Middle Men: The Visible Market‐Makers

This paper presents a framework in which middlemen emerge to intermediate between ex‐ante homogeneous buyers and sellers in the presence of search frictions. Middlemen announce prices, and hold an inventory to provide more sure services. Middlemen can mitigate trade imbalances with price competition. Using this framework I illustrate how the frictionless limit can emerge and how middlemen can implement the short‐side principle for the market price to be Walrasian. The recent progress in the literature on intermediation will also be discussed.     

作为自省之学的中国人类学——费孝通与柳田国男的学问及方法

费孝通和柳田国男分别开拓了各自对本土社会的独特研究。费孝通以“乡土”为对象,以“同情”来自省的学问,宗旨是通过对本土社会的理解来提出切实可行的对策与举措。柳田国男的“乡土研究”乃是由乡土的人们在乡土、地方或农村搜集资料,以比较之法认识乡土,最终的目的则是认识整个日本社会。从这个意义上讲,乡土研究是“自我反思”的学问,这也正是费孝通与柳田国男学术思想的共同之处。两位先生都是以解决问题为目标,采取了跨学科的知识生产方式,可以说这正好体现了近代亚洲知识分子的学问特点以及他们对于社会的责任感。     

Estimates of optimal public capital stocks in Japan using a public investment discount rate framework

The purpose of this paper is to empirically assess the optimality of the level of public capital in Japan. We use a methodological approach based on Burgess's (1988) procedure for calculating the public discount rate. This approach involves estimating a production function, but does not necessarily require utility function estimation. The results indicate that, although the Japanese economy experienced a public capital deficiency over the period 1960–1982, public capital moved toward optimal levels throughout the period. First version received: March 1997/final version received: June 1998     

Is a Big Entrant a Threat to Incumbents? The Role of Demand Substitutability in Competition Among the Big and the Small

We establish a model of market competition between large and small firms and investigate the way in which demand substitutability affects how the entry of big firms impacts incumbents. We focus on the relative strength of two opposing effects of entry on large incumbent firms’ demand: the direct substitution effect among large firms (negative) and the indirect feedback effect through the change in small firms’ aggregated behavior (positive). If the substitutability between large and small firms is sufficiently high, the indirect effect dominates the direct effect and large incumbents’ equilibrium prices and profits increase. We show that welfare effects are ambiguous, which calls for careful assessment when regulating large firms’ entry.     

Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

This study examines a timing game in a mixed duopoly wherein public and private firms compete by taking account of the increasing marginal cost of both firms, as well as partial foreign ownership of the private firm. This study finds that if the private firm has a strong cost advantage over the public firm, public leadership is a risk dominant equilibrium irrespective of foreign ownership ratio. This result means that the cost difference between the public and private firms matters in selecting the risk-dominant equilibrium of the timing game. Additionally, if the private firm has only a weak cost advantage over the public firm, then private leadership (public leadership) is the risk dominant equilibrium if the foreign ownership ratio is (not) small.     

Public infrastructure and trade in a dynamic two‐country model

We develop a two‐country dynamic trade model with public infrastructure having an “unpaid‐factor”‐type positive externality on private sectors’ productivity. With welfare‐maximizing national governments making infrastructure investment, we show that a country with a smaller labor endowment, a lower depreciation rate of infrastructure, and/or a lower time preference rate will become an exporter of a good that is more dependent on infrastructure and will gain from trade, whereas its trading partner may lose from trade. We consider both the nonstrategic governments case and the case of strategic governments that recognize the effect on the terms of trade.     

International migration,foreign direct investment,and development stage in developing economies

The existing empirical results on the relationship between FDI and migration are rather mixed. This study reevaluates, both theoretically and empirically, how inward FDI relates to emigration in developing countries. Our model illustrates that the relationship between inward FDI and emigration flows depends on the development stage of a developing country, that is, there is a positive association between inward FDI and emigration flows for relatively less‐developed countries but a negative association between these two variables for relatively developed countries. We confirm the empirical validity of our model prediction using the panel data of 21 OECD and 51 non‐OECD countries during the period from 2003 to 2012. Our results argue that as economic development proceeds in a developing country, the home effect of inward FDI associated with intensified labor demand would dominate the linkage effect that induces the brain drain problem through enhancing the socioeconomic ties with migrant networks.     

Transitional dynamics of the R&D growth model with public education

This study analyzes the transition dynamics of the R&D-based growth model with public education, based on [Prettner, K. (2014). The non-monotonous impact of population growth on economic prosperity. Economics Letters, 124, 93–95]. We show that the equilibrium path can be monotonous or oscillatory, but may not converge depending on the value of parameters. Thus, we determine and indicate the sufficient condition for long-run oscillation to emerge. In addition, we find that the technological progress rate speeds up during the long-run balanced growth path when income tax rates for public education rise. This result is consistent with empirical analysis.     

Trade imbalances and harmonization of competition policies

The present study constructs a game in which the two countries strategically set competition policies in their respective non-tradable service sectors. These policies affect the countries’ utilities through the presence of trade imbalances. We demonstrate that in the presence of persisting trade imbalances, in a Nash equilibrium, the trade-deficit country maintains perfect competition while the trade-surplus country restricts competition. This shows it highly difficult to harmonize their policies to achieve the first best state under the current international trade regime, which is centered around the principle of reciprocity.     

HISTORY‐DEPENDENT PATHS AND TRADE GAINS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY WITH A PUBLIC INTERMEDIATE GOOD*

This study reexamines McMillan's (International Economic Review 19 (1978), 665–78) analysis of a dynamic small open economy with a public intermediate good. Concerning the trade patterns of the open economy, we find results that were overlooked in McMillan's analysis. Among others, if labor endowment is of intermediate size, there are two saddle‐point steady states, and the initial stock of the public good determines the long‐run trade pattern. We also add a gains‐from‐trade analysis to McMillan's model and demonstrate that if the economy has a comparative advantage in a good with productivity less sensitive to the public intermediate good, the economy may lose from trade at the steady state.