Equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model

We examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model. In contrast to Salop [Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156.], the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint.     

Threshold behavior and aggregate fluctuation

This paper concerns a propagation mechanism in an economy where many individuals follow a threshold rule and interact with a positive feedback. We derive an asymptotic distribution of the propagation size when the number of the agents tends to infinity. The propagation distribution exhibits a slower convergence to a deterministic value than it would if the agents followed a smooth adjustment policy. This gives rise to significant aggregate fluctuations in a finite lumpy-adjusting economy even when the agents are hit by small independent shocks.     

Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the extent to which the capital endowment of the medium‐sized country is similar to that of the large or small country. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country is to the average one, the less likely the tax harmonization including the median country is to prevail and the more likely the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country is to prevail. We also show that partial tax harmonization makes the member countries of the tax union better off and non‐member countries worse off, which stands in sharpe contrast with previous studies, such as Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) and Bucovetsky (2009).     

Middle Men: The Visible Market‐Makers

This paper presents a framework in which middlemen emerge to intermediate between ex‐ante homogeneous buyers and sellers in the presence of search frictions. Middlemen announce prices, and hold an inventory to provide more sure services. Middlemen can mitigate trade imbalances with price competition. Using this framework I illustrate how the frictionless limit can emerge and how middlemen can implement the short‐side principle for the market price to be Walrasian. The recent progress in the literature on intermediation will also be discussed.     

作为自省之学的中国人类学——费孝通与柳田国男的学问及方法

费孝通和柳田国男分别开拓了各自对本土社会的独特研究。费孝通以“乡土”为对象,以“同情”来自省的学问,宗旨是通过对本土社会的理解来提出切实可行的对策与举措。柳田国男的“乡土研究”乃是由乡土的人们在乡土、地方或农村搜集资料,以比较之法认识乡土,最终的目的则是认识整个日本社会。从这个意义上讲,乡土研究是“自我反思”的学问,这也正是费孝通与柳田国男学术思想的共同之处。两位先生都是以解决问题为目标,采取了跨学科的知识生产方式,可以说这正好体现了近代亚洲知识分子的学问特点以及他们对于社会的责任感。     

Estimates of optimal public capital stocks in Japan using a public investment discount rate framework

The purpose of this paper is to empirically assess the optimality of the level of public capital in Japan. We use a methodological approach based on Burgess's (1988) procedure for calculating the public discount rate. This approach involves estimating a production function, but does not necessarily require utility function estimation. The results indicate that, although the Japanese economy experienced a public capital deficiency over the period 1960–1982, public capital moved toward optimal levels throughout the period. First version received: March 1997/final version received: June 1998     

Economic Regulation in the Consumer Loans Market

Atlantic Economic Journal - This paper models a consumer loan market with a vertical structure where an upstream monopolist supplies funds to downstream nonbanks. The nonbanks supply funds to...     

Trade imbalances and harmonization of competition policies

The present study constructs a game in which the two countries strategically set competition policies in their respective non-tradable service sectors. These policies affect the countries’ utilities through the presence of trade imbalances. We demonstrate that in the presence of persisting trade imbalances, in a Nash equilibrium, the trade-deficit country maintains perfect competition while the trade-surplus country restricts competition. This shows it highly difficult to harmonize their policies to achieve the first best state under the current international trade regime, which is centered around the principle of reciprocity.     

HISTORY‐DEPENDENT PATHS AND TRADE GAINS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY WITH A PUBLIC INTERMEDIATE GOOD*

This study reexamines McMillan's (International Economic Review 19 (1978), 665–78) analysis of a dynamic small open economy with a public intermediate good. Concerning the trade patterns of the open economy, we find results that were overlooked in McMillan's analysis. Among others, if labor endowment is of intermediate size, there are two saddle‐point steady states, and the initial stock of the public good determines the long‐run trade pattern. We also add a gains‐from‐trade analysis to McMillan's model and demonstrate that if the economy has a comparative advantage in a good with productivity less sensitive to the public intermediate good, the economy may lose from trade at the steady state.