The New Accountability? Devolution and Expenditure Politics in Scotland

Devolution is seen to be a means for enhancing democratic control and accountability in the British political system (Scottish Office, 1997). Proponents of such change have presented it as offering the prospect of a more consensual, transparent and inclusive form of governance, in effect a 'new politics', with less executive dominance than at Westminster. This would be delivered in part by proportional representation, by strengthening the role of the legislature, and by adopting a more consultative approach to decision-making (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995). This article focuses on expenditure politics in the budget and audit processes of the Scottish Parliament.     

Variable Specific Factors and the “X-Efficiency Cost” of Protection *

This paper analyzes the effects of protection on X-efficiency using a general equilibrium Ricardo-Viner model with variable sector-specific effort. As in earlier models, it is found that protection only reduces effort if the income effect is sufficiently strong. It is also shown that, provided the correct compensated import demand curve is used, all welfare effects attributable to changes in effort are captured in the standard “triangle” measure of deadweight loss. Moreover, any protection-induced fall in effort will reduce the overall cost of protection, suggesting that policy-induced “X-inefficiency” may be beneficial.     

Honesty, Individualism, and Pragmatic Business Ethics: Implications for Corporate Hierarchy

The boundaries of honesty are the focal point of this exploration of the individualistic origins of modernist ethics and the consequent need for a more pragmatic approach to business ethics. The tendency of modernist ethics to see honesty as an individual responsibility is described as a contextually naive approach, one that fails to account for the interactive effects between individual choices and corporate norms. By reviewing the empirical accounts of managerial struggles with ethical dilemmas, the article arrives at the contextual preconditions for encouraging the development of reflective moral agents in modern corporations.     

High-Involvement Management and Pay in Britain

High‐involvement management practices have well‐established benefits for employers, but what do they do for employees? Using a nationally‐representative survey of British private‐sector workplaces, high‐involvement management is shown to be associated with higher pay. The wage premium is little affected by the choice of employee involvement practices (e.g., teams versus quality circles), but it appears only where employee involvement practices are supported by job security guarantees. Powerful trade unions increase the premium.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization On Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergers*

This paper analyzes the effects of tariff reductions on horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly in a two-country world. It is shown that for mergers between two domestic firms and for cross-border mergers which supply both markets from a foreign plant, unilateral tariff reduction encourages mergers which concentrate market power at the expense of mergers which reduce cost, while bilateral tariff reductions have the opposite effect, encouraging mergers which significantly reduce cost. Cross-border mergers which continue to supply each market from a local plant are discouraged by both unilateral and bilateral tariff reduction.     

The Effect of Information Systems on Honesty in Managerial Reporting: A Behavioral Perspective*

This study examines the behavioral impact of an information system, and how that impact varies with the information system's precision, in an internal reporting environment. We propose that a manager's reporting decisions are affected by his or her trade‐off of the benefits of appearing honest against the benefits of misrepresentation. The information system affects the manager's trade‐off by improving the owner's ability to make an inference regarding the manager's level of honesty. Thus, to the extent that the manager perceives benefits to appearing honest, the presence of an information system can increase managerial honesty. As the information system becomes more precise, however, the manager must forgo greater benefits of misrepresentation in order to achieve the same appearance of honesty. For managers under a precise system, this will shift the trade‐off decision toward the benefits of misrepresentation and away from the benefits of appearing honest. Notably, in our experiment, the only benefit of appearing honest is an intrinsically motivated desire for social approval. We find that, although the existence of an information system increases managerial honesty, honesty is lower under a precise than under a coarse information system. We also compare profit earned by the owners in our experiment, which relies on a behavioral role of an information system, with the maximum profit theoretically possible given a contractual use of the information system. This comparison suggests that, unless the available information system is sufficiently precise, the owner will obtain greater profits by not contracting on its output, even if that output is fully contractible.     

EUROPE AND CHINA: THE FATAL CONCEIT1

China's recent economic growth has been driven by an apparent acceptance by the Chinese government of many of the key insights of Hayek's economic and social thought. Current Chinese economic policies stand in stark contrast to those being pursued by the EU and many European countries, where interventionist policies of the kind Hayek predicted would lead to relative impoverishment and declining freedom are being pursued. The long‐term consequence of these two trends is likely to be the economic dominance of China over Europe in the present century.     

Deposit Insurance,Banking Reform,and Financial Sector Development in Several Nations of Southeastern Europe

Deposit insurance has spread to many sections of the world. In the newly formed nations of the former Yugoslavia, this has occurred under conditions of post‐conflict reconstruction, hyperinflation, and several different governmental structures. Three cases are examined; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro. They all have developed deposit insurance programs. The implementation process was compared to “best practice” recommendations. It is found that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was difficult due to the fractured nature of the Dayton Accord government structure on the one hand but easier to the strong international presence supporting required actions. In the case of Croatia, a unified state emerged from the war, but it was somewhat isolated. Its bank restructuring was costly, and a fragmented deposit insurance program was introduced in the middle of a banking crisis. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the bank restructuring process is still underway, and implementation of a functioning deposit insurance program properly awaits its completion.     

Why Manufacture Offshore? An Empirical Analysis of Valuation Effects

In this study, announcements by U.S. firms of offshore joint venture manufacturing during the 1980s are used to provide more comprehensive evidence than past studies on the wealth effects of offshore joint ventures. Evidence shows that the target country's level of economic development and political stability, currency strength of the originating country (U.S. in this study) relative to that of the target country, U.S. firm's mode of entry, and the relative value of the U.S. firm's investment in the joint venture affect the wealth of U.S. firms which engage in offshore joint ventures. The target country's level of economic development, its political stability, and the currency strength of the originating country relative to the target country are shown to be the dominant economic factors. Of particular importance, evidence indicates that the target country's level of economic development is a more important determinant of excess returns than is its political stability.