Central bank haircut policy

We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral. Setting a haircut therefore involves balancing the trade-off between relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents on one hand, and increasing potential inflation risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents on the other. We argue that the optimal haircut is higher when the central bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity. Finally, for a temporary surprise drop in the haircut, the central bank can be more aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut.     

Dynamic Financial System: Complexity,Fragility and Regulatory Principles

A financial system improves the allocation of real resources and enhances the performance of the production economy, but these benefits are offset in part by the risk of financial distress and the associated deadweight loss resulting from bankruptcy costs. We argue that “tiers” of financial claims increase complexity and fragility of the financial network. In equilibrium, the financial system grows relative to the real economy as the allocation of funds and risks becomes more sophisticated and as more financial claims are tiered. Growth is limited by the risk of a tiered, complex financial network and by the need to set aside additional capital as the financial sector grows. We discuss several sources of fragility in the financial system. We propose that regulators should limit the breaks in the system and do more to improve the resiliency of the network and less on individual issues that are only symptoms of fundamental problems of a network. We advocate a market based system of regulation in which market participants regulate each other, to a degree. In order for this to be feasible, the financial network must be organized according to three principles: trading transparency, competitive markets and competitive regulators, and incentive alignment of participants. Insofar as these regulatory approaches are successful in limiting network fragility, capital requirements can be reduced. Regulators should keep in mind this tradeoff between capital and regulation. With regard to regulatory policy, regulators should let the three principles be their guide in adapting to the evolving financial system rather than implementing narrowly conceived regulations that are quickly outmoded.     

Competent jerks, lovable fools, and the formation of social networks

When looking for help with a task at work, people turn to those best able to do the job. Right? Wrong. New research shows that work partners tend to be chosen not for ability but for likability. Drawing from their study encompassing 10,000 work relationships in five organizations, the authors have classified work partners into four archetypes: the competent jerk, who knows a lot but is unpleasant; the lovable fool, who doesn't know much but is a delight; the lovable star, who's both smart and likable; and the incompetent jerk, who.. .well, that's self-explanatory. Of course, everybody wants to work with the lovable star, and nobody wants to work with the incompetent jerk. More interesting is that people prefer the lovable fool over the competent jerk. That has big implications for every organization, as both of these types often represent missed opportunities. Because they are liked by a disproportionate number of people, lovable fools can bridge gaps between diverse groups that might not otherwise interact. But their networking skills are often developed at the expense of job performance, which can make these employees underappreciated and vulnerable to downsizing. To get the most out of them, managers need to protect them and put them in positions that don't waste their bridge-building talents. As for the competent jerks, too often their expertise goes untapped by people who just can't put up with them. But many can be socialized through coaching or by being made accountable for bad behavior. Others may need to display their competence in more isolated settings. Intriguingly, managers aren't limited to leveraging people that others like and changing those that others loathe. They also can create situations in which people are more apt to like one another, whatever their individual qualities.     

A Sufficient Condition for Generalized Lorenz Order

In this paper, a sufficient condition for non-negative random variables to be ordered in the Generalized Lorenz sense is presented. This condition does not involve inverse distribution functions. Applications of this result to several income distribution models are given. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D36, D69.     

The contribution of minimum wage valorization policy to the decline in household income inequality in Brazil: A decomposition approach

There is a vast literature that estimates the effect of the minimum wage on wage inequality in various countries. However, as the minimum wage directly affects nonlabor income of families in some countries (in the Brazilian case via the benefits of the pension system and of certain social programs), this article extends the empirical analysis by studying the effects of the minimum wage on the level of inequality of household income as a whole. To accomplish that we employ a decomposition method that gauges the contribution of the increases in the minimum wage that occurred in recent decades in Brazil through the labor and nonlabor sources of household income. The results show that the minimum wage had a contribution of 64 percent to the observed fall in income inequality between 1995 and 2014 and that pensions were the most relevant channel over this period.     

Organizational Culture, Individual Differences and the Participation System in Cooperativism of Associated Workers in Andalusia, Spain

From a psychosocial perspective, we have attempted to identify the characteristics of the democratic systems of a sample of 36 Andalusian cooperatives of associated workers. In this study it has become evident that those who participate the least in the governments of their organizations are the workers and those with less education. Thus, there is a high degree of association between participation in the governing of the cooperative and the development within it of an appropriate organizational culture. The results of this study have allowed us to empirically deconstruct the concept of cooperative democracy, and this process may have an effect on the improvement of human resource administration in this type of organization.