On the shape of the single-country and world commodity-substitution and factor-substitution surfaces under conditions of joint production

In recent years trade theorists have completed the task of specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for the single-country and world transformation surfaces to be locally of any assigned degree of flatness. However those conditions are relevant only if the technology is of the no-joint-products type. In the present note we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the single-country and world transformation surfaces to be of any assigned degree of flatness under conditions of joint production; and we also obtain, as a by-product, necessary and sufficient conditions for the single-country and world equal-product surfaces to be of any assigned degree of flatness.     

An Hedonic Analysis of the Rental Office Market in the Tokyo Central Business District: 1985–1994 Fiscal Years

We study the rental office market in the Tokyo central business district by estimating hedonic equations for the office rent for 1985–94 fiscal years. This period includes the "Bubble" of asset prices, followed by its deflation. We find that the characteristics related to transportational conveniences are less effective in explaining office rents than the characteristics related to the agglomeration of offices and the amenity characteristics of the office buildings themselves. Using a skewed error-term specification, we show that the discount in rental transactions is not irrelevant. The hedonic office rent indices and possible policy implications are also presented.
JEL Classification Numbers: L85, R32.     

Revealed Specialization: Evidence on U.S. International Services

This article is an investigation of the comparative advantage structure of United States international trade in services. It appears that the United States has a strong comparative advantage in knowledge-based services. For this study, the author adopts the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index to analyze the comparative advantage structure, and demonstrates that variance in the RCA deviations indicates a similarity in the export structure between the United States and the world. This study also focuses on the role of multinational companies, linking microeconomic entities and the macroeconomic surroundings.     

Market Size and Firm Location in a Service Industry

This paper investigates the welfare effects of firm location in a service industry. We consider the situation where firms determine their locations in either of two regions with a difference in market size. From the viewpoint of the consumers' welfare, there are too few firms in the large market and too many in the small market. However, from the viewpoint of the producers' and social welfare, the opposite is true. Further, an increase in the difference in market size is unambiguously unfavorable for the producers. On the other hand, such an increase is favorable for the consumers and the economy as a whole.     

Rates and Biases of Technical Progress and Returns to Scale in the Multi-output, Multi-input Production: Primal Versus Dual, Output-augmenting Versus Input-saving and Long-run Versus Short-Run

I examine the relationships among various dual concepts of output-augmenting and input-saving rates of technical progress as well as various dual concepts of returns-to-scale measures in the long run and short run. Output-augmenting rates of technical progress are all equal, and so are input-saving ones. Returns to scale plays an important role in the relationship between output-augmenting and input-saving rates of technical progress. Capacity utilization plays an important role in the relationship between the long run and short run. The bias of technical progress is also briefly referred to.
L Classification Numbers: D24, O030, O047.     

Endogenous Timing in a Strategic Trade Policy Game: A Two-Country Oligopoly Model with Multiple Firms

This paper examines strategic trade policy games where the number of firms in the importing and exporting countries differs and all firms play as Cournot oligopolies. Under the assumption of linear demand and constant marginal cost, we show that, if the number of firms in the exporting country exceeds that in the importing country by more than three, the government of the exporting country chooses to move as a leader, imposing an export tax on firms. The government of the importing country then becomes a follower and imposes an import tariff. This lies contrary to the previous study, which assumed that there is only one firm in each country.     

Modeling Methods for Discrete Choice Analysis

This paper introduces new forms, sampling and estimation approaches fordiscrete choice models. The new models include behavioral specifications oflatent class choice models, multinomial probit, hybrid logit, andnon-parametric methods. Recent contributions also include new specializedchoice based sample designs that permit greater efficiency in datacollection. Finally, the paper describes recent developments in the use ofsimulation methods for model estimation. These developments are designed toallow the applications of discrete choice models to a wider variety ofdiscrete choice problems.     

Factors in the Development of Trade Credit: Case Study of Provinces in China

Using Chinese province-level panel data for 2001-9, we investigate significant factors for the development of financial intermediation via trade credit in developing economies. First, we confirm that a competitive market environment, a well-functioning legal system, and greater bank loans for non-state-sector firms promote the development of trade credit in China. Conversely, corruption hinders its development. Second, we find that proper functioning of the legal system and bank lending to non-state-sector firms are highly likely to be the causes of the complex relationships between these determinants. Finally, we observe that an increase in the number of lawyers effectively improves the quality and function of the legal system, which, in turn, alleviates the harmful influence of corruption on trade credit development.