A bargaining model in general equilibrium

The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at the same competitive prices.     

Is Ecolabelling a Reliable Environmental Policy Measure?

The rationale of ecolabelling is to enable firms to reap the willingness-to-payfor the environmental attributes of goods by helping consumers toidentify ``green' products. By so doing, ecolabelling is expected tostimulate spontaneous environmental innovation and to reduce aggregatedpollution. Our analysis however outlines situations under whichecolabelling could induce perverse effects, namely increased investment inconventional technologies before the labels are awarded, and examineswhether restricting the issue of labels could constitute an antidote.     

The economics of research,consulting, and teaching quality: theory and evidence from a technical university

We investigate the effect of both research and consulting on teaching quality in higher education, at the individual level. We propose a theoretical model in which academics allocate effort between the three activities, over a two period time horizon, under the assumption of positive spillovers from research to both consulting opportunities and teaching, and of life-cycle effects on incentives. Propositions from the model are tested against data from a mid-sized Italian engineering faculty. We find that teaching quality is negatively related to consulting and positively related to research experience. However, both relationships are not linear, due to the importance of several mediating factors, such as seniority and the role of scientific publications as a signal for attracting consulting opportunities.     

Endogenous time-varying risk aversion and asset returns

Stylized facts about statistical properties for short horizon returns in financial markets have been identified in the literature, but a satisfactory understanding for their manifestation is yet to be achieved. In this work, we show that a simple asset pricing model with representative agent is able to generate time series of returns that replicate such stylized facts if the risk aversion coefficient is allowed to change endogenously over time in response to unexpected excess returns under evolutionary forces. The same model, under constant risk aversion, would instead generate returns that are essentially Gaussian. We conclude that an endogenous time-varying risk aversion represents a very parsimonious way to make the model match real data on key statistical properties, and therefore deserves careful consideration from economists and practitioners alike.     

Redistributive taxation in democracies: Evidence on people's satisfaction

Theories of political redistribution are tested using data collected in three phases of the International Social Survey Programme. Individuals categorized as having high, middle, or low incomes were asked whether they consider the overall tax burden in their countries too high, too low or about right. Very few citizens indicated that they were satisfied with tax systems; most believed that taxes on low and middle incomes are too high, while taxes on high incomes are too low. Support for tax systems is bimodal within the income classes, with the richest 5% being the most supportive, and the median in a population being second. Ideological values have a strong impact on political support for redistribution across all income classes. The results bear witness to the multidimensional nature of preferences for redistribution, and to the delicate question of the effectiveness of democracy in implementing citizens' preferences.     

Estimation of the regression slope by means of Gini’s cograduation index

The simple linear model \(Y_i = \alpha + \beta \, x_i + \epsilon _i\) \((i=1,2, \ldots ,N \ge 2)\) is considered, where the \(x_i\)’s are given constants and \(\epsilon _1, \epsilon _2 , \ldots , \epsilon _N\) are independent identically distributed (iid) with continuous distribution function F. An estimator \(\tilde{\beta }\) of the slope parameter is proposed, based on a stochastic process which makes use of Gini’s cograduation index. The properties of \(\tilde{\beta }\) and of the related confidence interval are studied. Some comparisons are given, in terms of asymptotic relative efficiency, with other estimators of \(\beta \) including that obtained with the method of least squares.     

On the effectiveness of monetary policy under fixed rates of exchange

The IS-LM framework traditionally used to discuss the role of monetary policy under fixed rates of exchange has several weaknesses. The theoretical findings based on such a model cannot be accepted uncritically. The paper reassesses the role of monetary policy by appropriately modifying the IS-LM apparatus so that its resilts can be easier to compare with much of the existing literature. The meaning and effectiveness of monetary policy is analysed in short-run equilibrium, stock-flow equilibrium and full long-run equilibrium. Dynamical equations linking the short to the long run are specified. The notable implication is that monetary policy is effective in the short run and need not be ineffective in the long run. Complete emasculation of monetary policy occurs when the central authorities relinquish control over the flow distribution of government debt between money and bonds in favour of an independent use of a set of fiscal instruments. Perfect capital mobility requires that the central authorities decide whether monetary or fiscal policy become totally dependent on external forces. Whether one or the other is chosen is more a matter of specific circumstances than theoretical necessity. Critical comments are directed at the literature on offsetting capital flows.     

The Canada/Quebec pension plan disability program and the labor force participation of older men

The effects of the Canadian disability insurance program on the labor force participation of older men are studied using pooled cross-sectional time series data from ten Canadian provinces.