Supplier Development Responsibility and NPD Project Outcomes: The Roles of Monetary Quantification of Differences and Supporting‐Detail Gathering

Firms increasingly rely on suppliers to perform tasks in new product development (NPD). Research has only recently begun to focus on the processes to manage this supplier development responsibility, and has hardly investigated how firms collect and analyze information regarding the cost and performance of alternative supplier offerings. Our study addresses this gap, through a field survey among 144 paired samples of project leaders and cost analysts involved in the same NPD projects. On the basis of literature and qualitative research, we conceptualize a substantive model. We first use a substantive validity assessment to vet the measures for the proposed constructs. We then test the substantive model with structural equation modeling using a multiple‐sample analysis. The results strongly show that monetary quantification of differences and detail gathering play significant roles in successfully leveraging supplier development responsibility. The findings support the hypothesis that the extent of development responsibility that suppliers have leads the development team to a more focused monetary quantification of the differences in alternative supplier offerings. Monetary quantification of differences has a significant, positive effect on the extent of supporting‐detail gathering and on the development speed of the project, whereas supporting‐detail gathering has a significant, positive effect on the product advantage of the new product as well as development speed. These findings are robust across the two functional perspectives. Our study complements the literature on interfirm control and monitoring by demonstrating the effects of selective and focused output controls.     

A critical review of the “ladder of investment” approach

The “ladder of investment” is a regulatory approach proposed by Cave (2006), which has been widely embraced by national regulatory authorities in the European telecommunications sector. The approach entails providing entrants, successively, with different levels of access—the “rungs” of the investment ladder, while inducing them to climb the ladder by setting an access charge that increases over time or by withdrawing access obligations after some pre-determined date (i.e., by setting sunset clauses). Proponents of the ladder of investment approach claim that such regulatory measures would make service-based entry and facility-based entry complements—albeit they have been traditionally viewed as substitutes—in promoting competition. The regulators, thus, have shown a strong interest in this approach. The paper provides a critical review of the ladder of investment approach by setting out its two underlying assumptions and discussing their validity with references to the related industrial organization literature.     

How to learn new tasks: Shop floor performance effects of knowledge transfer and performance feedback

We investigate how learning and the task performance of individuals are affected by different forms of knowledge transfer. Whereas previous research has proven the positive performance impacts of knowledge transfer, self-observation and feedback mechanisms individually, we explore the cumulative effect of these factors on learning and performance. With the help of two laboratory experimental studies reproducing manufacturing tasks that are typical for industrial production, we show that explicit knowledge transfer is superior to other forms of knowledge transfer. Externally provided performance feedback in the form of cost information and non-financial performance indicators has no effect on the order of different forms of knowledge transfer. Moreover, external feedback does not even have an additional significant performance effect on learning new tasks irrespective of the type of knowledge transfer.     

DECISION THEORY UNDER AMBIGUITY

Abstract We review recent advances in the field of decision making under uncertainty or ambiguity. We start with a presentation of the general approach to a decision problem under uncertainty, as well as the ‘standard’ Bayesian treatment and issues with this treatment. We present more general approaches (Choquet expected utility, maximin expected utility, smooth ambiguity and so forth) that have been developed in the literature under the name of models of ambiguity sensitive preferences. We draw a distinction between fully subjective models and models incorporating explicitly some information. We review definitions and characterizations of ambiguity aversion in these models. We mention the challenges posed by some of the models presented. We end with a review of part of the experimental literature and applications of these models to economic settings.     

Long-term reactions to large stock price declines and increases in the European stock market: a note on market efficiency

This study tests for underreaction and overreaction in European large cap markets by examining the abnormal returns of those stocks in the EuroStoxx 50 Index following large price increases and decreases. We find that large price increases and declines tend to be followed by average market returns. Thus, our results support the efficient market theory, rather than any of the behaviour finance hypotheses. This insight is contrary to price patterns found in various national markets.     

‘Territorial deregulation’: local authorities at risk from technical networks

Technical networks (transport, telecommunications, energy etc.) possess paradoxical virtues. They produce ‘structuring effects’ on space, obtaining comparative advantages for the places they serve. But they are ubiquitous factors which also enable a homogenization of space. The myths of deterritorialization and dual space are refuted by empirical analyses of the interaction between networks and territories. Networks ‘format’ market areas and political territories. They create matrixes which until now were controlled by the public powers. Linked to current transformations – globalization, deregulation – the present mode of development of the technical macro‐systems brings about a telescoping of geographical scales which is having an adverse effect on the historic compromise between networks and territories. The boundaries of traditional political space have become obsolete and an economic rationale in the form of an extension of the technical networks predominates. In order to rediscover their policy‐making capacity, local authorities must pay more attention to controlling the occupation of public space as well as to the design and organization of the networks’ hubs. They should encourage the emergence of users as players in the regulation of public utilities so that debates on universal service and territorial equality may be activated. Les réseaux techniques (transport, télécommunication, énergie etc.) sont parés de vertus paradoxales. Ils produiraient des ‘effets structurants’ sur l’espace, procurant des avantages comparatifs aux lieux desservis. Mais, facteurs d’ubiquité, ils permettraient aussi une homogénéisation de l’espace. Ces mythes de la déterritorialisation et de la dualisation de l’espace sont réfutés par les analyses empiriques des interactions entre réseaux et territoires. Les réseaux ‘formatent’ des aires de marché et des territoires politiques; ils fabriquent des métriques, dont les pouvoirs publics avaient jusquà présent la maîtrise. Liées aux transformations en cours – globalisation, dérégulation – le mode de développement actuel des macro‐systèmes techniques entraîne un télescopage des échelles géographiques qui met à mal le compromis historique entre réseaux et territoires. Il y a obsolescence des frontières des espaces politiques traditionnels et prédominance de la logique économique dans l’extension des réseaux techniques. Afin de retrouver des capacités d’action, les collectivités locales doivent porter plus d’attention au contrôle de l’occupation de l’espace public ainsi qu’à la conception et à l’organisation des noeuds de réseau. Elles ont aussi à favoriser l’émergence des usagers comme acteurs de la régulation des services en réseau, afin que soient activés les débats sur le service universel et sur l’équité territoriale.     

Performance evaluation of National Football League teams

Most recent empirical analyses of production in the sports economic literature have focused on Major League Baseball. This paper extends that literature by analysing football production in the National Football League (NFL). Using the Poisson regression model, we measure the performance of NFL teams and head coaches. The measure is based on a production process where player skills are converted into games won. The evidence reveals that quality coaching is an important component in the production process. It appears that efficient coaching can account for an additional three to four victories in a given season. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The economics of nonprofit organisations' governance

We determine theoretically when we can expect agency problems amenable to shirking agents to arise in nonprofit organisations and derive the conditions for governance measures to remedy these. Agents' private benefits of shirking need to be considered combined with the effect of their efforts on the probabilities of being successful in fundraising and production. If this effect is large, agency problems can more easily be avoided. Sufficient conditions for governance measures to reduce agency problems are derived. The empirical literature fits a number of the results derived and shows important gaps, especially w.r.t. the role of success probabilities.     

Optimal financial investments for non-concave utility functions

We prove a formula for the computation of optimal financial investments in an expected utility framework with arbitrary (not necessarily concave) utility functions. This extends classical results on optimal financial investments for strictly concave utility functions and is of importance particularly for applications of prospect theory where the utility function has a convex-concave shape.