By trying to answer these two questions this article aims not only to shed light on a hitherto largely unexplored topic in the comparative geographic, economic, and demographic history of the two countries, but also to contribute to the understanding of migration as a factor in the promotion of economic growth.     

Disciplining the ‘black sheep of the Balkans’: financial supervision and sovereignty in Bulgaria, 1902–38

Using the example of Bulgaria, we argue that familiar models of international political economy fail to capture the tension between national sovereignty and access to capital markets experienced by peripheral debtors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Existing accounts exaggerate the significance of the gold standard as a good housekeeping seal of approval and underestimate the role of direct financial controls. Furthermore, they underestimate the linkage in zones of inter‐imperial rivalry, such as the Balkans, between foreign borrowing and strategic alignment. We show how Bulgaria found its politics destabilized prior to 1914 by the demands of its creditors. After defeat in the First World War, Bulgaria was forced to submit to an even tighter system of creditor control. Though it obtained substantial debt relief during the 1930s, these concessions were gained not through an assertion of national sovereignty and default, but at the price of even closer supervision. This in turn casts new light on the conventional view of Bulgaria as a victim of Nazi ‘informal imperialism’. In light of Bulgaria's previous experience, the more striking feature of its trade relations with Hitler's Germany is that they were conducted on a basis of sovereign equality.