Competitiveness of the Euro Zone Manufacturing: A Panel Data Analysis

The purpose of this paper is to assess the main aspects involved in the competitiveness of manufacturing industries in the Euro zone area (EZ-12). To this end, we apply the generalized method of moments to a panel data error correction model. Our sample spans the period from 1970 to 2007, and our findings provide insight into the impact of manufacturing on the international competitiveness of European firms and industries. From the estimated magnitude of the relevant coefficients, we conclude that in the long run, a change in labor and capital compensation is not fully passed on to manufacturing growth, while an increase in the market power of the manufacturing sector will negatively affect its competitiveness.     

The Resource Dependence, Service and Control Functions of Boards of Directors in Hong Kong and Taiwanese Firms

Since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990's, there have been numerous calls for the reform of East Asian corporate governance. Without reform, fears abound that the crisis will return. However, a baseline understanding of corporate governance in East Asia needs to be established before reform efforts can begin. In the West, three major functions of boards are commonly recognized: resource dependence, service, and control. These functions have yet to be examined in the context of boards of directors of Overseas Chinese firms in East Asia. In this exploratory study, we examine the extent to which these functions are performed, primarily by outside board members, in Overseas Chinese firms in Hong Kong and Taiwan. We find that the service and control functions are less pronounced for East Asian boards than what would be expected in the West, while the resource dependence function is more pronounced. We also findthat the governance of the region is being moved closer to international practices by a new generation of leaders that have been exposed to Western influences and intense global competition. The implications of our findings for managers, educators, and researchers are discussed.     

Wage and price controls in the equilibrium sequential search model

In this paper, we study the effects of wage and price controls on employment, output, and welfare in a simplified version of the Bénabou (J. Econom. Theory 60 (1993) 140) equilibrium sequential search model with bilateral heterogeneity. We show that a price ceiling increases output but the change in welfare depends on three effects: the reduction in aggregate search costs, the increase in surplus due to increased output, and the transfer of production to the least efficient firm. The model is formally identical to a standard equilibrium search model of the labor market so analogous results hold for the minimum wage.     

FORMAL SEARCH AND REFERRALS FROM A FIRM'S PERSPECTIVE

We explore the relationship between firms' characteristics and recruitment strategies. We present a theoretical search model with two search channels: a costly formal channel and a costless informal channel (referrals). We empirically test the model predictions and find that: larger firms search more formally; firms search more formally for high-skilled workers; the positive relationship between firm's size and formal search intensity also holds for firms not using referrals; firms using referrals invest less into formal search compared to firms not using referrals; larger firms hire less often by referrals than smaller firms; and larger search effort leads to more applicants.     

Dynamics of agricultural groundwater extraction: Comment and correction

In a paper published in this journal, Hellegers et al. [Hellegers, P., D. Zilberman, E. van Ierland, 2001. Dynamics of agricultural groundwater extraction. Ecological Economics, 303-311] analysed a dynamic model of groundwater extraction in which they added the quality dimension of nitrate concentration to an intertemporal model of resource depletion. This contribution shows that the set-up of the model contains a serious mistake which affects the results of the paper and it corrects the results.     

Learning by doing,spillovers and shakeouts

This paper studies industry evolution driven by non strategic learning by doing and spillovers. We characterize a dynamic process of cost and output changes and its effect on welfare and industry profits. The paper gives conditions for shakeouts to occur and analyzes the key factors affecting these conditions. Since shakeouts could lead to a long-run social loss due to higher market concentration, there is a role for a government to play in limiting unnecessary shakeouts. The most effective way to do so is to enhance spillovers.JEL Classification: L11, L13, O31Correspondence to: Michael TroegeWe would like to thank Hans Mewis, Christophe Moussu and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. We also benefited from comments of seminar participants at WZB, Humboldt University, Northwestern University and the EEA/ESEM 1999 meetings. Part of the research was carried out while Michael Tröge was visiting Northwestern University. Financial support by the German Research Council (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.     

THE SHORT‐RUN EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF RECENT MINIMUM WAGE CHANGES: EVIDENCE FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY

This paper presents early evidence on the employment effects of state minimum wage increases enacted between January 2013 and January 2015. As of 2015, we estimate that relatively large minimum wage increases (defined as those exceeding $1) reduced employment among low‐skilled population groups by just over 1 percentage point. Smaller minimum wage increases, as well as increases linked to inflation indexation provisions, appear to have had much smaller (and possibly positive) effects on employment over our sample period. The estimates thus raise the potential importance of nonlinearities in the minimum wage's effects, which are consistent with standard models of the labor market. (JEL H11, J08, J23)     

Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations

This paper analyzes a simple model of taxation in a federal system within which policymakers are revenue–maximizing Leviathans and fiscal externalities arise not only horizontally, across the "states," but also vertically between levels of government. Such an economy is characterized by excessively high taxation in the noncooperative equilibrium. Intensifying horizontal competition, by increasing the number of states, unambiguously increases revenues (contrary to the Leviathan wisdom) but nevertheless enhances consumer welfare (consistent with the Leviathan wisdom). Revenue sharing arrangements between policymakers are shown to be—contrary to the Leviathan wisdom—Pareto improving.