MANAGING CHANGE IN SUPPLY CHAINS: A PROCESS COMPARISON

The coordination required to successfully implement supply chain initiatives suggest that supply chain management change processes may possess some unique characteristics. Yet, empirical studies are scarce to support this logic. Using an empirical design and data obtained from managers, and drawing largely from Lewin's change process conceptualization, this study compares the process of supply chain management change to non‐supply chain management change. Further investigation into monitoring and control of supply chain management change is advised.     

Backcasting energy futures using industrial ecology

Backcasting has been widely used for developing energy futures. This paper explores the potential for using industrial ecology to guide the development of energy futures within a backcasting framework. Building on the backcasting work of Robinson [1], a seven step method is presented to embed industrial ecology principles within the development and assessment of future scenarios and transition paths toward them. The approach is applied to the case of backcasting regional energy futures in the Latrobe Valley, near Melbourne, Australia. This region has substantial brown coal deposits which are currently mined and used in coal-fired power stations to generate electricity. Bounded by a sustainability vision for the region in a carbon-constrained world, regional industrial ecologies in 2050 were backcast around three themes: bio-industries and renewables (no coal usage); electricity from coal with carbon capture and storage (low to high coal usage); and coal to products such as hydrogen, ammonia, diesel, methanol, plastics and char (demonstrating medium to high overall coal use relative to current levels). Potential environmental, technological, socio-political and economic impacts of each scenario across various life cycle stages were characterised. Results offer a platform for regional policy development to underpin deliberation on a preferred future by the community, industry and other stakeholders. Industrial ecology principles were found to be useful in backcasting for creatively articulating alternative futures featuring industrial symbiosis. However, enabling the approach to guide implementation of sustainable transition pathways requires further development and would benefit from integration within the Strategic Sustainable Development framework of Robèrt et al. [2].     

Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings

A burgeoning literature in experimental studies of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism focuses on the ability of institutions that allow the monitoring, sanctioning, and/or rewarding of others to facilitate cooperation. In this paper rewards and sanctions are examined in a one-shot VCM setting that so far has been unexplored in the literature. The study finds that while some subjects are willing to reward and sanction others at a personal cost, the opportunity to reward or sanction is ineffective in facilitating cooperation relative to previous experiments in which a repeated game environment is employed. The study also compares behavior in an environment in which the imposition of rewards and sanctions is certain to an environment in which imposition is uncertain. The expected value of the reward or sanction is kept constant across environments to focus simply on the effect of uncertainty about imposition. Uncertainty does not change behavior in a significant way, either in the level of cooperation or the willingness of individuals to impose rewards or sanctions.     

Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms

The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals finds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign firms are either multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous firms, we find equilibria in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study the case of endogenously chosen tariffs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the socially optimal tariffs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous firms, we find that non-cooperative tariffs promote the existence of low-productivity firms relative to the socially optimal tariffs. This highlights a new source of inefficiency from tariff competition not found in models of homogeneous firms. In addition, we find that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariff when FDI is a potential firm structure is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariff competition.     

Rational conjectures and evolutionary beliefs in public goods games

This paper applies conjectural variations (CVs) to a model of public good provision and shows that CVs are superior to Nash beliefs. In addition to imposing consistency, as Bresnahan, I show that consistent conjectures (CCs) are obtained from individual payoff maximization. CCs emerge as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (NE) in a two-stage game in which beliefs are chosen in Stage 1 and quantities in Stage 2. There is an individual payoff advantage to non-Nash behavior, generating a Prisoner's Dilemma in conjectures in addition to the usual free-rider problem associated with public goods. The correct and payoff maximizing conjecture is the unique equilibrium in an evolutionary framework against a player with Nash conjectures. The consistent conjecture equilibrium is the unique evolutionary equilibrium when both players conjectures evolve. Hence, the NE prediction is too optimistic when players have rational conjectures.     

The political economy of decarbonisation: from green energy ‘race’ to green ‘division of labour’

This paper aims to provide an addendum to the rapidly growing concept of a global ‘green energy race’ between major states. It argues that although this framing has been useful in underscoring important dynamics in the process of decarbonisation, its narrow focus on installed capacity obscures a much broader and more complex process at play. In particular, it overlooks the critical role played by states aggressively investing in R&D and export manufacturing in the renewable energy sector. The paper thus supplements the concept of a green ‘energy race’ with that of a green ‘global division of labour’, which sees the process of decarbonisation not exclusively as an effort by individual states to install renewables domestically, but rather as a collective and interdependent process by dozens of states, all striving in different ways to promote capital accumulation on their soil. The paper provides an overview of data covering innovation, manufacturing and deployment in the clean energy sector, and offers a theoretical analysis of the trends observed.     

A quantification of minimum floor space requirements

In order to live and maintain life, people require some amount of shelter as protection against nature's elements. This paper investigates minimum areas required for shelter. To this end, standards of floor space for households consisting of one to five persons and available from the World Wide Web were obtained for locations in the United States, Canada, Scotland, England, Denmark, India, Hong Kong, Thailand and refugee camps. While some variation exists among regions, particularly for larger households, plotted data indicate a convergence to a minimum requirement of about 140 square feet for single-person households     

Strongly stable networks

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a “top convexity” condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be non-anonymous—depending on player labels.