The True Meaning of ‘Social Justice’: A Catholic View of Hayek

Hayek's well‐known dismissal of the concept of ‘social justice’ is examined and questioned. While basically agreeing with Hayek's critique, the author argues that we should not entirely reject this concept, although it is often used in a vague and emotional way – ‘social justice talk’. Drawing on the tradition of classical liberalism and Catholic social teaching, he makes the case for the true meaning of social justice, which applies to the basic legal and institutional framework of a society rather than the distributional outcomes of market processes.     

Propuesta de indicadores SMARTER de trabajo decente para la agenda de desarrollo posterior a 2015

Los indicadores actuales de los ODM sobre empleo presentan deficiencias importantes, como problemas de medición, uso inadecuado de estadísticas agregadas, ambigüedad interpretativa y supuestos de base no aplicables a los países en desarrollo. Tratando de superar estos problemas, los autores proponen cuatro nuevos indicadores de empleo productivo y trabajo decente: el crecimiento de la contribución del trabajo al valor añadido por trabajador, la tasa de trabajadores pobres y los porcentajes de trabajadores que ganan menos de un ingreso laboral mínimo absoluto y relativo (el 60 por ciento de la mediana del ingreso laboral). Aplican empíricamente estos indicadores a los casos de Uganda y Perú.     

Marketmaking in the Laboratory: Does Competition Matter?

This paper is the first experimental study of the effects of competition and adverse selection on the performance of market maker (MM-) markets. Information distribution may is either symmetric or heterogeneous. MM-markets are either monopolistic (the specialist markets), or competitive (the multi MM-market). Welfare comparisons are with respect to a continuous double auction (DA-) market. Informed subjects receive an imperfect signal of the true state of the world. We find three main results. First, competition among market makers significantly reduces the bid-ask spread, and increases transaction volume. Second, competition among market makers induces competitive undercutting, yielding net trading losses for market makers as a group in most periods. Third, from the perspective of uninformed traders, a competing MM-regime is optimal, since it minimizes their expected trading losses.     

Which school systems sort weaker students into smaller classes? International evidence

We examine whether the sorting of high- and low-achieving students into classes of different sizes results in a regressive or compensatory pattern of class sizes for 18 national school systems. Sorting effects are identified by subtracting the causal effect of class size on performance from their total correlation. Our empirical results reveal strongly compensatory patterns of sorting within and especially between schools in many countries. Only the United States, which has a decentralized education finance and considerable residential mobility, exhibits regressive between-school sorting. Between-school sorting is more compensatory in systems with ability tracking. Within-school sorting is more compensatory where administrators rather than teachers assign students to classrooms.     

Uncertainty and sustainability in the management of rangelands

We analyze a dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic model of grazing management in semi-arid rangelands. The ecosystem is driven by stochastic precipitation. A risk averse farmer chooses a grazing management strategy under uncertainty such as to maximize expected utility from farming income. Grazing management strategies are rules about which share of the rangeland is given rest depending on the actual rainfall in that year. In a first step we determine a myopic farmer's optimal grazing management strategy and show that a risk averse farmer chooses a strategy such as to obtain insurance from the ecosystem: the optimal strategy reduces income variability, but yields less mean income than possible. In a second step we analyze the long-run ecological and economic impact of different strategies. We conclude that a myopic farmer, if he is sufficiently risk averse, will choose a sustainable grazing management strategy, even if he does not take into account long-term ecological and economic benefits of conservative strategies.     

The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmström-Milgrom type

The paper extends the Holmström-Milgrom [B. Holmström, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives, Econometrica 55 (1987) 303-328] analysis of intertemporal incentive provision to allow for the implementation of actions on the boundary of the feasible set. Boundary actions provide the principal with some freedom in choosing incentive schemes. This can be used to reduce premia. The paper characterizes optimal incentive schemes for the continuous-time Brownian-motion model and its discrete-time approximations. Linearity of incentive schemes in “accounts” is confirmed. However, for models with effort costs depending only on mean returns, the availability of boundary actions destroys the linearity of optimal incentive schemes in profits.     

The Power of Networks: Integration and Financial Cooperative Performance

Abstract ** :  The purpose of this paper is to perform a cross‐country survey of the level of integration of systems of financial cooperatives (FC) and its effect on measures of performance. We develop a classification scheme based on a theoretical framework that builds on published work using transaction cost economics (TCE) to explain integration of large numbers of financial cooperatives into networks. We identify three critical levels of increasing integration we call respectively atomized systems, consensual networks and strategic networks. Further, we test some of the propositions that result from the theoretical framework on an international sample of financial cooperative systems. Based on this analysis we can conclude that: (i) Integration is less (more) important in developing (more developed) countries and for very small (large) financial cooperatives as a determinant of efficiency. However, integration tends to reduce volatility of efficiency and performance regardless of development. (ii) Integration appears to help control measure of managers' expense preferences that tend to affect performance of FC. (iii) Despite high costs of running hub‐like organizations in highly integrated system, these systems economize in bounded rationality and operate at lower costs than less integrated systems.     

The influence of entrepreneurs’ social referents on start-up size

This paper uses social comparison theory to explore the effect that the average size of established businesses at the regional (provincial) level may have on start-up size. It is argued that established entrepreneurs at the regional level become referents of new entrepreneurs, influencing not only the decision to become entrepreneurs but also the characteristics of the new venture, such as its initial size. Specifically, the greater the average size of established businesses at the provincial level, the bigger the start-up size of new ventures. This paper further considers how this effect is moderated by two key individual level variables: knowing an entrepreneur personally (i.e., close social referent), and being the owner and manager of an existing business (i.e., past entrepreneurial and managerial experience). Predictions are tested using data that combine individual- and provincial-level information in Spain over the period 2008–2014. The results show the positive relationship of the average size of established businesses on new venture start-up size, and that this effect decreases when the entrepreneurs have previous entrepreneurial experience.     

Behavioral agency and corporate entrepreneurship: CEO equity incentives & competitive behavior

Scholars have long studied drivers of entrepreneurial behavior among established firms. Yet little is known about how individual factors shape a firm’s choice to pursue entrepreneurship. We draw on behavioral agency theory to explore the role of equity incentives in driving corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings suggest CEOs avoid corporate entrepreneurial behaviors as their option wealth increases. However industry dynamics also prove to be an important contingency when predicting the effects of both restricted stock and stock options on the likelihood that the CEO engages in corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings provide a theoretical platform for predicting dimensions of entrepreneurial behavior and highlight effects of CEO equity ownership.