Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics

We consider a model of evolution in games in which agents occasionally receive opportunities to switch strategies, choosing between them using a probabilistic rule. Both the rate at which revision opportunities arrive and the probabilities with which each strategy is chosen are functions of current normalized payoffs. We call the aggregate dynamics induced by this model excess payoff dynamics. We show that every excess payoff dynamic is well-behaved: regardless of the underlying game, each excess payoff dynamic admits unique solution trajectories that vary continuously with the initial state, identifies rest points with Nash equilibria, and respects a basic payoff monotonicity property. We show how excess payoff dynamics can be used to construct well-behaved modifications of imitative dynamics, and relate them to two other well-behaved dynamics based on projections.     

All politics is local: The effect of fiscal and monetary constitutions on economic policy

The rules of behavior for the monetary authorities changed in 1933 and 1947 and the Fed temporarily changed its operating procedures in 1979, but these changes did not alter the fact that the monetary authorities serve as the agent of the fiscal authorities. On the fiscal side, a shift from a centralized process to one where Congress was composed of a set of individual entrepreneurs altered the fiscal focus from the national economy to one of localized interests. This change led to a more autoregressive and deficit-prone federal budget and changed the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. It also elevated the status of monetary policy to the extent where financial markets react to every utterance from the monetary authorities.     

Consumer mobility and community tax bases : The financing of local public goods

In a model of economic ‘clubs’, size is fixed and members consuming a public good raise the question of composition; with whom would they rather consume? This depends on the way collective consumption is financed, and three results are proven With a poll tax, clubs must be homogeneous in income for all to be satisfied With a marginal benefit (Lindahl) tax, no consumer is ever satisfied with any composition; and with an income tax, at least one consumer in each club is always dissatisfied. Satisfaction implies there exists no club composition preferred to the existing one.     

Income determination in market disequilibrium: The implications of spillover for the design of monetary policy

This paper specifies and analyzes a generalized disequilibrium macroeconomic model that explicitly includes the concept of spillover in nontatonnement financial and real markets. It is shown that the dynamic quantity and expenditure theories of income determination are special cases of the model which depend upon the degree of spillover from the bond to the commodity market. Simulation experiments designed to produce a vigorous monetary shock to the system clearly show that national product is very sensitive to the degree of spillover, and thus, the design of monetary policy within the context of gradual market clearing should consider the size of spillover.     

A framework for market-based organizational learning: Linking values, knowledge, and behavior

The authors review the concept of organizational learning and present a broad conceptual framework for its modeling. Within this framework, one specific process for market-based organizational learning is postulated. An empirical test of this model leads the authors to conclude that a more positive learning orientation (a value-based construct) will directly result in increased market information generation and dissemination (knowledge-based constructs), which, in turn, directly affects the degree to which an organization makes changes in its marketing strategies (a behavioral construct). Managerial implications are discussed. His research interests lie primarily in the areas of organizational information use and market-based organizational learning. His work has been published in theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Advertising Research, Journal of Business Research, andJournal of Marketing. His research interests include both individual and organizational learning. He has published in the areas of consumer decision making, advertising effectiveness, and market-based organizational learning. His research interests include organizational marketing and marketing channels. His work has been published in theJournal of Marketing, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Journal of Business Logistics, Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management, andJournal of Health Care Marketing.     

The “Iron Law of Paternalism” in Employee Grievances and Arbitration? A Comparison of Disciplinary and Nondisciplinary Cases

In the criminology literature, the iron law of paternalism suggests that women receive less serious sanctions in the judicial system. This examination of three years of grievance outcomes (n= 1216) and arbitration outcomes (n= 1146) tests this iron law in the context of organizational disciplinary and dispute resolutions. These data, across several levels of outcomes (win, lose, compromise), controlling for the severity of grievances (disciplinary/nondisciplinary) and arbitrations (termination/nontermination) provide no support for the paternalistic thesis. Moreover, we find no support for the paternalistic thesis with regard to either the incidence or length of suspensions as a function of gender.     

Service Quality,Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector

This paper presents a simple model which illustrates the possible policy- and welfare-implications of endogenous product selection in the postal sector. The cost of a unit of mail depends on its "quality" (e.g., speed of delivery) and on the type and location of the addressee (firms, urban households, and rural households). Senders have inelastic demands and differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Addressees are passive but their utility may affect social welfare. Two operators play a two-stage game, first choosing qualities and then prices. We first show that the equilibrium with two private (profit maximizing) operators results in an inefficient provision of quality. Then, we consider the mixed (Nash) equilibrium with one private and one (welfare maximizing) public operator. If the budget constraint of the public firm is not binding, this equilibrium is shown to be first-best efficient even if social welfare accounts for the utility of addressees. If the budget constraint is binding, the mixed equilibrium is not efficient but yields a higher level of welfare than the private equilibrium. Finally, we study the impact of minimum quality standards within our setting.     

Adam Smith and the ethics of contemporary capitalism

This paper presents a theoretical elaboration of the ethical framework of classical capitalism as formulated by Adam Smith in reaction to the dominant mercantilism of his day. It is seen that Smith's project was profoundly ethical and designed to emancipate the consumer from a producer and state dominated economy. Over time, however, the various dysfunctions of a capitalist economy — e.g., concentration of wealth, market power — became manifest and the utilitarian ethical basis of the system eroded. Contemporary capitalism, dominated as it is by large corporations, entrenched political interests and persistent social pathologies, bears little resemblance to the system which Smith envisioned would serve the common man. Most critiques of capitalism are launched from a Marxian-based perspective. We find, however, that by illustrating the wide gap between the reality of contemporary capitalism and the model of amoral political economy developed by Smith, the father of capitalism proves to be the most trenchant critic of the current order.G. R. Bassiry is currently professor of Management and international business at California State University, San Bernardino, California. Formerly he served as Vice President and Acting President of Farabi University. His most recent articles on business ethics include Ethics, Education, and Corporate Leadership,Journal of Business Ethics and Business Ethics and the United Nations: A Code of Conduct,Sam Advanced Management Journal. He has also published numerous journal articles on international business, corporate strategy and corporate leadership, and is the author ofPower vs. Profit by Arno Press of New York Times.Marc Jones is a management lecturer at the University of Otago, New Zealand. His research interests include multinational corporations and economic development. He has worked as a financial analyst for Electronic Data Systems Corporation and as a management consultant for Peat Marwick Main & Company.     

Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism:Concepts and Modeling

We develop a model that captures the distinct natures of and interactions between conditional and unconditional conservatism. Under unconditional conservatism, the book value of net assets is understated due to predetermined aspects of the accounting process. Under conditional conservatism, book value is written down under sufficiently adverse circumstances, but not up under favorable circumstances. The specification of earnings provided by the model yields hypotheses about how unconditional conservatism and other factors preempt conditional conservatism and so affect the asymmetric response of earnings to positive and negative share returns, both current and lagged, documented by Basu (1995, “Conservatism and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester’ 1997, “The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 3–37).This revised version was published online in August 2005 with a corrected cover date.