The welfare effect of income tax deductions for losses as insurance: Insured- versus insurer-sided adverse selection

Kaplow (1992) shows in a complete-information environment that allowing income tax deductions for losses as partial insurance is undesirable in the presence of private insurance markets. This paper elaborates on Kaplow's finding by studying two extreme types of asymmetric information structures in private insurance markets: Either the insured or insurers possess superior information. It is shown that our derived result is consistent with Kaplow's if the insured have superior information; however, Kaplow's negative conclusion with respect to the income tax deduction will be overturned if insurers have superior information instead. A policy implication from our finding is that whether or not to allow an income tax deduction for losses needs to be more refined and, specifically, it should be tailored to the “adverse selection” information structures of private insurance.     

The determinants of West German exports of manufactures: An integrated demand and supply approach

Zusammenfassung Die Determinanten der westdeutschen Exporte von verarbeiteten Produkten. Eine Integration von Angebots- und Nachfragefaktoren. - Die Autoren entwickeln ein Modell, das das Gewinnmaximierungsverhalten der in offenen Volkswirtschaften operierenden Unternehmen ausdrücklich mikro?konomisch erkl?rt und setzen es ein, um zu zeigen, da? die westdeutschen Exporte und Exportpreise gut durch die inl?ndischen und ausl?ndischen Preise, die internationale Nachfrage, den inl?ndischen Kapitalstock und die Kosten erkl?rt werden k?nnen. Die dynamischen Versionen des Modells best?tigen, da? die westdeutschen Exporte von verarbeiteten Produkten, Gütern des Maschinenbaus und Automobilen schneller auf Ver?nderungen der internationalen Nachfrage und der Rentabilit?t im Exportgesch?ft reagieren als auf Ver?nderungen in der preislichen Wettbewerbsf?higkeit.

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Résumé Les déterminants de l’exportation des produits manufacturés allemands. Une intégration des facteurs de l'offre et de la demande. - Les auteurs construisent un modèle, dans lequel la maximation des profits par des firmes aux économies ouvertes est expliquée par des facteurs microéconomiques. Puis ils utilisent le modèle pour démontrer que les exportations et les prix d'exportation du RFA peuvent être bien expliquées par les prix étrangers et domestiques, la demande internationale, le stock de capital domestique et les co?ts. Les versions dynamiques du modèle confirment que les exportations des produits manufacturés, des produits de la construction mécanique et des automobiles réagissent plus vite aux changement dans la demande internationale et dans la rentabilité d'exportation qu’aux changements dans la compétiveté de prix.

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Resumen Las déterminantes de la exportaciones manufactureras de Alemania Occidental. Un enfoque integrado de oferta y demanda. - Utilizando un modelo derivado que considera explícitamente los fundamentos microeconómicos de las decisiones de maximizatión de ganancias de una empresa que opera en una economía abierta, se explican los movimientos de las exportaciones y de los precios de exportatión alemanes con los movimientos en los precios nacionales, precios extranjeros, la demanda mundial, el stock de capital national y los costos. Las versiones dinámicas del modelo confirman que las exportacíones manufactureras alemanas, en particular de productos de ingeniería mecánica y automotores, responden más rápidamente a cambios en la demanda mundial y la rentabilidad de las exportaciones que a cambios en la competitividad derivada del precio.

     

Basel II and bank lending to emerging markets: Evidence from the German banking sector

This paper investigates whether the new Basel Accord will induce a change in bank lending to emerging markets using a comprehensive new data set on German banks’ foreign exposure. We test two interlinked hypotheses on the conditions under which the change in the regulatory capital would leave lending flows unaffected. This would be the case if (i) the new regulatory capital requirement remains below the economic capital and (ii) banks’ economic capital to emerging markets already adequately reflects risk. On both accounts the evidence indicates that the new Basel Accord should have a limited effect on lending to emerging markets.     

Digitalisierung im Gesundheitswesen — zwischen Datenschutz und moderner Medizinversorgung

The digital transformation of the healthcare branch is important and unstoppable. The enormous possibility of digitalisation to redesign and enhance processes has been shown in other branches. Digital technologies offer the similarly large potential to improve the quality and efficiency of healthcare services. However, in terms of digitalisation, the German health system lags behind other European countries. But given a lack of available evidence, the effects of the digitalisation of the healthcare system cannot be reliably evaluated. Digital access to patient data necessitates constructive error cultures in organisations in order to limit defensive medicine. And digital access to health information necessitates individual competence in searching and using this information for participatory decision-making. As with all technological progress, information security is very important in order to gain citizens’ confidence in a digital healthcare system. Thus, it is necessary to simultaneously pursue both enhanced privacy standards and state-of-the-art medical technology.     

Wer wird Professor für Kommunikationswissenschaft und Journalistik?

Der vorliegende Beitrag fragt nach der demographischen Struktur der zentralen akademischen Akteure der Kommunikationswissenschaft in Deutschland und nach m?glichen Ver?nderungen dieser Struktur in den letzten 50 Jahren. Die Analyse zeigt zum einen, dass von einem einheitlichen Zugang zum Hochschullehrerberuf nach wie vor keine Rede sein kann, und zum anderen, dass das Fach vor einer demographischen Herausforderung steht. Die Kommunikationswissenschaft hat sich durch Akademisierung und ?Versozialwissenschaftlichung? von ihren Wurzeln gel?st. War Berufserfahrung im Medienbereich bis in die 1960er Jahre Voraussetzung für eine Berufung, verfügt heute nur noch eine Minderheit über solche Erfahrungen. Da die Existenz des Faches im Rahmen der Universit?t auch von der Nachfrage der Studierenden abh?ngt, kann man über die Folgen des anstehenden Generationswechsels nur spekulieren. In jedem Fall fehlt es an formal für die Hochschullehrerlaufbahn qualifiziertem Nachwuchs. Deshalb sind erhebliche Anstrengungen erforderlich, wenn der Boom im letzten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts sich nicht als Seifenblase erweisen soll.     

Sequential selling mechanisms

Summary In this paper we attempt to formalize the idea that a mechanism that involves multilateral communication between buyers and sellers may be dominated by one that involves simple bilateral communication. To do this we consider the well known problem in which a seller tries to sell a single unit of output to a group ofN buyers who have independently distributed private valuations. Our arguments hinge on two considerations. First, buyers communicate their willingness to negotiate with the seller sequentially, and second, buyers have the option of purchasing the good from some alternative supplier. It is shown that the seller cannot improve upon a procedure in which she offers the good to each buyer in turn at a fixed price. The seller reverts to multilateral communication if possible, only when no buyer is willing to pay the fixed price. In reasonable environments buyers will be too impatient to wait for the outcome of a multilateral negotiation and all communications will be bilateral.In many problems in mechanism design, informed traders have no alternative to participation in the mechanism that is offered by its designer. The best mechanism from the designer's point of view is then the one that is most efficient at extracting informational rents, that is, a simple auction. In a competitive environment it is likely to be costly for buyers to participate in an auction or any other multilateral selling scheme in which the seller must process information from many different buyers because alternative trading opportunities will be disappearing during the time that the seller is collecting this information. Buyers might be willing to participate in an auction, but only if they could be guaranteed that the competition that they face will not eliminate too much of their surplus.At the other extreme to the auction is a simple fixed price selling scheme 1. The seller simply waits until he meets a buyer whose valuation is high enough, given the opportunities that exist in the rest of the market, for him to be willing to pay this price. The seller extracts the minimum of the buyer's informational rents since the price that a buyer pays is independent of his valuation. Yet the seller might like this scheme if adding a second bidder to the process makes it very difficult for him to find a buyer with a valuation high enough to want to participate.In the presence of opportunity costs, the seller faces a trade-off between his ability to extract buyers informational rents and his ability to find buyers who are willing to participate in any competitive process. In practice this trade-off will impose structure on the method that is used to determine a price. In markets where there are auctions, limits are put on buyer participation. In tobacco auctions bids are submitted at a distinct point in time from buyers who are present at that time. In real estate auctions time limits are put on the amount of time the seller will wait before making a decision. These restrictions on participation are presumably endogenously selected by the seller (possibly in competition with other mechanism designers) with this trade-off in mind.On the other hand, markets in which objects appear to trade at a fixed price are rarely so simple. A baker with a fixed supply of fresh bagels is unlikely to collect bids from buyers and award the bagels to the high bidder at the end of the day. Buyers are unlikely to be willing to participate in such a scheme since they can buy fresh bagels from a competitor down the street. Yet despite the fact that bagels sell at a fixed price throughout the day, most bakers are more than willing to let it be known that they will discount price at the end of the day on any bagels that they have not yet sold. Selling used cars presents a similar problem. Each potential buyer for the used car is likely to have inspected a number of alternatives, and is likely to know the prices at which these alternative can be obtained. A seller who suggests that buyers submit a bid, then wait until the seller is sure that no higher offer will be submitted is asking buyers to forgo these alternative opportunities with no gain to themselves. To avoid the rigidity of the pure fixed price scheme most used cars are sold for a fixed price or best offer. These examples suggest that the best selling mechanism may involve a complex interplay between participation and surplus extraction considerations.The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple formalism within which the factors that determine the best contract can be evaluated. We consider the best known environment from the point of view of auction design in which there are a large number of buyers with independent private valuations for a unit of an indivisible commodity that is being sold by a single supplier who acts as the mechanism designer. We modify this standard problem in two critical ways. First, we assume that the seller meets the potential buyers sequentially rather than all at once. Secondly we assume that buyers have a valuable alternative that yields them a sure surplus. This creates a simple bidding cost that is effectively the expected loss in surplus (created by the disappearance of outside alternatives) that the buyer faces during the time that he spends negotiating with the seller.These simple assumptions allow us to calculate the impact of competition and communication costs using completely standard arguments from the mechanism design literature. We are able to show that with these assumptions the seller's expected surplus will be highest if the object is sold according to the following modified fixed price scheme: the seller contacts each of the potential buyers in turn and either offers to negotiate or announces that he no longer wishes to trade. If he offers to negotiate and the buyer agrees, the buyer immediately has the option of trading for sure with the seller at a fixed price set ex ante. If the buyer does not wish to pay this fixed price, he may submit an alternative bid. The seller will then continue to contact new buyers, returning to trade with the buyer only if no buyer wishes to pay the fixed price and no higher bid is submitted.It will be clear that in our environment, both the simple fixed price scheme and the simple auction are feasible. The simple auction prevails when the fixed price is set equal to the maximum possible valuation, while the simple fixed price scheme occurs when the fixed price is set so that buyers are willing to participate if and only if they are willing to pay the fixed price. Our results will show that a simple auction in never optimal for the seller. The seller can always strictly improve his payoff by moving to a scheme in which there is some strictly positive probability that trade will occur at the fixed price. On the other hand, there are reasonable circumstances in which the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than the one she gets by selling at a fixed price. It is shown that for any positive participation cost, there is a large, but finite, number of potential buyers so that the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than what she gets by selling at a fixed price. Two simple, but important continuity results are also illustrated. As the cost of participation in the mechanism increases (decreases), the probability with which the seller's unit of output is sold at a fixed price goes to one (zero) in the best modified fixed price mechanism for the seller.Our paper is not the first to generate such a modified fixed price scheme. Both McAfee and McMillan (1988) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) come up with similar schemes for the case in which the seller must bear a fixed cost for each new buyer that she contacts. There are two essential differences between our model and theirs. First, as the cost is interpreted as the opportunity cost of participation in the mechanism, it is reasonable to imagine that the seller advertises the mechanism ex ante. Another way of putting this is that the seller pays a fixed rather than a variable cost to communicate the mechanism to buyers. This makes it possible to assume that the mechanism is common knowledge to the seller and all the buyers at the beginning of the communication process. For this reason we can make our case using completely standard arguments. Secondly, the mechanism in the opportunity cost case plays a different allocative role than it does in the case when the seller bears a cost. The mechanism must decide whether buyers should communicate with the seller or pursue their alternative activities, as well as who should trade and at what price. It is this allocative role that makes bilateral communication superior to multilateral communication in a competitive environment. These differences allow us to show, for example, that a simple fixed price scheme is undominated for the seller when the number of buyers is finite. As shown by McAfee and McMillan, this is only possible when the number of potential buyers is infinite when the seller bears the cost of communication.Remarkably, the existence of opportunity costs to buyer participation is not, by itself, sufficient to explain why sellers might prefer bilateral communications mechanisms. Samuelson (1983) and McAfee and McMillan (1987) show that when buyers must pay a fixed cost to submit a bid, which is equivalent to giving up a valuable alternative, a seller cannot expect to earn more than she does in a second price auction (though Samuelson shows that the reserve price may depend on the number of potential buyers). One of the contributions of this paper is to show that the assumption that buyers make their participation decisions simultaneously is critical to this result. Simultaneous entry decisions means that whether or not any particular buyer is assigned to the alternative activity is independent of any other buyer's valuation. With sequential communication the seller is able to relax this constraint. It is precisely the enlargement of the class of feasible mechanism that breaks down the optimality of the simple auction.The second author acknowledges the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the CRDE at the Université de Montreal.