A Review of: “REAPPRAISAL OF A ROAD PROJECT IN IRAN” By Herman G. Van Der Tak and Jan de Weille World Bank Staff Occasional Papers - No. 7 The Johns Hopkins University Press 1969 127pp. $3.00

This paper presents time-dependent deterministic and stochastic variations of common discounted cash flow formulae with explicit consideration given to inflation. The cash flows, the rates of discount or of compounding, and the rate of inflation are allowed to vary with time in a deterministic as well as random fashion in equations for the Compound Amount of a Single Payment, Present Worth of a Single Payment, Amount of an Annuity, Periodic Deposits to Accumulate a Future Amount, Present Worth of an Annuity, Capital Recovery, and the Present Worth of a Deferred Annuity.     

Predicting the government's decision to seek a rescheduling of external debt

Drawing on the relevant literature on the link between economic growth and external debt accumulation of less developed countries (LDCs), this study seeks to identify the variables leading countries to experience debt servicing difficulties. Discriminant analysis was used to distinguish between the rescheduling and non-rescheduling countries. The available data are the values of finanical ratios for 75 LDCs in 1988. The common log and sin transformation were applied to the ratios, resulting in variables that satisfied the discriminant function model. Ten variables represcenting debt burden, foreign exchange position and domestic economy situation were found significant in exploring the rescheduling decision. The model can be useful for both the financial institutions and the borrowing countries.     

Who Benefits from Multiple Brand Celebrity Endorsements? An Experimental Investigation

Advertisers commonly use celebrity endorsers to increase the effectiveness of advertising in persuading consumers. In many cases, these celebrities endorse more than one brand. Little is known, however, about the benefit to brands from these multiple endorsements by the same celebrity. This research applies classical conditioning theory to an exploration of multiple brand endorsements by a single celebrity, and examines how brand concept consistency between endorsed brands affects consumers’ evaluations of the endorsed brand. The findings, over two separate studies, indicate that exact and high concept consistency between endorsed brands positively influences consumers’ attitude toward these brands.     

A NOTE ON THE ‘GREAT CONTRACTION’

The modern literature on the US banking crisis in 1931 overlooks the key role played by ‘liquidity black holes’ and under‐pricing in the corporate and government bond markets resulting from the banking system's fire sale of assets. This process weakened the bank lending channel in a continuous feedback loop which was eventually checked by ‘money creation’ by the Federal Reserve. This note investigates the work of Evans Clark (1933 ) who highlighted the process of fire sales and mispricing of assets due to non‐fundamental causes.     

Effective utility functions induced by organizational target‐based incentives

Many companies set performance targets for their divisions to decentralize the decision‐making process and communicate with outside investors. This paper analyzes the effects of performance targets on the decision‐making behavior of the divisions. We introduce the notion of an ‘effective utility function’—a function that a division should use in its selection of projects if it wishes to maximize the probability of achieving its targets. We show that many target‐based incentives induce S‐shaped utility functions and discuss the organizational problems they may pose. We then show how an organization can set targets that induce expected utility maximization. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Repeated games with one-memory

We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1-memory strategies. We establish the following in games with perfect (rich) action spaces: First, when the players are sufficiently patient, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds with 1-memory. Second, for arbitrary level of discounting, all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported with 1-memory if the number of players exceeds two. Furthermore, in this case all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by an ε-equilibrium with 1-memory. In two-player games, the same set of results hold if an additional restriction is assumed: Players must have common punishments. Finally, to illustrate the role of our assumptions, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained with 1-memory. Thus, our results are the best that can be hoped for.