Standardization Process of Systems Technologies: Creating a Balance between Competition and Cooperation

Many firms are experimenting with how to standardize new technologies. They may use proprietary technologies for their products and services, and let them compete in the market selection. Alternatively, they can cooperate to jointly set a standard and experiment with combinations of market process and cooperation. If firms let the market decide, they can compete with technologies and need not invest time and effort in hammering out a standard. If they do incur the costs of negotiated standardization, they may enable end users to realize the benefits of standards. A hybrid standardization process combines the advantages of both market selection and negotiated decision making. This paper presents a contingency framework to identify conditions that will affect the preferred standardization process for vendors who introduce new technologies. A major contingency that this paper points to is the systemic nature of technologies in information and communication technology industries. The more systemic the technology is (in a way to be clarified), the less likely that firms will establish a hybrid standardization process. One advantage of decomposing technology systems in smaller components (modules) is that this approach enables firms to combine market selection with negotiated selection of standards.     

Inequality‐averse well‐being measurement

We construct individual well‐being measures that respect individual preferences and depend on the bundles of goods consumed by the individual. Building on previous work in which general families of well‐being measures are identified, we introduce basic transfer principles that apply either to bundles or directly to indifference sets, and we characterize specific well‐being measures that involve either the ray utility or the money‐metric utility.     

Exploring governance of the new European Banking Authority—A case for harmonization?

In the context of the proposed EU financial supervisory reforms, this paper focuses on the governance of the network of national supervisory banking agencies and the newly established Community supervisor (European Banking Authority, EBA). We assess to what extent lack of governance convergence nationally and with EBA could undermine the incentives for cooperation among supervisors. Convergence should particularly focus on (i) the issue of the presence of politicians on decision-making bodies; (ii) the need for clearly defining dismissal procedures of heads of supervision; (iii) autonomy from government in regulatory matters; (iv) supervisory autonomy in matters of licensing and withdrawing licenses; (iv) mechanisms for judicial accountability; (v) legal protection for supervisors handling in good faith. In the absence of full centralization of prudential supervision, early harmonization of national governance arrangements towards best practice would better align supervisors’ incentive structures and, hence, be beneficial for the effectiveness of European supervision.     

Pareto optimal chains of reinsurance

Extending Arrow (1963), we show that coinsurance is the optimal insurance scheme if all companies belonging to a chain of reinsurance are risk averse. The extent to which Borch's (1960) theorem and corollary are still valid in this context is investigated.     

Trade Impact Analysis on the ASEAN-China Trade in Goods Agreement

BackgroundASEAN and China signed the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation which entered into force on 1 July 2003.     

Financial development,financial liberalization and social capital

The relationship between financial liberalization policies and financial development is controversial. The impact of these policies differs greatly across countries. In the literature, the quality of formal institutions has been identified as an important source of this heterogeneity, as countries with a weak institutional environment generally fail to benefit from financial liberalization. Using panel data covering 82 countries for the period 1973–2008, we find evidence that social capital may substitute for formal institutions as a prerequisite for effective financial liberalization policies. In particular, we find that during the post Washington-consensus period countries with a high prevailing level of social capital can ensure that financial liberalization positively influences financial development, despite the poor quality of their formal institutions.     

Cow-calf profitability and leptin genotyping

Profitability of cow-calf production is determined largely by market prices, calf weaning weights, and cow productive life. While producers individually have no effect on prices, weaning weights and productive life have genetic influences and hence can be altered by selection programs implemented by producers. We investigate the impact of a mutation in the leptin gene (exon 2; single nucleotide polymorphism [SNP] 305) on cow-calf profitability. Prior research shows that this mutation has effects on performance and traits of fed cattle and milk production in dairy cows. Using data from a teaching-research herd, we find that it is also associated with calf weaning weights and cow productive life. A bio-economic stochastic simulation demonstrates that the mutation has statistically positive impacts on profits, suggesting that producers can profitably make use of this information.     

Country asymmetry,trade agreements,and transfers

Using a standard 2 × 2 trade agreement model, I show that the welfare effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) depend on the asymmetry on supply and demand functions. When countries are sufficiently asymmetric with respect to the size or the demand functions, the small country tends to be better off, while the large country is worse off. Thus, the small country must compensate the large country for the FTA to be incentive‐compatible. However, in the presence of sufficient asymmetry in the supply functions, the small country is worse off, while the bigger is better off. In this case, the transfer must flow from the large to the small country. This last finding helps explain why some FTAs between rich and poor countries provide for adjustment transfers to the latter.