The resource-based theory and human resources

This paper applies the resource-based theory on human resources and analyzes its effect on human resource management. This focus considers that each firm is heterogeneous, and it can keep that heterogeneity for a long period of time. A resource is a kind of production factor which is at the firms' disposal, that is, each one is controlled by the firm in spite of having no property right to it. Additionally, any resource is able to create a competitive advantage if it has certain features. This paper will analyze whether human resources can be considered strategic. The answer will be positive because employees are able to create a sustainable competitive advantage, making human resource management a key function. Finally, some practices of human resource management will be named that could make it possible to attain a higher position than a competitor.     

Economic Implications of Demographic Change: Diversity Dividend or Deficit?

The economic implications of demographic change depend on steadfast investments in research and development; replenishment of the human capital stock diminished by retiring Baby Boomers; and raising college attainment rates. This way the United States can leverage its diverse, fast-growing population to harness a demographic dividend—the productivity boost enabled by declining fertility—while also fueling economic growth, restocking the Social Security system, and bolstering global competitiveness.     

Top executive commitment to the status quo: Some tests of its determinants

Some top executives are more committed to the status quo—particularly to their organization's current strategy and leadership profile—than are others. Most empirical research on upper echelons treats psychological phenomena as a ‘black box’—the unobserved intervening mechanisms—that causes associations between more observable executive characteristics and organizational outcomes. In contrast, this paper attempts to directly examine the determinants of an important element of an executive's psychological orientation—commitment to the status quo (CSQ). We focus on a select set of variables which have been posited in prior research as determinants of executive CSQ, but which have not been directly tested for such a relationship. Based on a large-scale survey methodology, results suggest that an executive's tenure in an industry is a pronounced determinant of CSQ, and has significantly more impact than organizational tenure. As expected, the firm's current performance was found to be positively related to CSQ; this relationship was stronger in high-discretion than in low-discretion industries. Finally, the project reaffirms a well known human tendency: incumbent CEOs tend to believe that their eventual successors should be just like them.     

Fishing Technology and Optimal Distribution of Harvest Rates

This paper examines the problem of the optimal management of a joint-ownership fishing exploitation, where agents use different fishing gears. We consider a model in which the fishing activity may affect resource growth, not only through the harvest function but also through the natural growth rate of the resource. This allows us to capture the fact that some fishing gears alter the natural growth rate of the resource. We find that when the natural growth of the resource is altered by the fishing technology, the optimal stock is not independent of how harvest quotas are distribute among the agents. As a result, a fishing policy that firstly determines the optimum stock and, secondly, decides how to distribute the harvest among the different agents, will not be efficient. We also analyze the joint determination of optimal stock and harvest quotas and show that positive harvest quotas will only be optimal when countries are characterized by certain asymmetries.     

Decision theories and probabilistic insurance: an experimental test

This paper reports the results of an experiment in which probabilistic insurance, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is compared both with full insurance and no insurance. The experimental results conform to the intuitive prediction that risk-averse agents who are indifferent between full insurance and no insurance, will prefer full insurance to probabilistic insurance and probabilistic insurance to no insurance. The first conclusion is incompatible with the predictions of expected utility theory, and the second with Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory. We also show that Loomes and Sudgen's regret theory can easily accommodate these intuitive results. JEL Classification: C91, D81. We are most grateful to Graham Loomes and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, under project BEC2001-0535, and from the Generalitat Valenciana under project GRUPOS03/086, is gratefully acknowledeged.     

Branching,lending and competition in Italian banking

With the liberalization of legal barriers to the opening of bank branches in 1990, both market structure and competitive conditions in Italy changed profoundly as banks expanded their branching networks. This paper provides novel empirical evidence on how changes of the branch network structure at the province level affect the performance and lending activity of banks across the period 1993–2011. In particular, we adopt two modes of analysis. The first focuses on the impact of diversification strategies on performance, lending and funding strategies at the province level. The second one examines how the increase of big banks' local presence affects single-market bank performance and lending strategies. Our results show that geographical diversification strategies can reduce performance, the adjusted Lerner Index of banks and lending activities, but increase the Lerner Index in deposit markets. Furthermore, we find that the expansion of branches by large-medium sized banks in concentrated markets can reduce the Lerner Index for the deposit market and the amount of loans offered by single-market banks.     

Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for a two-stage game of asset creation

The paper studies a two-stage economy where consumers choose first the asset structure and then use it in a standard general equilibrium framework to transfer wealth across time and states of nature. The financial structure is chosen by maximizing indirect utility functions, using continuous random selections from the second-stage equilibrium correspondence. We depart from Bisin (J Econ Theory 82:19–45, 1998) where an endogenous beliefs approach was used and the asset creation was left to financial intermediaries. Moreover, our approach allows us to go beyond a mixed strategies result as we obtain an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for the economy with incomplete information about future endowments.     

Wage differentials by sector and gender: a quantile analysis for the Spanish case

This paper analyses existing wage differentials between workers in the public and private sectors and by gender in Spain. This analysis is run throughout the entire earnings distribution and observed wage differentials are decomposed into a part explained by differences in productive characteristics and a part due to differences in returns to such characteristics. Our results show that public sector workers tend to earn higher wages than private employees, although most of this sector wage gap is due to better public workers’ productive characteristics. A wage premium in favour of men is also found in both the public and private sectors, with the gender wage gap greater at the top of the earnings distribution.