Endogenous Choice of Strategic Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts

We revisit the endogenous choice problem of strategic contracts for the public firm and the private firm in a managerial mixed duopoly with differentiated goods. We consider the situation wherein the managerial delegation contracts are determined by maximising social welfare within the public firm, which is equal to the objective function of its owner, and through bargaining over the content of managerial delegation contracts between the owner and manager within the private firm. We show that, in equilibrium, when the manager of the private firm has high bargaining power relative to that of the owner, the public firm chooses a price contract, while the private firm chooses a quantity contract. However, there is no equilibrium market structure under the pure strategic contract class when the manager has sufficiently low bargaining power relative to that of the owner.     

A Non-homothetic Globally Concave Flexible Cost Function and its Application to Panel Data

A new non-homothetic globally concave flexible cost function is introduced and applied to a panel of firms in the Japanese paper and pulp industry. This cost function is a mixture of the generalized McFadden form and the generalized Ozaki form due to Nakamura (1990). A generalized index of technical change is used in place of the standard quadratic form of time-trend. The estimated cost function satisfied global concavity, and the symmetry condition of the Slutsky matrix was not rejected. Homotheticity was strongly rejected.
JEL Classification Numbers: C33, D24.     

Whistleblowing and management accounting: An approach

In this paper, we consider the licensing of and codes of ethics that affect the accountant not in public accounting, the potential for an accountant not in public accounting encountering an ethical conflict situation, and the moral responsibility of such accountant when faced with an ethical dilemma. We review an approach suggested by the National Association of Accountants for dealing with an ethical conflict situation including that association's position on whistleblowing. We propose another approach based on the work of De George (1981), in which both internal and external whistleblowing are possible alternatives, for use by management accountants in an ethical conflict situation. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for management accounting. While most of the analysis centers on management accountants, we note the likely applicability of the analysis to accountants in the public sector. Dr. Stephen E. Loeb is Professor and Chairman of Accounting and the Ernst and Young Alumni Research Fellow at the University of Maryland at College Park. He is the author or co-author of a number of articles relating to accounting and ethics that have appeared in journals such as The Accounting Review, the Journal of Accounting Research, the Journal of Accountancy, and The Government Accountants Journal. Dr. Loeb is co-editor of the Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.Dr. Suzanne N. Cory is Associate Professor of Accounting at California State University, San Bernardino. A good deal of the work on this paper was done while Dr. Cory was a faculty member at The George Washington University.We are indebted to Lawrence A. Gorden, Allen G. Schick, Jere Francis, Lee Preston, Stanley W. Davis and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors are our own.     

Valuation of Mortgage-Backed Securities Based upon a Structural Approach

This paper studies the valuation of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) based upon a structural approach of several risks involving the prepayment and/or default behavior of mortgagors. For the Kariya and Kobayashi (1999) model using a time-consuming Monte-Carlosimulation, we provide an alternative semi-analytic valuation methodology closely related to solving the (Volterra type) integral equation with respectto the first hitting time density for a curved/flat boundary; consequently that enables us to calculate the MBS price faster and more precisely. Next, to capture the path-dependent prepayment behavior of the interest ratemovements we give some prepayment models based upon a two-dimensional Markov process of the interest rate and its long-run average rate. Third, we study the simultaneous assessment issue of prepayment and defaultrisks, encountered in practice.Finally we discuss the calculation of the joint probability density ofmultiple first hitting times.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

Endogenous Alleviation of Overreaction Problem by Aggregate Information Announcement

It is well‐known that agents overreact to public information in markets characterized by strategic complementarities. We propose a simple and implementable method of alleviating the overreaction problem. Extending the beauty‐contest game of Morris and Shin to a multi‐region economy, we show that, under an aggregate information announcement, each agent converts purely public information into imperfect public information endogenously. This makes the agents’ beliefs dispersed and alleviates the overreaction problem. Moreover, we compare the welfare effect of the aggregate information announcement with that of a separate announcement. We find that there exist plausible situations where the aggregate information announcement is better than the separate information announcement despite reduced quality.     

Questions about the equivalence of market rents and user costs for owner occupied housing

For modern nations, it is recognized as important that temporal and spatial variations in costs for comparable dwelling services are carefully measured. The costs of owner occupied as well as rental housing have important roles to play in both the consumer price index (CPI) and the System of National Accounts (SNA). The 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA93) specifies that a rental value of the housing stock should be included as part of the aggregates for personal consumption, personal income, income of proprietors and value added for the real estate industry. Yet, little attention has been devoted to an underlying commonality of practice: the implicit assumption that housing cost information for either renters or owner occupiers can be used for assessing movements over time and spatial differences in the cost of housing for both renters and owners, after allowing for differences regarding payment for taxes and certain ongoing expenses such as insurance and utilities. But in the real world, are the services that renters and owner occupiers get from their dwellings comparable? Also, for both renters and owner occupiers, are there place-related differences in the services they derive from their dwellings? And if so, what are the implications for official statistics making? These are the questions raised by the empirical results presented in this paper.     

Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies

CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns, R&D expenditures, and financial leverage, and a positive association between CEO inside debt holdings and the extent of diversification and asset liquidity. Collectively, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that CEOs with large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky.