Energy‐Related Environmental Policy and Its Impacts on Energy Use in Asia

Economic growth in Asia has increased in the past three decades and has heightened energy demand, resulting in rising greenhouse gas emissions and severe air pollution. To tackle these issues, fuel switching and the deployment of renewables are essential. In the present paper, we discuss the environmental regulations, mainly carbon pricing, implemented in Asia and discuss their achievements. Empirical studies using microdata have shown that carbon pricing in Asia can reduce carbon emissions by promoting energy efficiency. At the macro level, we observe some evidence of fuel switching from coal to natural gas among major emitters. However, more carbon pricing is necessary in Asia if we aim for the decarbonization of the economy.     

Economic Regulation in the Consumer Loans Market

Atlantic Economic Journal - This paper models a consumer loan market with a vertical structure where an upstream monopolist supplies funds to downstream nonbanks. The nonbanks supply funds to...     

Instructional skills for on‐the‐job training and experiential learning: an empirical study of Japanese firms

Despite the effectiveness of on‐the‐job training (OJT), few systematic empirical studies have been conducted on how OJT trainers instruct trainees in firms. The primary goal of this study was to investigate the characteristics of the trainer's instructional skills for OJT using survey data collected from 715 employees covering 22 firms. Results indicate that excellent OJT trainers use four types of instructional skills: (1) stretching trainee objectives, (2) monitoring their progress, (3) providing positive feedback, and (4) promoting reflection on results. The findings suggest that excellent OJT trainers facilitate trainees' experiential learning by promoting deliberate practice and reflective practice. Theoretical and managerial implications are also discussed.     

Collateral fluctuations in a monetary economy

This paper studies economy-wide fluctuations that occur endogenously in the presence of monetary and real assets. Using a standard monetary search model, we consider an economy in which agents can increase consumption, over and above what their liquid monetary asset holdings would allow, pledging real assets as collateral for monetary loans. It is shown that, if the liquidation value of real assets is below full market value, a stable cyclical equilibrium can emerge in consumption and capital around the unstable steady state. We also provide conditions for the existence of cycles of higher order, chaos and sunspot equilibria.     

On the Uniqueness of the Welfare–maximizing Number of Firms Under Cournot Oligopoly

Under Cournot oligopoly with a homogeneous product, we present a sufficient condition that guarantees the uniqueness of the welfare–maximizing number of firms to attain the global maximum level of welfare by implementation of a piecemeal policy changing the number of firms gradually. We adopt Selten's (1973) 'fitting–in function' method, which relates an individual firm's output to an industry's output. When the number of firms is unique, then introducing a lump–sum profit tax (subsidy) can attain the optimal level of welfare. Indirect entry regulation is superior to direct entry regulation from the standpoint of welfare if each entrant engages in rent–seeking activities.     

Credit spreads on corporate bonds and the macroeconomy in Japan

Using secondary market data on corporate bonds issued in Japan between 1997 and 2005, this paper explores the determinants of the credit spread of corporate bond rates over interest swap rates. We find that the credit spreads properly reflect financial factors at the firm level, including debt-to-equity ratios, volatility, and maturity, particularly for longer-term bonds. In addition, an economy-wide factor common among bond issues unable to be captured by firm-level factors, plays an important role in determining credit spreads, and these economy-wide effects to a great extent cancel out firm-level factors for some subsample periods. We also identify possible factors responsible for the significant economy-wide effects.     

COLLUSION,FLUCTUATING DEMAND,AND PRICE RIGIDITY*

We study an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which an i.i.d. demand shock occurs in each period. Each firm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the beginning of each period. At the end of each period, all information but the private signals becomes public. We consider the optimal symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SPPE) mainly for patient firms. We show that price rigidity arises in the optimal SPPE if the accuracy of the private signals is low. We also study the implications of more firms and firms' impatience on collusive pricing.     

Network externalities, discrete demand shifts, and submarginal‐cost pricing

Abstract.  The introduction of a new product often causes a massive (discrete) demand shift to the new product. This study demonstrates that if a large‐scale demand shift to a new product is accompanied by network externalities, it may result in 'submarginal‐cost pricing,' by which the seller sets its price below the marginal cost. This finding casts new light on dumping and safeguard issues in the real world. JEL classification: D42