UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "PROBLEM": A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.     

Learning across the life cycle: Experimentation and performance among the hollywood studio heads

Guided by notions from the literature on organizational learning, this paper investigates how product line experimentation and organizational performance change across the careers of top managers. Its subjects are the studio heads who ran all the major Hollywood film studios from 1936 to 1965. The study found first, that product line experimentation declines over the course of executive tenures; second, that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between top executive tenure and an organization's financial performance; and third, that product line experimentation is more likely to benefit financial performance late in top executives' tenures. These findings are consistent with a three‐stage ‘executive life cycle’. During the early years of their tenures, top managers experiment intensively with their product lines to learn about their business; later on their accumulated knowledge allows them to reduce experimentation and increase performance; finally, in their last years, executives reduce experimentation still further, and performance declines. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some brief notes on the “unfinished business” of qualitative inquiry

The paper argues that there are a variety of implicit issues in qualitative inquiry that need to be addressed if the area is to develop in some normal science sense. This unfinished business is concerned with a deeper investigation of basic terms that are now simply taken for granted, such as theme and pattern. It also includes the need to develop rules which will assist in making and justifying how qualitative interpretations are made from the implicit processes of inference. Specific suggestions are made for accomplishing these issues.     

CAPITAL AGGREGATION IN THE PRESENCE OF OBSOLESCENCE-INDUCING TECHNICAL CHANGE

The major question addressed is the treatment of capital embodied technical progress. Should Obsolescence be deducted to calculate a net stock, or should quality adjustments be made in each vintage of new capital, or both, or neither? In order to estimate the contribution of new investment to growth it is necessary to use a capital stock where different vintages are weighted in proportion to their marginal products. The commonly used gross capital measures do not do this, because they do not allow for the higher marginal product of more modern capital. Such an allowance for capital embodied technical progress can be made either by quality adjusting new capital or by incorporating obsolescence into the valuation of the old capital (but not both). However, even if new capital incorporates an allowance for improved quality, it will still be necessary to revalue the old capital. Frequently, a reasonable approximation to the net capital stock results from a linear decline in quasi-rents and can be approximated by published estimates of the stock of capital net of straight line depreciation. Steady technical progress will not lead to the commonly used exponential service decline functions. To avoid overestimating the return to investment when technology changes it will be necessary to use information on capital embodied technical change to revalue old capital, rather than to change the price indices for new capital.     

Inventory accuracy in 60 days!

Despite great advances in manufacturing technology and management science, thousands of organizations still don't have a handle on basic inventory accuracy. Many companies don't even measure it properly, or at all, and lack corrective action programs to improve it. This article offers an approach that has proven successful a number of times, when companies were quite serious about making improvements. Not only can it be implemented, but also it can likely be implemented within 60 days per area, if properly managed. The hardest part is selling people on the need to improve and then keeping them motivated. The net cost of such a program? Probably less than nothing, since the benefits gained usually far exceed the costs. Improved inventory accuracy can aid in enhancing customer service, determining purchasing and manufacturing priorities, reducing operating costs, and increasing the accuracy of financial records. This article also addresses the gap in contemporary literature regarding accuracy program features for repetitive, JIT, cellular, and process- and project-oriented environments.     

Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts, Earnings Uncertainty, and Stock Returns

In this study we examine the association among confirming management forecasts, stock prices, and analyst expectations. Confirming management forecasts are voluntary disclosures by management that corroborate existing market expectations about future earnings. This study provides evidence that these voluntary disclosures affect stock prices and the dispersion of analyst expectations. Specifically, we find that the market's reaction to confirming forecasts is significantly positive, indicating that benefits accrue to firms that disclose such forecasts. In addition, although we find no significant change in the mean consensus forecasts (a proxy for earnings expectations) around the confirming forecast date, evidence indicates a significant reduction in the mean and median consensus analyst dispersion (a proxy for earnings uncertainty). Finally, we document a positive association between the reduction of dispersion of analysts' forecasts and the magnitude of the stock market response. Overall, the evidence suggests that confirming forecasts reduce uncertainty about future earnings and that investors price this reduction of uncertainty.     

Debt in industry equilibrium

This article shows (1) how entry and exit of firms in a competitiveindustry affect the valuation of securities and optimal capitalstructure, and (2) how, given a trade-off between tax advantagesand agency costs, a firm will optimally adjust its leveragelevel after it is set up. We derive simple pricing expressionsfor corporate debt in which the price elasticity of demand forindustry output plays a crucial role. When a firm optimallyadjusts its leverage over time, we show that total firm valuecomprises the value of discounted cash flows assuming fixedcapital structure, plus a continuum of options for marginalincreases in debt.