To push performance,check the leader’s power motive

The power motive, defined as the desire to impact the behavior and emotions of another person, has long been controversial. On one side, the exercise of power has been put forth as a fundamental human need greater in strength than the need to survive. On the other, it has been vilified for its potentially devastating consequences. We argue the latter view is distorted, and, by relying too heavily on it, we have come to misunderstand the essential nature of power and its use by leaders charged with driving performance. It is not the power motive that leads to corruption and tyranny, but rather how the power motive is channeled into behavior by other personality factors. Consequently, those charged with leader selection should place greater emphasis on how individuals with strong power motives differ in how they channel power. Doing so will support the selection of executives best equipped to deliver organizational performance.     

Bargaining externalities in a privatization programme

In privatization programmes, the state commonly keeps a minority ownership stake in firms. We provide an explanation based on the externality that privatization of one firm has on the profitability of others. If this externality is negative, as with oligopolistic firms, the government can gain a strategic advantage in bargaining over the sale of one firm if it keeps an ownership share in another. We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential sale of firms. The results apply to the period in which privatization takes place, and are consistent with the delayed sale of minority ownership often observed in practice.     

Changes in analysts’ stock recommendations following regulatory action against their brokerage

Review of Accounting Studies - Despite the importance of sell-side analysts in the capital markets, we know little about the effectiveness of routine monitoring of the sell-side industry. We...     

Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers

We describe the quantitative modeling techniques that are used in horizontal merger review for the evaluation of unilateral effects, and discuss how the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines helped legitimize these methods and motivate scholarly research. We cover markets that feature differentiated products pricing, auctions and negotiations, and homogeneous products, in turn. We also develop connections between quantitative modeling and market concentration screens that are based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).

     

Replicating the Levitt and Porter estimates of drunk driving

Estimates of the prevalence and risk of drinking-and-driving are a high-priority need for researchers and policymakers. Levitt and Porter (Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 109(6), 1198–1237) demonstrate how these can be recovered using publicly available information in the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). Although robust to systematic misreporting and sample selection and far cheaper to implement than surveys, their methodological innovations are largely ignored. We believe this arises partly from difficulty in replicating their results. This article identifies the underlying causes of replication failure and offers practical guidance for future implementation that takes advantage of the current structure of the FARS data.     

Can the Timing of Negotiations Impact the Consequences of Mergers?

This paper uses a theoretical model to examine whether variation in the timing of negotiations between buyers and sellers can alter the effects of mergers between sellers. The model shows that mergers between horizontally overlapping firms lead to price increases regardless of how negotiations take place. In contrast, mergers between firms in different markets can only lead to higher compensation for the combined firm when negotiations occur sequentially. However, any price effects from out‐of‐market mergers stem from a mechanical redistribution of existing market power and not from a loss in competition. Published 2014. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.     

Towards mediation: developing a theoretical framework to understand alternative dispute resolution

This article examines alternative approaches to conflict resolution by developing a theoretical framework that relates dispute resolution practice to philosophical assumptions about authority and knowledge. By investigating the assumptions underpinning interest‐based bargaining and mediation their link to direct democracy and challenge to managerial authority are revealed at the level of theory and practice.     

Regulatory Barriers and Entry into a New Competitive Industry

We model the effects of license fees and bureaucratic delay on firm entry into a new competitive industry, whose profitability is initially unknown. A license fee alone reduces the number of first movers and the steady‐state number of firms. The combination of license fee and delay may cause some entrepreneurs to purchase licenses speculatively, only using them to enter production later if profitability is revealed to be sufficiently favourable. Alternatively, some entrepreneurs may wait, possibly buying a license only after profitability is revealed; but it is never found that some entrepreneurs adopt one of these strategies and some the other.     

Bilateral political relations and sovereign wealth fund investment

We examine the role of bilateral political relations in sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment decisions. Our empirical results suggest that political relations play a role in SWF decision making. Contrary to predictions based on the FDI and political relations literature, we find that relative to nations in which they do not invest, SWFs prefer to invest in nations with which they have weaker political relations. Using a two-stage Cragg model, we find that political relations are an important factor in where SWFs invest but matter less in determining how much to invest. Inconsistent with the FDI and political relations literature, these results suggest that SWFs behave differently than rational investors who maximize return while minimizing risk. Consistent with the trade and political relations literature, we find that SWF investment has a positive (negative) impact for relatively closed (open) countries. Our results suggest that SWFs use—at least partially—non-financial motives in investment decisions.