Non-linear Gaussian sovereign CDS pricing models

Prior literature indicates that quadratic models and the Black–Karasinski model are very promising for CDS pricing. This paper extends these models and the Black [J. Finance 1995, 50, 1371–1376] model for pricing sovereign CDS’s. For all 10 sovereigns in the sample quadratic models best fit CDS spreads in-sample, and a four factor quadratic model can account for the joint effects on CDS spreads of default risk, default loss risk and liquidity risk with no restriction to factors correlation. Liquidity risk appears to affect sovereign CDS spreads. However, quadratic models tend to over-fit some CDS maturities at the expense of other maturities, while the BK model is particularly immune from this tendency. The Black model seems preferable because its out-of-sample performance in the time series dimension is the best.     

Jensen's alpha and the market‐timing puzzle

Theory predicts that market‐timing activities bias Jensen's alpha (JA). However, empirical studies have failed to find consistent evidence of this bias. We tackle this puzzle in a nested model analysis and show that the bias contains an exogenous market component that is unrelated to market‐timing skill. In a comprehensive empirical analysis of US mutual funds, we find that the timing‐induced bias in JA is mainly driven by this market component, which is uncorrelated with measured timing activities. Measures of total performance that allow for timing activities are virtually identical to JA, even if timing activities are present in the evaluated fund. Hence, we conclude that JA is a sufficient measure of total performance.     

US stock returns: are there seasons of excesses?

This article explores the existence of seasonality in the tails of stock returns. We use a parametric model to describe the returns, and obtain a proxy of the innovation distribution via a pre-processing model. Then, we develop a change-point algorithm capturing changes in the tails of the innovations. We confirm the good performance of the procedure through extensive Monte Carlo experiments. An empirical investigation using US stocks data shows that while the lower tail of the innovations is approximately constant over the year, the upper tail is larger in Winter than in Summer, in 9 out of 12 industries.     

Firm Opacity Lies in the Eye of the Beholder

We classify and test empirical measures of firm opacity and document theoretical and empirical inconsistencies across these proxies by testing the relative opacity of banks versus non‐banks. We evaluate the effectiveness of these proxies by observing the effect of two cleanly identified shocks to firm‐specific information: credit rating initiation and inclusion in the S&P 500 index. Using a difference‐in‐difference approach, we compare firms that are newly rated and firms that are included in the S&P 500 index with a propensity matched sample of “unchanged” firms. We find that only the number of analysts and Amihud's illiquidity ratio provide consistent patterns across different estimation specifications and different econometric settings. These two proxies show that banks are more opaque than non‐banks. Based on our tests, we recommend that these proxies be used as the primary measures of firm opacity.     

Why are shareholders not paid to give up their voting privileges? Unique evidence from Italy

Dual-class share unifications have typically been argued to be beneficial for voting shareholders, who are usually compensated for the loss of their superior voting privileges. However, no covenants exist that make this compensation mandatory for voting shareholders. In this paper, we examine a subset of dual class share unifications from Italy where, in the main, voting shareholders are not offered any compensation in lieu of the loss of their superior voting rights. We present a simple model describing the conditions under which the controlling voting shareholder will choose not to offer compensation to minority voting shareholders as part of a share unification. Our empirical results support the model predictions.     

Financial dollarization and systemic risks: New empirical evidence

This paper explores the persistence of financial dollarization in a group of 79 economies with different levels of development. Our main hypothesis is that a high level of domestic debt combined with default risk explains this persistence, even after a decline in inflation rates. Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) in a panel data analysis, our results show that inflation risks caused by increasing probability of default account for financial dollarization more than inflation rate itself. After the decrease in inflation rates, the foreign currency-denominated deposits remain large because of the high debt-to-GDP ratios, particularly in speculative-grade economies. High public indebtedness leads to expectations of default. Dollarization is a rational response to the future inflation associated with investors' expectations of default observed in highly indebted economies.     

How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection

This paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise customers regarding the suitability of financial products. Our model explains why brokers are commonly compensated indirectly through contingent commissions paid by product providers, even though this compensation structure could lead to biased advice. When customers are wary of the adviser's incentives, contingent commissions can be an effective incentive tool to induce the adviser to learn which specialized product is most suitable for the specific needs of customers. If, instead, customers naively believe they receive unbiased advice, high product prices and correspondingly high commissions become a tool of exploitation. Policy intervention that mandates disclosure of commissions can protect naive consumers and increase welfare. However, prohibiting or capping commissions could have the unintended consequence of stifling the adviser's incentive to acquire information. More vigorous competition benefits consumers and reduces exploitation, but firms have limited incentives to educate naive customers.     

Which Factors Affect Bond Underwriting Fees? The Role of Banking Relationships

The question of which factors are relevant in determining bond underwriting fees is empirically investigated by analysing 2,202 bond issues completed by European firms during the 1993 – 2003 period. Four major results emerge from the analysis. First, the introduction of the single currency in 1999 has generated an increase in competition among banks, and, as a result, a reduction in underwriting fees. Second, a strong relationship with the issuer's main bank reduces the level of underwriting fees. Third, new issuers are charged with lower underwriter fees relative to firms that have completed issues without building any strong relationship with a bank. Fourth, higher reputation banks charge lower underwriting fees. The implications of these findings are also discussed.     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY,IMITATION, AND THE INCENTIVES FOR COST REDUCING R&D EFFORT*

I develop and test a model of strategic R&D investments where innovating and non‐innovating firms compete on the basis of their ability to reduce costs and imitate rivals. I find that a larger proportion of non‐innovating rivals stimulates cost‐reducing investments and attenuates the disincentive effect of imitation by innovators on firm level R&D. Key model properties are verified by estimating the first order condition for the optimal choice of R&D, using the 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey of U.S. industrial R&D. Results also suggest that R&D and size are simultaneously determined, with R&D being proportional to size, as predicted by the theoretical model.     

Eine Analyse ultimaten Verhaltens als Erklärungsansatz des moral hazards

For the insurance industry the moral hazard poses an incalculable risk. Changes in the behaviour of the insuree can lead to higher claims settlements and thus to higher premiums for the insured collective. Asymmetrically allocated information gives the insured individual the possibility to profit from the idea of common protection in a way that impairs insurer and the collective on the whole. Based on the homo oeconomicus model, economic concepts, first and foremost the agency theory of new institutional economics have made attempts to provide solutions for this management problem. However, behavioural economic experiments have demonstrated that the homo oeconomicus model does not fully succeed in describing the realities. As a result, the solutions proposed in these economic concepts have to be rated inadequate.The moral hazard is inherent in the conflicting realm of cooperation and defection, behaviour patterns that have evolved during the history of development of human behaviour. Ultimate behaviour analyses of these patterns do offer the opportunity to understand why humans behave in specific ways based on man's evolutionary origins and sources. Consequently, ultimate behaviour analyses could provide a solid foundation for the development of a framework giving insurers the possibility to exert influence on the insuree's behaviour and thus to assist in successfully impacting the moral hazard.