Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices

We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanismson bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impactof shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders)on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholdercontrol is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firmis exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence ofshareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differencesin takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points.Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associatedwith strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bondcovenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interestsdiverge.     

Voluntary Contributions to Multiple Public Projects

The problem of financing a set of discrete public goods (facilities, projects) by private contributions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game , is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This contribution game is shown to be a generalized ordinal potential game ; a best–response in the contribution game implies a best response in a coordination game in which the payoff to all players is the utilitarian collective welfare function, i.e., the sum of the utility functions of the players. Strategy profiles maximizing utilitarian welfare are strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Each strong Nash equilibrium corresponds in a natural way with a core element of the realization game, and vice versa. Moreover, each strong Nash equilibrium is coalitional proof.     

A note on the existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models

We study the one-way flow model of network formation with owner-homogeneous link costs and heterogeneous profits. Recently, several proofs of existence of Nash networks are discussed in literature. The proof by Billand et al. (Econ Theory, 2007, forthcoming) is based on a nice and clear idea, but the technical elaboration is tedious and too complex in our opinion. In this note, we provide an alternative and easy accessible proof based on the same idea. Also, we show by means of a counterexample that Nash networks may not exist for games where link costs are heterogeneous, but arbitrarily close to owner-homogeneity.     

Binary misclassification and identification in regression models

We study a regression model with a binary explanatory variable that is subject to misclassification errors. The regression coefficient is then only partially identified. We derive several results that relate different assumptions about the misclassification probabilities and the conditional variances to the size of the identified set.     

Two price economies in continuous time

Static and discrete time pricing operators for two price economies are reviewed and then generalized to the continuous time setting of an underlying Hunt process. The continuous time operators define nonlinear partial integro–differential equations that are solved numerically for the three valuations of bid, ask and expectation. The operators employ concave distortions by inducing a probability into the infinitesimal generator of a Hunt process. This probability is then distorted. Two nonlinear operators based on different approaches to truncating small jumps are developed and termed $QV$ for quadratic variation and $NL$ for normalized Lévy. Examples illustrate the resulting valuations. A sample book of derivatives on a single underlier is employed to display the gap between the bid and ask values for the book and the sum of comparable values for the components of the book.     

Cartelization Through Buyer Groups

Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to commit credibly to increased input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input costs are then refunded from suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The stability of such an ‘implied cartel’ depends on the retailers’ incentives to source their inputs secretly from a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement at lower input prices. Cheating is limited if retailers sign exclusive dealing or minimum purchase provisions. We discuss the relevancy of our findings for antitrust policy.