ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON FIRM R&D INVESTMENT: A SURVEY

This survey examines the empirical literature on the relationship between public R&D subsidies and private R&D investment over the past five decades. The survey reveals a considerable heterogeneity of empirical results that cannot be explained fully by methodological issues. We aim to provide further explanations of the possible causes of that heterogeneity. In particular, we emphasise a set of issues that, in our view, are critical to understanding the potential effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D spending. Special attention is paid to the dynamic aspects and composition of firm R&D, the constraints faced by the firm (such as financial constraints), and the amount and source of public subsidies. None of these issues have been investigated in depth. We formulate a set of research assumptions to guide future empirical research in this field.     

Private Information and Bargaining Power in Venture Capital Financing

We model the natural evolution of private information over the life of a venture capitalist financed project. In the early stages, the entrepreneur is better informed regarding the project, and when the project matures, the venture capitalist has an informational advantage over the entrepreneur. Within this framework, we examine how the venture capitalist's relative bargaining power affects cash flow rights and investment. When the bargaining advantage lies with the entrepreneur, the project may not be screened, and the venture capitalist may acquiesce to excessive initial investment but subsequently terminate the project. Increased venture capitalist bargaining power encourages project screening, attenuates the incentive to overinvest, and reduces the incidence of project termination subsequent to the initial investment. The payoff sensitivity of venture capitalist's financing contract also increases as his bargaining power improves.     

Signalling Theory and Equilibrium in Strategic Management Research: An Assessment and a Research Agenda

Actors within organizations commonly must make choices armed with incomplete and asymmetrically distributed information. Signalling theory seeks to explain how individuals are able to do so. This theory's primary predictive mechanism is ‘separating equilibrium’, which occurs when a signal's expectations are confirmed through experience. A content analysis finds that most strategic management signalling theory studies have not fully leveraged separating equilibrium. This presents two possible paths for future research. First, some researchers may wish to incorporate separating equilibrium. We illustrate how doing so can uncover new relationships, generate novel insights, and fortify the theory's application. Others who want to theorize about signals, but not examine separating equilibrium, could integrate ideas from signalling theory with other information perspectives. Here a signal becomes one stimulus among many that corporate actors interpret and act upon. We provide research agendas so strategy scholars can apply signalling theory most effectively to meet their research objectives.     

Fostering entrepreneurship: impact of specialization and diversity in education

The present research aims to enhance our understanding of how prospective entrepreneurs benefit from specialized entrepreneurship education combined with a diversified educational experience. We find intriguing evidence that depth or specialization of entrepreneurship education is not enough for wealth creation from future entrepreneurial activities. Instead, it is breadth or diversity of educational experiences that positively influences future wealth creation, in terms of both the entrepreneur’s personal income as well as personal net worth. The results of the study have important implications for entrepreneurship educators and their students, researchers, policy makers, as well as nascent entrepreneurs.     

TESTING POVERTY LINES

In theory, a poverty line can be defined as the cost of a common (inter‐personally comparable) utility level across a population. But how can one know if this holds in practice? For groups sharing common consumption needs but facing different prices, the theory of revealed preference can be used to derive testable implications of utility consistency knowing only the “poverty bundles” and their prices. Heterogeneity in needs calls for extra information. We argue that subjective welfare data offer a credible means of testing utility consistency across different needs groups. A case study of Russia's official poverty lines shows how revealed preference tests can be used in conjunction with qualitative information on needs heterogeneity. The results lead us to question the utility consistency of Russia's official poverty lines.     

Instrument Insufficiency and Economic Stabilisation

Recently concerns have been raised in New Zealand about the effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation while avoiding damage to the economy from high exchange rates. This review examines the basis for concern and identifies the problem as a failure in the primary instrument, namely the Reserve Bank's official cash rate, to adequately impact further along the term structure curve, which has become the more sensitive area for aggregate demand. Direct control over expenditure is therefore weak, and too much leeway is left to the housing and other asset markets to sustain demand in the economy. Globalisation of credit availability and financial technology have helped to blunt the policy instrument in this respect, shifting the adjustment burden on to the exchange rate. Deft management of interest and currency expectations can help, but the problem may require closer coordination and cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy, restoring a stabilisation role for the latter.     

A note on a value with incomplete communication

The Myerson's models on partial cooperation have been studied extensively [SIAM J. Discrete Math. 5 (1992) 305; Math. Methods Operations Res. 2 (1977) 225; Int. J. Game Theory 19 (1980) 421; 20 (1992) 255]. In [Game Econ. Behav. 26 (1999) 565], Hamiache proposes a new solution concept for communication situations. In this work, we analyze this value making some deficiencies clear and generalize this value to union stable cooperation structures emphasizing the differences in the extension.     

The fragility of a discipline when a model has monopoly status

We consider the consequences of a scientific literature with only one model of an important phenomenon. The falsification of the model would mean falsification of the science. Scientists who would prefer not to have their discipline falsified will be tempted to find ad hoc explanations to excuse the failure. To test this hypothesis we propose a study of the economic forecasts of the comparative Soviet and American growth rates in the years before a public choice model of central planning was a viable alternative to the public interest model. JEL Code A11, B23 Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the University of Manitoba Economics Department Retreat in October 2005 and at the Center for Study of Public Choice Wednesday Seminar in November 2005. We thank the participants for their suggestions. All the remaining errors are our responsibility.