Firm Opacity Lies in the Eye of the Beholder

We classify and test empirical measures of firm opacity and document theoretical and empirical inconsistencies across these proxies by testing the relative opacity of banks versus non‐banks. We evaluate the effectiveness of these proxies by observing the effect of two cleanly identified shocks to firm‐specific information: credit rating initiation and inclusion in the S&P 500 index. Using a difference‐in‐difference approach, we compare firms that are newly rated and firms that are included in the S&P 500 index with a propensity matched sample of “unchanged” firms. We find that only the number of analysts and Amihud's illiquidity ratio provide consistent patterns across different estimation specifications and different econometric settings. These two proxies show that banks are more opaque than non‐banks. Based on our tests, we recommend that these proxies be used as the primary measures of firm opacity.     

Crowding,satiation, and saturation: The days of television series' lives

The performance of firms depends not just on the structure of the industries in which they compete but also on their relative positioning within those industries, in terms of operating within particular niches. We propose that demand for these niches depends endogenously on the historical ecology of the products offered: Niches become saturated—reduced in their ability to support products—as a large number of previous offerings allows the audience to satisfy its desire for products of a particular type. Analyzing the survival rates of television series aired in the United States from 1946 to 2003, we found that the survival rates of future entrants fell with the extensiveness of recent offerings in the niche, and that the negative association between crowding and survival also weakened with this saturation. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Indirect exporters and importers

This paper analyses the relation between firms’ productivity and the different modes of participation in international trade. In particular, it accounts for the possibility that firms can not only export their products, but also internationally source their inputs, either directly or indirectly. Using a cross section of firm level data for several advanced and developing economies, the study confirms the productivity-sorting prediction according to which domestic firms are less efficient than those that resort to an export intermediary, while the latter are less productive than producers which export directly. We show that the same sorting exists on the import side. By considering firms involved in both exporting and importing activities, we also find that direct two-way traders are on average more productive than firms trading indirectly on one of the two trade sides. The latter are in turn more efficient than indirect two-way traders. Finally, we investigate the effects of source-country characteristics on the sorting of firms into different modes of international trade.     

US stock returns: are there seasons of excesses?

This article explores the existence of seasonality in the tails of stock returns. We use a parametric model to describe the returns, and obtain a proxy of the innovation distribution via a pre-processing model. Then, we develop a change-point algorithm capturing changes in the tails of the innovations. We confirm the good performance of the procedure through extensive Monte Carlo experiments. An empirical investigation using US stocks data shows that while the lower tail of the innovations is approximately constant over the year, the upper tail is larger in Winter than in Summer, in 9 out of 12 industries.     

Production Theory: Accounting for Firm Heterogeneity and Technical Change

The paper presents a new framework to assess firm level heterogeneity and to study the rate and direction of technical change. Building on the analysis of revealed short‐run production functions by Hildenbrand ( 1981 ), we propose the (normalized) volume of the zonotope composed by vectors‐firms as indicator of inter‐firm heterogeneity. Moreover, the angles that the zonotope's main diagonal form with the axes provide a measure of the rates and directions of productivity change. The proposed framework also accounts for n‐inputs and m‐outputs and, crucially, the measures of heterogeneity and technical change do not require many of the standard assumptions from production theory.     

Is there a role for uncertainty in forecasting output growth in OECD countries? Evidence from a time-varying parameter-panel vector autoregressive model

This paper uses a time-varying parameter-panel vector autoregressive (TVP-PVAR) model to analyze the role played by domestic and US news-based measures of uncertainty in forecasting the growth of industrial production of 12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Based on a monthly out-of-sample period of 2009:06 to 2017:05, given an in-sample of 2003:03 to 2009:05, there are only 46% of cases where domestic uncertainty can improve the forecast of output growth relative to a baseline monetary TVP-PVAR model, which includes inflation, interest rate and nominal exchange rate growth, besides output growth. Moreover, including US uncertainty does not necessarily improve the forecasting performance of output growth from the TVP-PVAR model which includes only the domestic uncertainty along with the baseline variables. So, in general, while uncertainty is important in predicting the future path of output growth in the 12 advanced economies considered, a forecaster can do better in majority of the instances by just considering the information from standard macroeconomic variables.     

Eine Analyse ultimaten Verhaltens als Erklärungsansatz des moral hazards

For the insurance industry the moral hazard poses an incalculable risk. Changes in the behaviour of the insuree can lead to higher claims settlements and thus to higher premiums for the insured collective. Asymmetrically allocated information gives the insured individual the possibility to profit from the idea of common protection in a way that impairs insurer and the collective on the whole. Based on the homo oeconomicus model, economic concepts, first and foremost the agency theory of new institutional economics have made attempts to provide solutions for this management problem. However, behavioural economic experiments have demonstrated that the homo oeconomicus model does not fully succeed in describing the realities. As a result, the solutions proposed in these economic concepts have to be rated inadequate.The moral hazard is inherent in the conflicting realm of cooperation and defection, behaviour patterns that have evolved during the history of development of human behaviour. Ultimate behaviour analyses of these patterns do offer the opportunity to understand why humans behave in specific ways based on man's evolutionary origins and sources. Consequently, ultimate behaviour analyses could provide a solid foundation for the development of a framework giving insurers the possibility to exert influence on the insuree's behaviour and thus to assist in successfully impacting the moral hazard.     

Tax competition, excludable public goods, and user charges

This paper provides an explanation for the increasing reliance on revenue from user charges on excludable public goods. We develop a model with many identical countries. The government of each country imposes a source-based tax on capital and supplies an excludable public good to heterogeneous households. Without tax competition, the price on the public good is zero. Tax competition induces each country to choose a positive price. The reliance on user charges turns out to be increasing in the intensity of tax competition measured by the number of countries. A coordinated decrease in user charges is shown to raise welfare in all countries.      

What is the role of legal systems in financial intermediation? Theory and evidence

We develop a theory’ and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection. These predictions are supported by the empirical analysis. Using a new empirical approach of comparing two sets of fixed-effect regressions, we also find that the investor’s legal system is more important than that of the company in determining investor behavior.