A bargaining model in general equilibrium

The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at the same competitive prices.     

Supplier selection-order allocation: A two-stage multiple criteria dynamic programming approach

This paper proposes a two-stage multiple criteria dynamic programming approach for two of the most critical tasks in supply chain management, namely, supplier selection and order allocation. In the first stage, to address multiple decision criteria in supplier ranking, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is employed. In the second stage, supplier ranks are fed into an order allocation model that aims at maximizing a utility function for the firm as well as minimizing the total supply chain costs, subject to constraints on demand, capacity, and inventory levels. A dynamic programming approach is crafted to solve the proposed bi-objective model.     

On the regulation of spatial externalities: coexistence between GM and conventional crops in the EU and the ‘newcomer principle’*

Pollen‐mediated gene flow is one of the main concerns associated with the introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops. Should a premium for non‐GM varieties emerge on the market, ‘contamination’ by GM pollen would generate a revenue loss for growers of non‐GM varieties. This paper analyses the problem of pollen‐mediated gene flow as a particular type of production externality. The model, although simple, provides useful insights into coexistence policies. Following on from this and taking GM herbicide‐tolerant oilseed rape (Brassica napus) as a model crop, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate data and then estimate the effect of several important policy variables (including width of buffer zones and spatial aggregation) on the magnitude of the externality associated with pollen‐mediated gene flow.     

The changing pattern of foreign trade specialization in Indian manufacturing

This paper examines the pattern of international trade specializationin Indian manufacturing since the mid-1980s by using data ontrade flows. Low-technology sectors still dominate the categoriesfor which India exhibits the largest degree of trade specialization.By contrast, high-technology sectors are prevalent among thecategories for which India is import-dependent. Significantly,India has experienced an improvement in the degree of specializationin some of the most dynamic sectors of world trade.     

Economic Theories of Political (Dis)integration

Abstract.  This paper surveys the recent political economy literature on countries' incentives to form international unions and/or to disintegrate in smaller jurisdictions. The main factors that affect these incentives are (i) economic integration, (ii) the international order, (iii) international spillovers and (iv) the institutional setting. Some implications are drawn for the current debate in Europe on the political effects of economic integration, on the enlargement process and on the distribution of prerogatives between the European Union and national governments.     

International equality of stock market returns

Real returns, excess returns, and nominal returns from stock markets in 11 developed countries are compared for the difference in their means and variances by using a new procedure to test their equality and to determine if one stock market dominates another. The sample period from January 1973 to September 1989 is divided into three subperiods. Results show that stock markets in the United States and Germany dominate those in the other countries in early sub-periods, but not in a recent sub-period, to indicate an increasing capital market integration. Integration with Germany has increased more than with the United States, due possibly to the European Monetary System.     

Approximation approach for the performance analysis of production lines under a kanban discipline

In a JIT production environment, pull-type control systems are usually implemented to reduce the lead time and to synchronize the production rate with the demand rate. The design of an effective production control system requires easy and reliable approaches for evaluating the effect of the major system parameters on its performance.In this paper we model the kanban control system of a manufacturing line as a Markov process. In addition, we develop an approximation approach to the model that permits reliable evaluation of manufacturing system performance in terms of throughput time and work-in-process. The validation of the approach is implemented by comparing the exact results (based on discrete event simulation) and the approximated results.A good approximation is observed for a large range of conditions.     

Profit sharing regulation and repeated bargaining with a shut-down option

We analyze the behavior of a firm where workers share profits with shareholders by using a model cast in an Aoki framework. There are two sorts of uncertainties: one relates to the market price, assumed to follow a random path in continuous time, while the other concerns internal organization, i.e. the share of profits to be distributed between workers and shareholders. In the institutional setting we adopt the firm is flexible, since it has the possibility of shutting down, by paying laid off workers a bonus, which represents a sunk cost. The distributive share is determined in the firm's internal labor market through a bargaining that takes place at two occasions: at the beginning of the firm's life and when profits reach a threshold level. The second bargaining is endogenized according to a procedure imposed upon shareholders and workers by a regulator who may use profit distribution as a way to intervene in the firm's internal labor market. Specificities make this market highly imperfect. Different share parameter patterns result, owing to a shut down option, according to whether (a) the regulator calls for renegotiation when profits are increasing or decreasing, (b) the regulator's rule is announced in advance or is discretionally set.