Technical change and irreversible investment under risk

A stochastic dynamic model was constructed to analyze investment decisions of an individual farme under risk in the presence of legibilities, embedded technical change and indivisible capital. An analytical solution was obtained and its local behavior studied by numerical methods. Optimal investment is obtained by regulating the difference between the desired and actual capital stocks between two barriers that define an inaction interval. While the desired capital drifts between the barriers, no action is taken. If the desired capital touches the upper barrier, the farmer invests pushing the average efficiency of the actual capital stock up. This in turn raises the desired capital even higher and contracts the inaction interval. If these effects are strong enough, the farmer will invest again until the potential gains of the technological package are exhausted. If the desired capital falls enough, the farmer disinvests, pushing down the average productivity and expanding the inaction interval. Disinvestment continues until it slops either because the inaction interval becomes so wide that it is no longer optimal to disinvest or because the actual capital stock is so small that it is no longer profitable to produce.     

Consumer Welfare and the Loss Induced by Withholding Information: The Case of BSE in Italy

The paper develops a measure of consumer welfare losses associated with withholding information about a possible link between BSE and vCJD. The Cost of Ignorance (COI) is measured by comparing the utility of the informed choice with the utility of the uninformed choice, under conditions of improved information. Unlike previous work that is largely based on a single equation demand model, the measure is obtained retrieving a cost function from a dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System. The estimated perceived loss for Italian consumers due to delayed information ranges from 12 percent to 54 percent of total meat expenditure, depending on the month assumed to embody correct beliefs about the safety level of beef.     

The general dynamic factor model: One-sided representation results

Recent dynamic factor models have been almost exclusively developed under the assumption that the common components span a finite-dimensional vector space. However, this finite-dimension assumption rules out very simple factor-loading patterns and is therefore severely restrictive. The general case has been studied, using a frequency domain approach, in Forni et al. (2000). That paper produces an estimator of the common components that is consistent but is based on filters that are two-sided and therefore unsuitable for prediction. The present paper, assuming a rational spectral density for the common components, obtains a one-sided estimator without the finite-dimension assumption.     

Do financial variables help predict the state of the business cycle in small open economies? Evidence from Switzerland

We analyze the forecasting ability of financial variables to predict the state of the Swiss business cycle up to eight quarters ahead. Overall, our results suggest that financial variables convey leading information for the prediction of business cycles, even when applied to a small open economy. However, we clearly find that model specifications need to be extended to include variables accounting for external shocks, such as exchange rates or international commodity prices. It also appears that the forecasting contribution of individual variables changes over time. Specifically, in the last two decades, stock market liquidity has replaced the term spread as the best single predictor.     

Feature selection methods involving support vector machines for prediction of insolvency in non‐life insurance companies

We propose two novel approaches for feature selection and ranking tasks based on simulated annealing (SA) and Walsh analysis, which use a support vector machine as an underlying classifier. These approaches are inspired by one of the key problems in the insurance sector: predicting the insolvency of a non‐life insurance company. This prediction is based on accounting ratios, which measure the health of the companies. The approaches proposed provide a set of ratios (the SA approach) and a ranking of the ratios (the Walsh analysis ranking) that would allow a decision about the financial state of each company studied. The proposed feature selection methods are applied to the prediction the insolvency of several Spanish non‐life insurance companies, yielding state‐of‐the‐art results in the tests performed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What is the objective of professional licensing? Evidence from the US market for lawyers

According to public interest theory, professional licensing solves the lemon problem generated by asymmetric information. In contrast, the capture theory claims that licensing aims at increasing professional salaries by restricting supply. This paper shows that the two theories can be identified using data from one regulated profession and provides an empirical application to the US market for entry level lawyers. The empirical results support capture theory.     

Higher education and firms: on the interaction between research and regional policies

In the European Union, a series of competencies are shared between a central agency called the European Commission, and the governments of the Member States. This paper focuses on two of those policies: research and regional development. Here, we model and discuss how the level of commitment of a central authority toward poor regions affects the design of the best decision-making process. We explore cases of full centralization and full decentralization, and situations where the two levels of government are allowed to take decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, we make a distinction between a situation where the central agency decides first as in most federations, and one in which it decides second, then being an agent of national governments. This setting is especially relevant for the European Union. We show, in particular, that when the degree of commitment of the center is high, assignment of redistributive competencies to both levels of power is a proxy for centralization. Additionally, the poorer region may find its best interest in an institutional design where the regions decide first.