Deposit guarantee evaluation and incentives analysis in a mutual guarantee system

This paper analyzes how the deposit guarantee value affects the risk incentives in a mutual guarantee system. We liken the guarantee’s value to that of a European-style contingent claims portfolio. The main feature emerging from our model is that a mutual guarantee system would give banks an adverse incentive to increase riskiness. To mitigate this incentive, we introduce a regulatory provision modelled using a path-dependent contingent claim. By comparing the mutual guarantee system with a non-mutual one, we show that the former is less expensive, but implies higher adverse incentives for the banks, especially for undercapitalized institutions.     

Technical change and irreversible investment under risk

A stochastic dynamic model was constructed to analyze investment decisions of an individual farme under risk in the presence of legibilities, embedded technical change and indivisible capital. An analytical solution was obtained and its local behavior studied by numerical methods. Optimal investment is obtained by regulating the difference between the desired and actual capital stocks between two barriers that define an inaction interval. While the desired capital drifts between the barriers, no action is taken. If the desired capital touches the upper barrier, the farmer invests pushing the average efficiency of the actual capital stock up. This in turn raises the desired capital even higher and contracts the inaction interval. If these effects are strong enough, the farmer will invest again until the potential gains of the technological package are exhausted. If the desired capital falls enough, the farmer disinvests, pushing down the average productivity and expanding the inaction interval. Disinvestment continues until it slops either because the inaction interval becomes so wide that it is no longer optimal to disinvest or because the actual capital stock is so small that it is no longer profitable to produce.     

Consumer Welfare and the Loss Induced by Withholding Information: The Case of BSE in Italy

The paper develops a measure of consumer welfare losses associated with withholding information about a possible link between BSE and vCJD. The Cost of Ignorance (COI) is measured by comparing the utility of the informed choice with the utility of the uninformed choice, under conditions of improved information. Unlike previous work that is largely based on a single equation demand model, the measure is obtained retrieving a cost function from a dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System. The estimated perceived loss for Italian consumers due to delayed information ranges from 12 percent to 54 percent of total meat expenditure, depending on the month assumed to embody correct beliefs about the safety level of beef.     

What is the objective of professional licensing? Evidence from the US market for lawyers

According to public interest theory, professional licensing solves the lemon problem generated by asymmetric information. In contrast, the capture theory claims that licensing aims at increasing professional salaries by restricting supply. This paper shows that the two theories can be identified using data from one regulated profession and provides an empirical application to the US market for entry level lawyers. The empirical results support capture theory.     

The general dynamic factor model: One-sided representation results

Recent dynamic factor models have been almost exclusively developed under the assumption that the common components span a finite-dimensional vector space. However, this finite-dimension assumption rules out very simple factor-loading patterns and is therefore severely restrictive. The general case has been studied, using a frequency domain approach, in Forni et al. (2000). That paper produces an estimator of the common components that is consistent but is based on filters that are two-sided and therefore unsuitable for prediction. The present paper, assuming a rational spectral density for the common components, obtains a one-sided estimator without the finite-dimension assumption.     

Asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups: response,speed of response and ex ante vs. ex post competitive interaction in the spanish bank deposit market

The objective of this study is to examine asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups in a given industry. Two research hypotheses argue for the existence of asymmetric rivalry in the sense that strategic groups of small companies have a greater degree of response but a slower speed of response to the actions of strategic groups of large companies, than vice versa. To test this, we use an ex post approach that examines the news releases published on the strategic actions and reactions of firms. A third hypothesis compares ex ante competitive expectations with ex post asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups. To test this, we compare ex post news on actions/reactions with an ex ante approach that estimates conjectural variations. The empirical application carried out on bank deposits in the Spanish market defines strategic groups in terms of size due to the historical and institutional conditions of the industry (deregulatory change). The results obtained show that rivalry patterns between strategic groups in terms of company size can be predicted as asymmetric in the sense that smaller bank strategic groups have a greater degree of response (Stackelberg ‘leader–follower’ competitive interaction), and a slower speed of response to the actions of larger bank strategic groups than is found the other way around. Moreover, ex ante expectations of aggressiveness on the part of larger strategic groups characterize greater ex post reactions from the smaller‐size strategic groups. Therefore, the size distribution of strategic groups is valuable to research on complex industries with deregulation changes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tourism Brochures: Usefulness and Image

Tourist information has been shown to have an important influence on the choice of vacation destinations. This article studies brochures, their significance as image generators, and their influence on the selection of destinations. The study sought to discover which features in this medium are more relevant in image generation and destination choice using logistic regression analysis. The analysis is based on data collected from tourists in Madrid, Spain. The results establish a model of usefulness of brochures in order to propose recommendations for their design and content. Implications pertain to the development of theoretical understandings about the influence of the information sources on destination image, destination choice, and satisfying tourist needs.