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21.
Maxim Engers 《European Economic Review》2006,50(7):1791-1815
This paper examines whether the optimal unilateral R&D policy for an open economy is a subsidy or a tax. It constructs a general equilibrium model with three successive layers of international integration: (a) trade in goods, (b) trade in technologies with international R&D spillovers and (c) internationally-coordinated R&D policy. Trade in technologies introduces the possibility that an R&D subsidy will have such strong, negative terms-of-trade effects that it harms domestic welfare. Numerical simulations of the OECD show this is a possibility for the US and Japan. With international R&D spillovers a domestic R&D subsidy may reduce domestic innovation. 相似文献
22.
We illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of insurance market regulation. We calibrate and solve a model of the United Kingdom's compulsory annuity market and examine the impact of gender-based pricing restrictions. We find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous Social Security-like annuity contracts. Our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical insurance market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis. 相似文献
23.
24.
John M. Finkelstein 《Journal of Macroeconomics》1980,2(4):351-364
This study employs a general equilibrium model of the financial sector to evaluate the impact of changing asset-side versus liability-side constraints on effective monetary control. On the basis of maximizing assumptions for individual and institutional behavior, it is possible to conclude qualitatively that asset-side constraints (e.g., a loan reserve requirement and/or a bank capital/assets ratio) automatically stabilize the economy by reducing the expected fluctuations of the rate of return on physical capital. By contrast, the stabilization impact of liability-side constraints (e.g., a deposit reserve requirement and/or a bank capital/deposits ratio) is found to be ambiguous. 相似文献
25.
Summary. Models of spatial competition are typically static, and exhibit multiple free-entry equilibria. Incumbent firms can earn
rents in equilibrium because any potential entrant expects a significantly lower market share (since it must fit into a niche
between incumbent firms) along with fiercer price competition. Previous research has usually concentrated on the zero-profit
equilibrium, at which there is normally excessive entry, and so an entry tax would improve the allocation of resources. At
the other extreme, the equilibrium with the greatest rent per firm normally entails insufficient entry, so an entry subsidy
should be prescribed. A model of sequential firm entry (with an exogenous order of moves) resolves the multiplicity problem
but raises a new difficulty: firms that enter earlier can expect higher spatial rents, and so firms prefer to be earlier in
the entry order. This tension disappears when firms can compete for entry positions. We therefore suppose that firms can commit
capital early to the market in order to lay claim to a particular location. This temporal competition dissipates spatial rents
in equilibrium and justifies the sequential move structure. However, the policy implications are quite different once time
is introduced. An atemporal analysis of the sequential entry process would prescribe an entry subsidy, but once proper account
is taken of the entry dynamics, a tax may be preferable.
Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: September 22, 1999 相似文献
26.
Maxim Ivanov 《Economic Theory》2013,52(1):337-365
This paper analyzes a market with multiple sellers and horizontally differentiated products. We investigate the sellers’ incentives to reveal product relevant information that affects the buyer’s private valuation. The main finding is that if the number of sellers is sufficiently large, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with full information disclosure. Thus, unlike the results by Lewis and Sappington (Int Econ Rev 35:309–327, 1994) and Johnson and Myatt (Am Econ Rev 93:756–784, 2006) for monopoly, which state that the monopolist reveals either full information or no information, intense competition results in a single extreme with respect to information disclosure. We show that the market is always inefficient, but the magnitude of inefficiency converges to zero at a high rate as competition intensifies. 相似文献
27.
Scientific controversies are associated with significant uncertainty. Despite this uncertainty, available knowledge must be communicated to the public, who are potentially at risk. There are contradictions in the existing literature about the value of communicating uncertainty associated with science. Some scientists and decision-makers believe that communicating uncertainty to the public will produce panic and confusion, and will discredit science. Others believe that uncertainty must be communicated to increase trust in science. We tested reactions to communication about uncertainty related to the controversial link between exposure to endocrine disrupters and a decline in human male fertility. Our empirical setup used focus groups and qualitative analysis of participants’ perceived uncertainty and their emotions. The results show that laypeople raise more and different uncertainties than those communicated by researchers. Moreover, laypeople did not react to uncertainty ‘globally;’ they had different reactions to the different sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty did not elicit panic in this case study. Rather, uncertainty was reassuring, except when it was associated with an inability to precisely identify and, therefore, control the cause of male reproductive disorders. We discuss the emotions expressed and their relationships with communication about scientific uncertainty (powerlessness, guilt, outrage, etc.). We also note that feelings of confusion increase after uncertainty has been communicated. 相似文献
28.
Maxim Sinitsyn 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2016,25(1):161-178
In this paper, I examine how firms should position their complementary products. I assume that there are two competing firms, each producing two complementary products. Each firm decides whether to employ strategies that enhance the quality of the fit (the degree of complementarity) between its pair of complementary products before competing in prices. The consumers have heterogeneous tastes for the four possible bundles. They are willing to pay a price premium in order to purchase a bundle from the same firm if this firm chose to make such bundle more attractive. I find that increasing the degree of complementarity between a firm's complementary products intensifies price competition and often leads to smaller profits. Only when complementarity‐enhancing strategies significantly increase the demand for a firm's matching bundle, does the firm benefit from employing them. The highest profits for both firms are obtained when both firms do not employ complementarity‐enhancing strategies. Deteriorating the quality of the fit between one's own and a rival's complementary products is never profitable. 相似文献
29.
30.
We extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary. 相似文献