A Model of an Oligopoly in an Insurance Market

This article analyzes the behavior of an oligopoly of risk-averse insurers that insure many consumers facing identical independent risks; however, the probability of a loss is ex ante not known with certainty. It is shown that there is a continuum of equilibria in the Bertrand game. The most plausible equilibrium can be obtained by requiring that all insurers are content with the number of policies they sell given the equilibrium premium.     

Imperfect Agency and the Regulation of Hospitals

This article addresses the combined problem of imperfect agency and asymmetric information in the regulation of hospitals by modeling the physician as a utility maximizer with both the utility of patients and profit of the hospital as arguments in his or her utility function. The article concludes that optimal regulation of hospitals is based on three important factors: the doctor's marginal rate of substitution between profit of the hospital and utility of the patients, moral hazard in the relationship between the regulator and the hospital, and adverse selection in the same relation.     

Sustainable energy prices and growth: Comparing macroeconomic and backcasting scenarios

How do results from the sustainability research world of backcasting relate to the macroeconomic scenarios used for policy evaluation and planning? The answer is that they don't, mostly — they come from different scientific traditions and are not used in the same contexts. Yet they often deal with the same issues. We believe that much can be gained by bringing the two systems of thinking together. This paper is a first attempt to do so, by making qualitative comparisons between different scenarios and highlighting benefits and limitations to each of them.Why are the pictures we get of the energy future so different if we use a macroeconomic model from when using a backcasting approach based on sustainable energy use? It is evident that the methods for producing those two kinds of scenarios differ a lot, but the main reason behind the different results are found in the starting points rather than in the methods. Baseline assumptions are quite different, as well as the interpretations and importance attached to signals about the future. In this paper, it is discussed how those two types of scenarios differ and how they approach issues such as energy prices and growth.The discussion is based on a comparison between Swedish economic and sustainability scenarios. The economic scenarios aim at being forecasts of the future and are used as decision support for long-term policies. But are the assumptions in the economic scenarios reasonable? The sustainability scenarios are explicitly normative backcasting scenarios. They do not take the issue of growth and consumption fully into account. Could they be developed in this respect? The comparison between the scenarios is also used to look closer at the issue of energy prices in a society with sustainable energy use. One of the questions raised is if a low energy society calls for high energy prices. Moreover, the effects of tradable permits versus energy taxes is analysed in the context of how energy use could be kept low in a growing economy.     

Corporate Governance and Strategic Change in SMEs: The Effects of Ownership,Board Composition and Top Management Teams

This paper investigates how governance mechanisms affect the ability of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to introduce strategic change. Previous research typically assumes that governance mechanisms operate independently of each other. Building on agency theory and insights from the literature on small firm governance, we hypothesize that governance variables related to ownership, the board of directors and the top management team all affect strategic change and that it is important to examine the interaction effects of these governance mechanisms. Using a longitudinal sample of over 800 SMEs, our general logic and hypotheses are supported by the analyses. We find that closely held firms exhibit less strategic change than do SMEs relying on more widespread ownership structures. However, to some extent, closely held firms can overcome these weaknesses and achieve strategic change by utilizing outside directors on the board and/or extending the size of the top management teams. Implications for theory and management practice in SMEs are discussed. All three authors have contributed equally to the paper. Their names are listed alphabetically.