Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery

In an economy with private information, we introduce the notion of objects of choice as lists of bundles out of which the market selects one for delivery. This leads to an extension of the model of Arrow–Debreu that is used to study trade ex ante with private state verification. Under the assumption that agents are prudent, equilibrium is characterized by the fact that agents consume bundles with the same utility in states that they do not distinguish. This is a weaker condition than the restriction of equal consumption imposed by Radner (Econometrica 36(1), 31–58, 1968), therefore, some no trade situations are avoided and the efficiency of trade increases.     

Die Geschäftsleiterkontrolle im Versicherungsaufsichtsrecht

The material risks, which can derive from insurance companies, legitimate the severe limitation of the insurance company manager’s constitutional right of the freedom of work. The reliability in insurance company managers is basically assumed. It can regularly only dispensed with a qualified infringement of law, not by a decline in moral standards. In this context the eligibility of infringements has to be detected by a valuation. Therefore the criteria besides the whole purpose of the German Insurance Supervision Act (VAG) are met in: The gravity of the offence, the reference to the occupation, frequency, the future comportment as well as the time lapse. Business judgements are categoricaly not approachable to the supervision of reliability.     

Individual Agents,Firms, and the Real Estate Brokerage Process

This study examines how individual agents affect house selling prices and time on the market while controlling for brokerage firm-specific effects as well as supply and demand conditions that vary by neighborhood. Firm size effects disappear once firm specialization and agent characteristics are taken into account but geographic concentration by firms leads to higher selling prices. For individual agents, neither sex nor selling own listings affects price or selling time, but there are gains from partnering transactions across firms. Agents who specialize in listing properties obtain higher prices for their sellers while those who specialize in selling obtain lower prices for their buyers. Houses nearer to other transactions of an agent sell for higher prices. Finally, greater scale of listing and selling activity by an agent tends to lower selling price or lengthen the time on the market.

The Economic Impact of SFAS NO. 157

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, “Fair Value Measurements,” (SFAS 157) defines fair value, establishes a three tiered framework for measuring fair value and expands the required disclosures about fair value measurements. The objective of this study is to examine and evaluate the benefits of the information disclosed by SFAS 157. The results of our study indicated that a large majority of the inputs are observable in that 93.5% of the sample financial assets and 93.1% of the sample financial liabilities were measured by level 1 or 2 criteria. However, we found a mismatch between assets and liabilities subject to the three tiers of fair value measurements. The companies in our sample disclosed $18.8 trillion in total assets, with 51%, or $18.8 trillion in total assets, with 51%, or 9.5 trillion reported at fair value. Whereas, sample company liabilities totaled 16.1 trillion with only16.1 trillion with only 3.7 trillion or 23% reported at fair value.     

Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

I consider a model of plea bargaining with multiple codefendants. I mainly compare the equilibrium outcomes under joint negotiations whereby both defendants can observe both plea offers and under separate (secret) negotiations whereby they can observe only their own respective offer. Contrary to the widespread perceptions, the prosecutor is made worse off under secret negotiations or at best as well off as under joint negotiations. I also discuss the implication of equilibrium offers on fairness.      

Minority banks and minority communities: Are minority banks good neighbors?

The lagging development of many minority communities has had an adverse effect on economic growth in the United States. One factor historically associated with creating or exacerbating this minority problem is the unwillingness of banks to service minority communities adequately. The federal government used two initiatives to address banks' reluctance to aid minorities: the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) that ended the practice of redlining and required all federally regulated banks to demonstrate that they served the convenience and credit needs of their local communities, particularly minorities, women, and other underserved groups, and the establishment and preservation of minority owned banks that were expected to be more sympathetic to the needs of their communities. This paper evaluates the extent to which minority banks have met the needs of minority communities. The assessment is conducted in the context of the ratings received by minority banks on their Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) audits. Through the use of CRA audits, the performance of minority banks is also compared to the performance of the general banking community to determine the validity and success of the government's minority banking initiative. Analysis of CRA audit ratings also compares the performance of minority banks among different ethnicities.     

Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games

In this paper, we analyze a model where individuals from finite populations are repeatedly drawn to play a finite game and in every period choose a weakly better reply to a sample distribution from a finite history of past play. For all finite games and sufficiently incomplete information, we prove convergence to minimal sets closed under better replies. This result complements previous findings in a deterministic continuous-time framework and implies convergence to strict Nash equilibria in many well-known classes of games.     

Demand for redistribution,support for the welfare state,and party identification in Austria

This paper describes subjective wage inequality and the demand for redistribution in Austria using individuals’ estimates of occupational wages from the International Social Survey Program. Although these estimates differ widely across individuals, the data clearly show that most individuals would like to decrease wage inequality, relative to the level of inequality which they perceive to exist. The empirical analysis also shows that the demand for redistribution is strongly associated not only with variables describing self-interested motives for redistribution, but also with perceptions of and social norms with respect to inequality. Further, the demand for redistribution is a strong predictor for whether an individual is supportive of redistribution by the state. On the other hand, however, I find almost no evidence for an empirical association between the demand for redistribution and individuals’ party identification.