Promising politicians,rational voters,and election outcomes

Overwhelming anecdotal evidence suggests that politicians often promise more during an election campaign than they are willing or able to deliver once elected. In this paper, we present two signaling models to explain this phenomenon. In the first model, two candidates maximize their share of the vote. In the second model both try to convince the median voter. In each model, candidates rationally distort their true policy position. Voters, however, are not fooled. Upon observing election promises, they can rationally infer the true position of each candidate. Hence, the election outcome is not affected.JEL Classification: D72, D82The author thanks Peter Kooreman, Wilko Letterie, Bert Schoonbeek, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. Financial support from The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged.     

A model of rational bias in self-assessments

Summary. A body of empirical work documents that most people believe they are above average in a variety of skills and abilities. This paper argues that such evidence does not necessarily imply that people process information in an irrational way. I build a model in which people can learn about their abilities at a cost of foregone production. Individuals in this model keep testing their abilities until their self-assessments become favorable enough, at which point they stop. This way, a disproportionately large share of the population ends up with a high opinion about their abilities.Received: 22 August 2001, Revised: 20 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D81, D83, J22, J29.I would like to thank an anonymous referee, Herbert Dawid, Tom Gilligan, Eric Van den Steen, Ruqu Wang, and especially Patrick Francois for helpful comments and suggestions. I have also benefited from comments of seminar participants at Queen's University and from conversations with Frank Milne and Ivo Welch.     

An empirical note about additive outliers and nonstationarity in Latin-American inflation series

This note shows the empirical dangers of the presence of large additive outliers when testing for unit roots using standard unit root statistics. Using recent proposed procedures applied to four Latin-American inflation series, I show that the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected.Jel classification: C2, C3, C5I want to thank Pierre Perron for useful comments on a preliminary version of this paper. Helpful comments from an anonymous referee, and Yiagadeesen Samy are appreciated. I thank the Editor Baldev Raj for useful comments about the final structure of this paper. Finally, I also thank André Lucas for helpful suggestions concerning the use of his nice computer program Robust Inference Plus Estimation (RIPE).First revision received: August 2001/Final revision received: December 2002     

COOPERATIVE ESSENCE AND ENTREPRENEURIAL QUALITY: A COMPARATIVE CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

This article links two different fields of research, entrepreneurship and cooperatives, and studies whether, depending on the context, differences in terms of the fulfilment of the cooperative philosophy (cooperative essence) and entrepreneurial quality exist. To this aim, a statistical analysis is carried out using data from two Spanish regions: Andalusia and the Basque Country. The results enable us to conclude, firstly, that cooperative essence differs in relation to regional context, but not in relation to entrepreneurial quality. Secondly, cooperative essence and entrepreneurial quality are positively related, suggesting that cooperative essence may be part of the entrepreneurial quality of these kinds of firms.     

Volatility transmission between stock and foreign exchange markets: a connectedness analysis

ABSTRACT

This paper empirically investigates volatility transmission among stock and foreign exchange markets in seven major world economies during the period July 1988 to May 2018. To this end, we first perform a static and dynamic analysis to measure the total volatility connectedness in the entire period (the system-wide approach). Second, we make use of a dynamic analysis to evaluate the net directional connectedness for each market. To gain further insights, we examine the time-varying behaviour of net pair-wise directional connectedness during the financial turmoil periods experienced in the sample period Our results suggest that slightly more than half of the total variance of the forecast errors is explained by shocks across markets rather than by idiosyncratic shocks. Furthermore, we find that volatility connectedness varies over time, with a surge during periods of increasing economic and financial instability.     

Estimating GARCH volatility in the presence of outliers

GARCH volatilities depend on the unconditional variance, which is a non-linear function of the parameters. Consequently, they can have larger biases than estimated parameters. Using robust methods to estimate both parameters and volatilities is shown to outperform Maximum Likelihood procedures.     

Partial cross-ownership and strategic environmental policy

This paper analyzes the effect of passive investment in rival firms on the setting of cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes. We consider two firms located in different countries, with each firm owning the same percentage of the stock of its rival. We show that bilateral partial cross-ownership affects the taxes set by the countries in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. When the stake that one firm has in its rival is great enough and environmental spillovers are low enough, cooperative taxes are lower than non-cooperative taxes. For the remaining values of parameters the opposite result is obtained.     

Income based price subsidies and parallel imports

We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI and both countries provide a subsidy to their poorer buyers as the subgame perfect equilibrium policies. However, when the Poor is able to PI a different equilibrium may arise. We show that the ability of the Poor to allow PI might increase welfare in this country even if it is never implemented. We also prove that as the Poor country gets richer, it will not be in their best interest to sign an agreement with the Rich to commit to not allowing PI.     

GROWING LIKE SPAIN: 1995–2007

Measured total factor productivity (TFP) fell in Spain during the boom years of 1995–2007. Using administrative data from the quasi-universe of firms, we show that there was an increase in misallocation, which was more severe in sectors where connections with public officials are more important for business success. We write and estimate a simple model of cronyism in which heterogeneous firms invest in political connections. Our quantitative exercise concludes that the institutional decline over this period costed 1.9% growth in TFP per year and a 0.8% annual increase in the resources spent by firms in establishing political connections.     

Digitalization of SMEs

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