On the investment value of sell-side analyst recommendation revisions in the UK

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This study conducts a comprehensive investigation into the investment value of sell-side analyst recommendation revisions in the UK, using a unique...     

Selectivity and timing performance of UK investment trusts

This study examines the selectivity and timing performance of 218 UK investment trusts over the period July 1981 to June 2009. We estimate the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) models augmented with the size, value, and momentum factors, either under the OLS method adjusted with the Newey–West procedure or under the GARCH(1,1)-in-mean method following the specification of Glosten et al. (1993; hereafter GJR-GARCH-M). We find that the OLS method provides little evidence in favour of the selectivity and timing ability, consistent with previous studies. Interestingly, the GJR-GARCH-M method reverses this result, showing some relatively strong evidence on favourable selectivity ability, particularly for international funds, as well as favourable timing ability, particularly for domestic funds. We conclude that the GJR-GARCH-M method performs better in evaluating fund performance compared with the OLS method and the non-parametric approach, as it essentially accounts for the time-varying characteristics of factor loadings and hence obtains more reliable results, in particular, when the high frequency data, such as the daily returns, are used in the analysis. Our results are robust to various in-sample and out-of-sample tests and have valuable implications for practitioners in making their asset allocation decisions across different fund styles.     

Alternative goods allocation schemes under repressed inflation

We incorporate endogenous production into Sah's analysis of alternative schemes for distributing a deficit good. The model is interpreted as applying to a socialist economy suffering from repressed inflation. Sah's results are robust to this generalisation provided production is linear. Also, amending Sah's assumptions, we suppose all individuals own equal shares in the means of production. If production is linear, a low-wage worker (particularly defined) prefers goods to be sold at a free-market price to the alternatives of (equal) nonconvertible rationing or a queuing system. Without linearity, the results are less clear-cut.I am grateful to Ben Lockwood and Lynn Mainwaring for helpful discussions, and to anonymous referees for constructive comments.     

Sovereign wealth fund investment and the return-to-risk performance of target firms

This paper investigates the relationship between sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment and the return-to-risk performance of target firms. Specifically, we find that target firm raw returns decline following SWF investment. Though risk also declines following SWF investment, we find that SWF investment is associated with a reduction in the compensation of risk over the 5 years following acquisition. Firm volatility decomposition suggests that idiosyncratic risk is what mainly drives these impacts toward decline. Employing a multinomial logit framework wherein combinations of target returns and risk movements are categorized, we see that, in cases of foreign investment, SWFs’ target firm performance most closely resembles that of other government-owned firms. The observed results are inconsistent with predictions of higher volatility and improved returns due to monitoring firm activities from the institutional investor literature. This suggests that SWFs may not provide some of the benefits that are offered by other institutional investors.     

Why Can't I Trade? Exchange Discretion in Calling Halts*,†

Stock exchanges are important intermediaries in how firm information enters price. Trading halts are a key tool, often exercised at the exchanges' discretion, to prevent extraordinary price volatility when new information arrives. We investigate how exchanges use discretion and whether the discretion alters the effectiveness of the halts. We provide evidence consistent with halts reflecting the preferences of listed firms rather than the stated exchange objectives (i.e., minimizing excess volatility and off-equilibrium trades). Furthermore, when exchanges exercise more discretion (unexplained by firm and information characteristics), the halts are less effective. Specifically, halts with more discretion are less likely to resume trading with efficient prices and are more likely to have been called unnecessarily (i.e., little to no price movement during the halt). These findings are consistent with exchanges using halts to cater to listed firms rather than to meet exchange objectives such as minimizing excess volatility or avoiding trades at off-equilibrium prices.