Instructional skills for on‐the‐job training and experiential learning: an empirical study of Japanese firms

Despite the effectiveness of on‐the‐job training (OJT), few systematic empirical studies have been conducted on how OJT trainers instruct trainees in firms. The primary goal of this study was to investigate the characteristics of the trainer's instructional skills for OJT using survey data collected from 715 employees covering 22 firms. Results indicate that excellent OJT trainers use four types of instructional skills: (1) stretching trainee objectives, (2) monitoring their progress, (3) providing positive feedback, and (4) promoting reflection on results. The findings suggest that excellent OJT trainers facilitate trainees' experiential learning by promoting deliberate practice and reflective practice. Theoretical and managerial implications are also discussed.     

Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the extent to which the capital endowment of the medium‐sized country is similar to that of the large or small country. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country is to the average one, the less likely the tax harmonization including the median country is to prevail and the more likely the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country is to prevail. We also show that partial tax harmonization makes the member countries of the tax union better off and non‐member countries worse off, which stands in sharpe contrast with previous studies, such as Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) and Bucovetsky (2009).     

On the Uniqueness of the Welfare–maximizing Number of Firms Under Cournot Oligopoly

Under Cournot oligopoly with a homogeneous product, we present a sufficient condition that guarantees the uniqueness of the welfare–maximizing number of firms to attain the global maximum level of welfare by implementation of a piecemeal policy changing the number of firms gradually. We adopt Selten's (1973) 'fitting–in function' method, which relates an individual firm's output to an industry's output. When the number of firms is unique, then introducing a lump–sum profit tax (subsidy) can attain the optimal level of welfare. Indirect entry regulation is superior to direct entry regulation from the standpoint of welfare if each entrant engages in rent–seeking activities.     

Credit spreads on corporate bonds and the macroeconomy in Japan

Using secondary market data on corporate bonds issued in Japan between 1997 and 2005, this paper explores the determinants of the credit spread of corporate bond rates over interest swap rates. We find that the credit spreads properly reflect financial factors at the firm level, including debt-to-equity ratios, volatility, and maturity, particularly for longer-term bonds. In addition, an economy-wide factor common among bond issues unable to be captured by firm-level factors, plays an important role in determining credit spreads, and these economy-wide effects to a great extent cancel out firm-level factors for some subsample periods. We also identify possible factors responsible for the significant economy-wide effects.     

COLLUSION,FLUCTUATING DEMAND,AND PRICE RIGIDITY*

We study an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which an i.i.d. demand shock occurs in each period. Each firm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the beginning of each period. At the end of each period, all information but the private signals becomes public. We consider the optimal symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SPPE) mainly for patient firms. We show that price rigidity arises in the optimal SPPE if the accuracy of the private signals is low. We also study the implications of more firms and firms' impatience on collusive pricing.     

Network externalities, discrete demand shifts, and submarginal‐cost pricing

Abstract.  The introduction of a new product often causes a massive (discrete) demand shift to the new product. This study demonstrates that if a large‐scale demand shift to a new product is accompanied by network externalities, it may result in 'submarginal‐cost pricing,' by which the seller sets its price below the marginal cost. This finding casts new light on dumping and safeguard issues in the real world. JEL classification: D42     

Urban Pollution,Unemployment and National Welfare in a Dualistic Economy

This paper undertakes a comparative static analysis in the Harris–Todaro (H–T) model by accommodating local pollution. Unlike in the classical H–T model where migration proceeds in response to urban–rural differences in expected earnings, we consider labor movement taking place according to the difference in utility, which is influenced by the quality of the local environment. The paradoxical result is that an improvement in pollution‐abatement technology gives rise to an increase in urban unemployment and has no effect on the workers' aggregate welfare.     

A TWO FACTOR MODEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS

This paper analyzes empirical income distributions and proposes a simple stochastic model to explain the stationary distribution and deviations from it. Using the individual tax returns data in the U.S. and Japan for 40 years, we first summarize the shape of the income distribution by an exponential decay up to about the 90th percentile and a power decay for the top 1 percent. We then propose a minimal stochastic process of labor and asset income to reproduce the empirical characteristics. In particular, the Pareto exponent is derived analytically and matched with empirical statistics.     

Location choice,competition, and welfare in non-tradable service FDI

We investigate whether non-tradable service FDI is efficient from a welfare point of view. A fixed number of firms strategically decide which markets to locate in and then compete in quasi-Cournot fashion. Considering firm location in two symmetric markets, non-tradable service FDI may or may not be efficient for the source country, depending on the total number of firms, competition in markets and the curvature of the demand function. In contrast, non-tradable service FDI is always efficient for the host country and the overall economy. This implies that any policy that affects firm location between two symmetric markets will not be beneficial from a welfare viewpoint.