Rock Paper Scissors

Rock Paper Scissors is used to resolve conflict when a compromise is not possible. Individuals playing ``games' tend to have biases they prefer to play. I show that Rock Paper Scissors with biased players results in a player with a high valuation for winning being victorious with a probability greater than a player with a low valuation. Thus, it frequently achieves the efficient outcome. Furthermore, as the benefit to victory increases for all players, victory for each player becomes equally likely. Therefore, it is often efficient for minor conflicts while it performs no better than a coin-flip for major conflicts.      

Your Place in Space: Classroom Experiment on Spatial Location Theory

The authors detail an urban economics experiment that is easily run in the classroom. The experiment has a flexible design that allows the instructor to explore how congestion, zoning, public transportation, and taxation levels determine the bid–rent function. Heterogeneous agents in the experiment compete for land use using a simple auction mechanism. Using the data that is collected, a bid–rent function is derived, and the experimental treatment is altered over the course of three sessions to uncover core concepts in urban economics. Moreover, this provides a tangible experience that can be used to help undergraduates relate to urban issues such as the steep rent gradient found around many larger colleges and universities.     

Does trade liberalization assist third-world industrial development? Experience and lessons of the 1980s

The 1980s can be regarded as a decade of trade liberalization in developing countries. This article reviews the evidence on the impact of trade policy reform measures on economic performance, and identifies a number of policy implications that can be drawn from this experience.     

New issues in long-term care

Employer sponsorship of long-term care programs is a growing trend, one that is likely to continue, no matter what direction national health care reform takes.     

Migration,self‐selection and income distributions

Self‐selection in rural–urban migration is examined using three datasets from rural and urban China in 2002. We construct a migrant sample including both migrants who converted their hukou status from rural to urban (permanent migrants) and those who did not (temporary migrants). We find a strong positive selection for permanent migrants, but the selection for temporary migrants is ambiguous. We reach these conclusions by comparing migrants' counterfactual wage densities, assuming they are paid as rural local workers, to actual wage densities of rural local workers. Our results imply that permanent migration has negative effects on rural human capital accumulation and income levels.     

Credible assignments in coordination games

This paper uses the experimental method to examine an arbiter's ability to determine the outcome of two-person coordination games. All of the arbiter's assignments in the experiments were strict equilibrium points, but some assignments violated payoff-dominance or symmetry. An assignment that corresponds to the game's outcome is a credible assignment. The experiments test the hypothesis that an assignment to a strict equilibrium is a credible assignment. Our subjects did not find the individual rationality and mutual consistency of an equilibrium assignment to be sufficient reason for implementing the assignment when doing so conflicts with payoff-dominance or symmetry.