The strategy of professional forecasting

We develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters’ strategic behavior. The first theory, reputational cheap talk, posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed. The market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state. If the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly, then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean. With correct market expectations, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded. The second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre-specified rules. In a winner-take-all contest, equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated.     

The right way to be fired.

Nearly all of us will lose our jobs sometime, but is there a right way to be terminated? What differentiates fired employees who make the best of their situations from those who do not? One answer is mind-set. Many workers unconsciously hold a "tenure mind-set," believing in the promise of employment security. By contrast, other workers hold an "assignment mentality," seeing each job as one in a series of impermanent, career-building stepping-stones. Most corporate board members and CEOs have this latter mind-set and consider their executives to be filling terminal assignments; people who possess this mentality usually rebound swiftly when fired. But when employees who hold a tenure mind-set are suddenly fired or laid off, the authors say, they can fall into three common traps. Executives who have overidentified with their jobs and feel indispensable to their organizations get caught in the "lost identity" trap; they react to termination with anger and bitterness. In the "lost family" trap, employees possess tight-knit, emotional bonds with coworkers. When terminated, they feel betrayed and rejected. And finally, some introverted executives fall into the "lost ego" trap; they quietly retreat without negotiating fair termination packages and may settle for less satisfying work the next time around. To prepare for the eventuality of termination, the authors suggest that executives adopt the assignment mind-set at all times. They should keep their social networks alive, include a termination clause in employment contracts, and consider hiring an agent. If warning signs warrant, they might even volunteer to be terminated. By assuming control over the way they are fired, people can gain control over their careers.     

On the optimality of optimal income taxation

The Mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mechanism with no strategic interdependence, i.e., the optimal labor supply of any one individual does not depend on the labor supply of others. It has been argued by Piketty (2009) [12] that this restriction is substantial because more sophisticated mechanisms can reach first-best allocations that are out of reach with simple mechanisms. In this paper, we assess the validity of Piketty?s critique in an independent private values model. As a main result, we show that the optimal sophisticated mechanism is a simple mechanism, or, equivalently, a Mirrleesian income tax system.     

A Theoretic Framework for the Analysis of Credit Union Decision Making

This paper presents a formal theoretic framework to analyze credit union interest rates on loans and savings deposits. The unique motivational and institutional features of a credit union, in particular its structure as a financial service cooperative, are used to develop the objective function. This is based on a comparison of the credit union's rates to alternatively available market rates and includes parameters to recognize the possibility of borrower-saver conflict. The principal result is that the optimal rates and reactions to exogenous changes depend critically on the preference of the organization toward financial gain to the borrowing and saving members.     

The effects of technological turbulence and breadth on supply chain technology acceptance and adoption

The current empirical study examines the intention to use and subsequent implementation of a supply chain technology. Specifically, the authors extend the technology acceptance model (TAM) to incorporate the state of the technology environment (technological turbulence) and the extent to which other supply chain technologies have already been adopted by the firm (technological breadth). A series of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) were used to analyze survey data from 195 respondents. The results show that in technologically turbulent environments, the relationships between the firm's perceived usefulness and ease of use and the firm's intention to use a supply chain technology are stronger. The study also finds that the relationship between the firm's intention to use a supply chain technology and the implementation of the technology is weaker in firms with greater technological breadth.     

Life‐Cycle Consumption and Children: Evidence from a Structural Estimation

I estimate by maximum likelihood a dynamic model of optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption in the presence of children using high‐quality Danish longitudinal data. The number and age of all children can affect the marginal utility of consumption while income uncertainty, credit constraints and postretirement motives also influence household behaviour. While I estimate that children have a surprisingly small effect on the marginal utility of non‐durable consumption, data simulated from the estimated model replicates similar correlations between log consumption growth and changing household composition as found in the Danish data and typically found in UK and US data. To reconcile the results with existing studies, I illustrate how ignoring precautionary motives increases the estimated importance of children. The results indicate that precautionary motives might play a larger role than children in explaining the observed consumption age profile.     

Why Dick and Jane don’t ask: Getting past initiation barriers in negotiations

Negotiation is an essential skill for personal well-being and professional success, a skill that begins with identifying and acting on one's wants and needs. Many individuals, however, lack the confidence, motivation, or training to simply ask for what they want in certain situations; for example, when negotiating with an important client. Still others are reluctant to initiate requests in general. This article discusses the personal characteristics and situational factors that influence an individual's likelihood of engaging another party in a negotiation, making a request, and optimizing that request. Herein, specific suggestions are offered for managing this critical phase of the negotiation process via three steps: mental preparation prior to the engagement; positioning prior to, and at the point of, the engagement; and verbal craftsmanship during the delivery of one's request.