Normative and positive theories of public finance: contrasting Musgrave and Buchanan

This paper assesses James M. Buchanan's claim of following a positive approach in stark contrast to the normative approach to public finance of Richard A. Musgrave. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the foundations of modern American public finance by analysing one aspect of the methodology of its two most prominent fathers. I show (1) that it is difficult to distinguish Musgrave's and Buchanan's theories of public goods along the positive/normative dividing line and (2) that Buchanan's theory can also be considered normative. In the first three parts, I follow the Weberian methodological tradition in looking for value judgements in the theories, and by reflecting on the nature of ideal types. In the last part, I propose a broader interpretation of Buchanan's methodological stance within the academic context of the 1960s.     

Macroeconomic forecast accuracy in a data‐rich environment

The performance of six classes of models in forecasting different types of economic series is evaluated in an extensive pseudo out‐of‐sample exercise. One of these forecasting models, regularized data‐rich model averaging (RDRMA), is new in the literature. The findings can be summarized in four points. First, RDRMA is difficult to beat in general and generates the best forecasts for real variables. This performance is attributed to the combination of regularization and model averaging, and it confirms that a smart handling of large data sets can lead to substantial improvements over univariate approaches. Second, the ARMA(1,1) model emerges as the best to forecast inflation changes in the short run, while RDRMA dominates at longer horizons. Third, the returns on the S&P 500 index are predictable by RDRMA at short horizons. Finally, the forecast accuracy and the optimal structure of the forecasting equations are quite unstable over time.     

A new contribution to the ‘Paris Metro Pricing’ proposal

Using the concept of the ‘Paris Metro Pricing’, we will show that, when the distribution of the capacity between sub-networks leads to any loss of technical effectiveness and when a traditional condition on the ‘hazard rate’ is checked, it is always optimal for the monopolist to subdivide his main network in as many sub-networks as there are different types of net surfers.     

Arguing over Goals for Negotiation: Adopting an Assumption-Based Argumentation Decision Support System

Computational models of argumentation has been put forward as a promising approach to support decision making. In this context several recent works have proposed argumentation-based frameworks for decision making. In this paper we describe an application based on an argumentation-based mechanism for decision-making to concede. Adopting the assumption-based approach of argumentation, we propose an argumentation framework in which preferences are attached to goals. Arguments are defined as tree-like structures. Our framework is equipped with a computational counterpart for solving a decision problem, modeling the intuition that high-ranked goals are preferred to low-ranked goals which can be withdrawn. In this way, our framework suggests some decisions and provides an interactive and intelligible explanation of this choice. Our implementation, called MARGO, has been used for service selection within the ArguGRID project. We illustrate our approach with an industrial application, and illustrate the operation of the system with a running example.     

Choosing and sharing

Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal, which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic. In practice, revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements. We address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to select the efficient site (the host with the lowest cost) while simultaneously allowing for the implementation of any individually rational division of the whole hosting cost. The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of our simple mechanism are efficient, budget-balanced and individually rational. Moreover, the truthful equilibrium is immune to coalitional deviations.     

Other determinental conditions for concavity and quasi-concavity

In the case of twice differentiable functions, the most usual tests of concavity and quasi- concavity are those concerning the monotonicity (with respect to l) property of the signs of the lth principal minors or the lth principal bordered minors of the hessian matrix. These tests are irreducible one with the other. However, we show that the symmetry of the procedures and the relationship between principal and principal bordered minors provides the possibility of a bridge between them and then an appreciable reduction of computation. Such a bridge is offered by the Sylvester identity. Then, new determinental criteria of concavity and quasi-concavity follow.     

Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case

Two agents jointly operate a decreasing marginal returns technology to produce a private good. We characterize the class of output-sharing rules for which the labor-supply game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It consists of two families: rules of the serial type which protect a small user from the negative externality imposed by a large user, and rules of the reverse serial type, where one agent effectively employs the other agent's labor. Exactly two rules satisfy symmetry; a result in sharp contrast with Moulin and Shenker's characterization of their serial mechanism as the unique cost-sharing rule satisfying the same incentives property [Moulin, H., Shenker, S., 1992. Serial cost sharing. Econometrica 60 (5), 1009–1037]. We also show that the familiar stand-alone test characterizes the class of fixed-path methods under our incentives criterion [Friedman, E.J., 2004. Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing. Econ. Theory 23, 643–658].     

Liberal Jansenists and interest-bearing loans in eighteenth-century France: a reappraisal

Abstract

This article is an attempt to prove that although the liberal Jansenists – Jansenism being the most powerful Christian protest movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – were not the first and the only ones to address the prohibition of interest-bearing loans, their writings on the issue shifted and fuelled the debate during the French Enlightenment, especially among the Encyclopédistes and the economists. By refuting the very logic of “extrinsic titles” of the Scholastics and their extension later on by the Jesuits, the liberals Jansenists redefined “interest” as the price to be paid for the use of money.