The Illiquidity Discount of Life Insurance Investments

We incorporate an illiquid life insurance investment in the multi-period investment strategy of an investor with constant relative risk aversion and independent and identically distributed returns. In our setup, the liquid and the illiquid assets are risky and correlated and the illiquid investment cannot be rebalanced. We calculate the illiquidity discount as the difference in certainty equivalent rates of return between the optimal strategy with all assets being rebalanced in each period and the strategy with the illiquid investment. Calibrating our model to data of the German market we find a negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and the illiquidity discount when the investor does not rebalance at all. However, when the investor rebalances his liquid assets in each period to hedge against the illiquid investment the illiquidity discount becomes economically negligible.     

Adaptation and inertia in dynamic environments

Research summary : We address conflicting claims and mixed empirical findings about adaptation as a response to increased environmental dynamism. We disentangle distinct dimensions of environmental dynamism—the direction, magnitude, and frequency of change—and identify how selection shapes adaptive responses to these dimensions. Our results show how frequent directional changes undermine the value of exploration and decisively shift performance advantages to inert organizations that restrict exploration. In contrast, increased environmental variance rewards exploration. Our results also show that, in dynamic environments, the best‐performing organizations are generally more inert than less successful organizations. Managerial summary : Our research helps managers to understand under what business conditions investments into exploration and strategic flexibility are more likely to pay off. Dynamic business environments characterized by persistent trends and by large, infrequently occurring structural shocks reward strategic pursuit of temporary advantage. Thus, exploration and strategic flexibility are preferred strategies. In contrast, the challenge in frequently changing environments with fleeting opportunities is to identify and to focus on strategic actions whose payoffs on average are high, independent of environmental volatility. Low levels of exploration and long‐term strategic focus are preferred strategies in these circumstances. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Actor and Institutional Dynamics in the Development of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives

As forms of private self-regulation, multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have emerged as an important empirical phenomenon in global governance processes. At the same time, MSIs are also theoretically intriguing because of their inherent double nature. On the one hand, MSIs spell out CSR standards that define norms for corporate behavior. On the other hand, MSIs are also the resultof corporate and stakeholder behavior. We combine the perspectives of institutional theory and club theory to conceptualize this double nature of MSIs. Based on a stage model that looks at the interplay of actor and institutional dynamics, we generate insights into why actors join a voluntary MSI, how the various motivations and intentions of the actors influence the standard development, and how these as well as the MSI design are subsequently influenced by both external (institutional) and internal (club) dynamics.     

UNDERSTANDING MEMBER CHARACTERISTICS AND COOPERATIVE PRICE EFFECTS: THE CASE OF THE ARGENTINEAN DAIRY SECTOR

Since the 1990s, Argentinean dairy‐processing cooperatives have lost considerable amounts of members and market share. We analyse their current role by investigating the characteristics of farmers who continue delivering to them and price differentials between cooperatives and investor‐oriented firms (IOFs). A probit regression model applied to 917 farmers suggests that cooperative farmers are more disadvantaged than farmers delivering to IOFs in terms of education, farm size and productive technology. Moreover, t‐tests applied to data representing 70 per cent of national volume indicate that farmers delivering to cooperatives are between 11 per cent and 29 per cent smaller than those delivering to IOFs, depending on province. A hierarchical multilevel regression model applied to 9,720 transactions among farmers and processors shows that, after controlling for quantity and quality, cooperatives pay lower (3.5%) but more stable prices than IOFs. In a context of rapid structural change, we observe a market in which larger farmers deliver to IOFs and smaller farmers deliver to cooperatives and conclude that, at the expense of paying lower prices, cooperatives may act as buyers of last resort for otherwise disadvantaged farmers.     

Trading the forward bias: Are there limits to speculation?

In this paper we investigate whether trading the forward bias allows for economically significant excess returns. We find that bias-trading strategies can be viewed as attractive investment opportunities per se, useful diversification devices, and promising portfolio extensions for active fund managers trying to beat their benchmarks. The empirical results, which also mirror the problems arising in attempts to explain the puzzle by risk-premia, are consistent with market evidence that the bias is traded in practice. Overall, our findings suggest that limits to speculation are unlikely to provide a (stand-alone) explanation for the persistence of the forward bias.     

Long term risk sharing contracts as an approach to establish public–private partnerships for investment into next generation access networks

This paper develops an investment/pricing model for the deployment of basic broadband networks which, along with other applications, is applicable to public–private partnership projects. In particular, a new investment model is suggested to be used for finance deployment over a longer term by enabling both private and public investors to participate in the roll-out of next generation access (NGA) infrastructure. This so-called “long-term risk sharing concept” has several notable benefits compared with the traditional regulatory approach. Above all, the model enables both private operators and public authorities to share the risk of investing in NGA infrastructure. Thus the model offers a way for public authorities to achieve a timely and countrywide roll-out of NGA networks, including in areas where NGA investment would otherwise not occur.     

Future images of meat consumption in 2030

The issue of meat consumption has been a subject of interest that has been looked at from environmental, animal and human perspectives. This paper contributes to the discussion by clarifying the diversity of views with regard to the future of meat consumption. Two round Delphi expert interviews and a consumer survey were conducted in order to collect information. Five coherent future images were constructed: Traditional Approach, Business as Usual, Humans First, Wellness and Vegetarian Society. The discussion part of the paper presents possible ways of influencing meat consumption according to the holders of these different images of the future.     

Which past returns affect trading volume?

Anecdotal evidence suggests and recent theoretical models argue that past stock returns affect subsequent stock trading volume. We study 3,000 individual investors over a 51 month period to test this apparent link between past returns and volume using several different panel regression models (linear panel regressions, negative binomial panel regressions, Tobit panel regressions). We find that both past market returns as well as past portfolio returns affect trading activity of individual investors (as measured by stock portfolio turnover, the number of stock transactions, and the propensity to trade stocks in a given month). After high portfolio returns, investors buy high risk stocks and reduce the number of stocks in their portfolio. High past market returns do not lead to higher risk taking or underdiversification. We argue that the only explanations for our findings are overconfidence theories based on biased self-attribution and differences of opinion explanations for high levels of trading activity.     

The Choice of Prices versus Quantities under Uncertainty

This paper analyzes a duopoly model with stochastic demand in which firms first commit to a strategy variable and compete afterwards. We find that in equilibrium the relative magnitude of demand uncertainty and the degree of substitutability determines firms' variable choice. Firms set prices if uncertainty is high compared to the degree of substitutability and quantities if the reverse holds true. The reason is that demand uncertainty and the degree of substitutability have countervailing effects on variable choice: Prices adapt better to uncertainty while quantities induce softer competition. If no effect dominates, firms choose different strategy variables in equilibrium.     

Do VCs matter? the importance of owners on performance variance in start‐up firms

Adding to the corporate effect literature, we study the effect of owners on firm performance in a new context, that of venture capital firms (VCs) and the start‐up firms in which they invest. After discussing the effect that VC ownership can have on start‐ups, we estimate that start‐up‐specific, owner (VC), and year effects account for significant variance in performance (26.3 percent, 11.2 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively). The effects of industry and investment stage are not statistically different from zero. We also provide an analysis that separates the owner effect into two components: a selection component—which impacts investment—and a management component—which explains significant variance in performance. By examining the owner effect in a different institutionalized form of governance—that of the start‐up and its relationship to VC owners—our study also contributes to an understanding of the ‘ownership’ effect in the strategy literature more generally. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.