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161.
Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan 《Economic Theory》2014,56(3):493-514
We identify a new channel through which schools can potentially manipulate the well-known student and school-optimal stable mechanisms. We introduce two fictitious students creation manipulation notions where one of them is stronger. While the student and school-optimal stable mechanisms turn out to be weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclic (Ergin in Econometrica 88:485–494, 2002) and essentially homogeneous (Kojima in Games Econ Behav 82:1–14, 2013) priority structures, respectively, they still lack strong fictitious student-proofness. We then compare the mechanisms in terms of their vulnerability to manipulations in the sense of Pathak and Sönmez (Am Econ Rev 103(1):80–106, 2013) and find out that the student-optimal stable mechanism is more manipulable than the school-optimal one. Lastly, in the large market setting of Kojima and Pathak (Am Econ Rev 99(3):608–627, 2009), the student-optimal stable mechanism becomes weakly fictitious student-proof as the market is getting large. 相似文献
162.
The number of assigned agents (i.e., size) is an important parameter in object allocations. While size maximality clashes with individual rationality and strategy-proofness, it can still be possible to increase the size over a mechanism while keeping these properties. To pursue this research, we devise a size comparison criterion to investigate the possibility of size increase. A mechanism size-wise dominates another mechanism if the latter never assigns more agents than the former, and at some problem, assigns more agents than . We obtain arguably mild conditions for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism. Moreover, whenever there are at least as many objects as the total number of agents, we find conditions, different from those previously mentioned, for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and group strategy-proof mechanism. These results have implications for deferred-acceptance, top trading cycles, efficiency-adjusted deferred-acceptance, serial dictatorship, and Boston mechanisms. 相似文献
163.
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We present two mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first is Pareto efficient and undominated—in terms of the number of assignments—in equilibrium. The second is fair for unassigned agents and assigns weakly more agents than any stable mechanism in equilibrium. 相似文献
164.
165.
Fatih Ayhan Mustafa Tevfik Kartal Tomiwa Sunday Adebayo Derviş Kirikkaleli 《Bulletin of economic research》2023,75(3):571-587
This study examines the linkage between economic risk and political risk in the United Kingdom. This linkage has attracted the attention of policymakers; however, there is no consequence of the linkage in the existing literature. The study aims to close this gap for the UK case by applying wavelet coherence (WTC) and quantile-on-quantile regression (QQR) approaches and using quarterly data between 1984/Q1 and 2020/Q4. The results of the WTC reveal that there is time–frequency dependency between economic risk and political risk majorly in the medium and low frequencies. Moreover, the direction of the causality changes over time. Furthermore, the outcomes of the WTC show that economic risk leads political risk between 1995 and 2005, whereas political risk leads economic risk from 2006 to 2019. The outcomes of the QQR approach disclose that in the higher tail (0.7–0.95) of political risk and lower and medium tail (0.05–0.60) of economic risk, the effect of political risk on economic risk is positive and strong. On the flip side, at all quantiles (0.05–0.95) of economic risk and lower quantiles (0.10–0.30) of political risk, the effect of political risk on economic risk is positive and strong. The results are also validated by the outcomes of partial wavelet coherence, multiple wavelet coherence, and quantile regression. Hence, the results highlight the importance of political risk (economic risk) for economic risk (political risk) in the UK case. 相似文献
166.
Adopting a Bourdieusian perspective, this paper examines the social structures that influence the labour market participation of individuals with mental illness. We draw on 257 qualitative surveys completed by individuals with diagnosed mental health conditions in Europe, North America, Oceania, Africa, and Asia. We employed thematic analysis to analyse the data. The findings reveal that the interplay of capital endowments, symbolic violence, habitus and illusio shape the labour market participation of individuals with mental illness. Capital endowments of individuals with mental illness are afforded less value in the labour market and these individuals internalize, legitimize and normalize their disadvantaged position, blaming themselves rather than questioning the social structures leading to the challenges they encounter. We highlight that social structures condition the opinion these individuals have of themselves and how this affects how they navigate the labour market. In sum, we show that Bourdieu's concepts provide a useful lens to study inequalities in the labour market, as they reveal the social structures that produce, sustain and reinforce the social order that disadvantages individuals with mental illness. 相似文献