Reputational cheap talk

We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truth telling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others.     

What kind of preference maximization does the weak axiom of revealed preference characterize?

A (multivalued) choice is justified if no two chosen alternatives are preferred to each other, and if all chosen alternatives are preferred to all rejected alternatives. This concept permits a connection between the behavioral property expressed by WARP and a weak form of preference maximization. I am grateful to Michele Lombardi, Michael Mandler, Paola Manzini and an anonymous referee for useful discussions and comments.     

Technology shocks, structural breaks and the effects on the business cycle

It is shown that time-series of US productivity and hours are apparently affected by a structural break in the late 60s. Moreover, the importance of technology shocks over the business cycle has sharply decreased after the break.     

Smoke in the (Tariff) Water

As the economic crisis deepened and widened, fears of a return to the protectionist spiral of the 1930s become more common. However, an important difference between the 1930s and today is the existence of the World Trade Organization and the legal limits it imposes on the protectionist responses members can pursue. The first objective of this paper is to assess the extent to which applied tariffs can be legally raised without violating bound tariff obligations and compare it with what is economically feasible. The second objective is the examination of whether individual countries have taken advantage of these legal tariff hikes as protectionist responses during economic crises, after the creation of the WTO. Results suggest that the policy space left when looking at what is economically possible is indeed quite large. However, in the recent past little of the available policy space has been used by countries suffering from an economic crisis.     

Disclosure Strategies and Cost of Capital

Theoretically, companies disclosing more voluntary information will benefit from a lower cost of capital, although empirical research provides inconclusive results. Our study aims to analyze the influence of the disclosure of forward‐looking information on the cost of capital, because this information is extremely useful for investors. Results show that only specific information on actions, programs, decisions, and/or quantitative financial information helps toward the reduction of cost of capital. This evidence has direct economic implications, because it enables regulators and managers to focus on those disclosure strategies that are effective in the reduction of cost of capital. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ranking participants in tournaments by means of rating functions

In this paper we bring a novel approach to the theory of tournament rankings. We combine two different theories that are widely used to establish rankings of populations after a given tournament. First, we use the statistical approach of paired comparison analysis to define the performance of a player in a natural way. Then, we determine a ranking (and rating) of the players in the given tournament. Finally, we show, among other properties, that the new ranking method is the unique one satisfying a natural consistency requirement.     

The Quasi-split Effect, Active Insiders and the Italian Market Reaction to Equity Rights Issues

The positive market reaction at the announcement of most European rights issues can be explained by two major factors which distinguish them from a US public offering: active insiders, and a quasi-split effect which signals a large increase in the dividend yield. An analysis of 428 Italian rights offerings and an event study involving 82 observations in the 1980–94 period show that Italian insiders are completely 'active', and almost 85 % of the equity rights issues result in a dividend yield increase, which corresponds to the quasi-split effect in approximately 40 % of the issues. The dividend yield rises, on average, by a significant +61 % after a combined rights offering and by a significantly lower +20 % following a fully-paid rights issue. The market reaction to the announcement is significantly positive for combined rights offerings (+ 2.77 %) and positive, but not significant, for the whole sample (+ 0.79 %). The dividend increase signalled by the quasi-split effect explains almost 30 % of the abnormal returns' cross-sectional variation and it is the only significant explanatory variable.     

ELECTIONS AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY CYCLES

This paper presents a theoretical model based on the distributive effects of real exchange rate (RER) changes that generates RER electoral cycles of the type identified in Latin American countries: more appreciated RER before elections and more depreciated after elections. Typically, a RER depreciation favors exporters and import-competing domestic industries, to the detriment of consumers. These RER cycles are generated by imperfect information on policy-makers' preferences, which are concealed from voters with the help of an unstable macroeconomic environment. Exchange rate cycles result from the interplay between the electoral power of the non-tradable sector and the tradable sector's ability to lobby the government.     

Inefficiency in the Spanish Cooperative Banking Sector

This paper researches X-inefficiency and scale economies in Spanish cooperative banking between 1988 and 1996, using the stochastic cost frontier methodology. The Translog cost function, with three outputs and three inputs, is used to measure X-inefficiencies across time and size. During this period of time there is no important reduction in inefficiency levels, so deregulation and internationalization has little effect on the Spanish cooperative banking market. We can see that large cooperative banks are less inefficient than small ones, indicating that it would be convenient to increase the size of these kinds of banks in order to reduce inefficiencies in this sector. We also find scale economies during this period.     

Resale and bundling in auctions

The possibility of resale increases bidders' incentives to jointly reduce demand in multi-object auctions, because resale increases low-value bidders' willingness to pay and reduces high-value bidders' willingness to pay. Therefore, resale may reduce the seller's revenue. In a simple model with complete information, however, allowing resale and bundling the objects on sale are “complement strategies” for the seller (under reasonable conditions)—by bundling and allowing resale the seller earns a higher revenue than by selling the objects separately and/or forbidding resale. We also show why allowing resale may reduce efficiency.