The form of U.S. in-kind assistance

Child care and housing programs in the United States are markedby quality homogeneity, restricted eligibility, rationing, andcopayments that increase as recipients' income rises. Why? Ishow that these programs can best be explained as attempts toreduce the child care or housing 'poverty gaps,' subject toconstraints that require that recipients be treated quite well.Such constraints are justified when the public is really notsure whether the government is acting generously.     

Changes in Indirect Taxes in Australia: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis

Over the last thirty years, the effects of indirect taxation changes have been analysed using comparative static general equilibrium models. We use a new method to analyse current changes in Australia's indirect taxes: dynamic computable general equilibrium modelling. Comparative static methods compare the situation in a given year (usually unspecified) with and without a policy change. The dynamic method shows the effects of a policy change through time. Comparative static methods are usually restricted to estimates of long-run changes in allocative efficiency. The dynamic method provides information not only on efficiency but also on adjustment processes, including variations in employment. With our dynamic method, the effects of policy changes are analysed as deviations from explicit forecasts. We find that these forecasts are important for the policy results. For Australia's current set of indirect tax changes, our main conclusions are (i) the short-run employment effects depend critically on the wage response; (ii) merchandise exporters benefit but tourism is harmed; and (iii) the long-run welfare effectsare likely to be negative, reflecting a decline in the terms of trade and increased compliance costs.     

Anchoring Induced Biases in Consumer Price Negotiations

Two studies were conducted with the aim of demonstrating anchoring induced biases in consumer price negotiations.In Study 1, 96 undergraduate students of business administration who were recruited as subjects played the role of buyers of a condominium. All subjects were given the same market information. They were then asked to state whether their reservation price was higher or lower than an arbitrary price example (irrelevant anchor) that for different groups of subjects was either low or high. Finally, subjects indicated their reservation price. As would be predicted if adjustments from the anchor are insufficient, the indicated reservation price was lower when the anchor was low than when it was high.In Study 2, employing 64 undergraduate students of psychology who conducted dyad negotiations about the price of condominiums, the effect of the irrelevant anchor on the initially indicated reservation price was replicated. In addition, an anchoring effect of the seller's initial offer was observed. The results also revealed effects of both irrelevant anchor and initial offer on the purchase price.From a public policy point of view, the results imply that consumers may be strongly influenced by irrelevant anchors provided by sellers. Provision of accurate market price information may however lessen the impact of irrelevant anchors.     

Time-consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and a balanced government budget

Abstract .  This paper analyzes optimal, time consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and with a balanced government budget. When tax revenue is used for publicly provided consumption or lump-sum transfers, leisure would be higher than its social optimum. Pareto optimal taxation requires taxing capital income more heavily than labour income and subsidizing investment at the same rate of the tax. Also, it requires either subsidizing labour at the same rate as a consumption tax or subsidizing consumption at the same rate as a labour income tax, and hence it is not a practical guide to policy. Further, a consumption tax, or equivalently a uniform income tax with investment subsidies at the same rate, can be improved on by taxing capital income more heavily than labour income.     

A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings

We define and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games. Existence of DCWs is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient. We characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes, study the effects of changes in the discount factor, investigate efficiency properties, and explore the potential for achieving renegotiation-proof outcomes. We apply this solution concept to a standard one-dimensional choice problem wherein agents have single-peaked preferences, as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate pay-off.