Internal monitoring, regulation, and compensation of top executives in banks

This paper examines the relation between incentive pay, monitoring, and regulatory requirements in banks. Using a one-period model with asymmetrical information between the bank owner and the top management team, as well as within the team itself, we show that (1) incentive pay increases the mutual-monitoring activity among top executives; (2) senior executives, especially the CEO, collect more incentive pay than their subordinates; and (3) bank regulations, such as capital adequacy (CAD) requirements, reduce the absolute amount of incentive pay granted to executives.     

Duopoly models with a joint capacity constraint

The paper proposes a two-stage mixed duopoly model of exhaustible resource market where at the first stage the government decides on the degree of privatization of public firm and at the second stage the public and private firms decide simultaneously on the two-period extraction paths. It is demonstrated that if the two firms have symmetric technologies with increasing marginal extraction costs and the same resource stocks, then neither full nationalization of any of the two firms nor full privatization will be socially desirable. It is shown that the presence of a semi-public firm improves intertemporal allocation of the fixed resource stock. Thus, partial privatization is optimal even under exogenously fixed total outputs of each firm. For asymmetric cost case, when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm, we derive the conditions under which full nationalization or full privatization is optimal.     

Stability and agreement criteria for the termination of Delphi studies

This paper addresses the question of the methodology of testing for stability between successive Delphi rounds and the necessity of doing so prior to the analysis of the level or type of consensus. Following a discussion of a hierarchical set of a criteria for determining the termination of such studies, the paper reviews some of the more common treatments of the subject in the literature. It is finally proposed that a χ² test be used to test the stability of responses between rounds. The method is demonstrated by a numerical example.     

Reconciling introspective utility with revealed preference: Experimental arguments based on prospect theory

In an experiment, choice-based (revealed-preference) utility of money is derived from choices under risk, and choiceless (non-revealed-preference) utility from introspective strength-of-preference judgments. The well-known inconsistencies of risky utility under expected utility are resolved under prospect theory, yielding one consistent cardinal utility index for risky choice. Remarkably, however, this cardinal index also agrees well with the choiceless utilities, suggesting a relation between a choice-based and a choiceless concept. Such a relation implies that introspective judgments can provide useful data for economics, and can reinforce the revealed-preference paradigm. This finding sheds new light on the classical debate on ordinal versus cardinal utility.     

Weighting income ranks and levels: A Multiple-Parameter Generalization For Absolute and Relative Inequality Indices

This paper gives a general expression for a multiple parameter index of absolute or relative inequality and indicates that the indices suggested by Atkinson, Kolm and Gini are particular cases of the proposed generalized index.     

The effect of banking market structure on the lending channel: Evidence from emerging markets

This paper analyses the extent to which the level of bank competition influences monetary policy transmission. Using a large panel dataset of 978 banks from 55 countries, and employing the Lerner index model as a measure of market structure, our results show that an increase in banking sector competition weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy on bank lending. The findings are robust to a broad array of sensitivity checks including control of alternative measurements of the Lerner index, different samples and different methodological specifications. By extension, these results have important policy implications for regulators in assessing the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanisms.     

Impact of the US–EC price war on major wheat exporters' shares of the Chinese market

China is both the world's largest producer and consumer of wheat. In an attempt to gain a larger slice of the important Chinese market, both the European Community and the United States have offered China subsidised wheat. In addition, other exporters have offered attractive credit arrangements to China. The objective of this paper is to measure the overall impact of these policies on each exporter's share of the Chinese market. To that end, an improved version of the constant market shares model is applied to data on Chinese wheat imports in the 1980's. The results indicate that the United States has been outperforming the other exporters since subsidised US wheat sales were authorised for China in 1987. The implications of the analysis for the smaller exporters and international wheat trade are discussed.     

On Licensing Under Bertrand Competition

This paper considers licensing by an innovating firm to its competitor in a differentiated duopoly with Bertrand competition. A principal finding is that royalty licensing may be superior to fee licensing for the innovating firm both when the innovation is drastic and when the innovation is non-drastic.