Do EU direct payments to beef producers belong in the ‘blue box’?

In the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, so-called 'blue box' support measures were exempted from reduction commitments, provided they were delivered under 'production-limiting' programs. Although classified as 'blue box', the EU system of direct payments (DP) to beef farmers imposes 'claim-limiting' restrictions rather than 'production-limiting' restrictions, allowing farmers to keep additional animals over and above the number upon which they are eligible to claim DP. The present paper provides empirical evidence that EU direct payments capitalise into the market prices of male calves and young steers in Ireland. It is also likely that DP capitalises into the prices of beef cows and heifers. Given this capitalisation process, some farmers can obtain 'capitalised' DP on animals produced over and above the 'claim-limiting' restrictions, by selling these animals through auction markets. Thus, 'capitalised' DP probably encourages production over and above the limiting measures.     

The character of demand in mature organic food markets: Great Britain and Denmark compared

We investigate the organic food market in two selected European countries, Great Britain and Denmark, identifying main differences and similarities. We focus particularly on consumer perceptions and priorities, labelling schemes, and sales channels as a basis for assessing market stability and prospects for future growth. We employ a unique set of household panel data that includes information on stated values and concerns as well as registered purchasing behaviour. Most organic food on both markets is produced and processed by large-scale industrialised units and distributed through mainstream sales channels, consumer confidence being sustained at present by organic labelling schemes that appear to function well. However, a parallel market, based on the supply of goods through various direct sales channels to heavy users, prevails. We find that organic food purchase decisions are primarily motivated by ‘private good’ attributes such as freshness, taste and health benefits, attributes that may be perceived as being compatible with modern production and sales structure. Mature markets for organic foods nevertheless appear to be vulnerable to consumer dissatisfaction, particularly among heavy users of organic food products.     

Adverse selection when loss severities differ: First-best and costly equilibria

With information asymmetry between contracting parties, adverse selection may result. A separation may be achieved if low-risk types can signal their identity—for example, by selecting from a menu of price-quantity contracts. In such models, signaling is costly and solutions are, at best, second best. These models characterize risk types by differences in the probability, rather than in severity, of the costs they impose. However, when severity differences also are considered, first best solutions become feasible. We identify the circumstances in which costly separating equilibria prevail and those in which full-information equilibria can be attained.     

An Expert System Solution to Mortgage Arrears Problems

This article draws on research into the current level of provision of arrears and debt counselling in building societies, banks and finance houses and concludes that, whilst interest in a consistent and systematic approach to arrears counselling is very positive, progress towards any practical application of Information Technology in the arrears counselling process is slow. In response to this shortfall the article presents a novel approach to arrears counselling through an expert system named Personal Insolvency Strategy Counselling Expert System (PISCES). Work on PISCES at Loughborough University Banking Centre has shown that much of the expertise and knowledge of the experienced arrears counsellor can be captured within a computer-based system. An evaluation of PISCES by interested parties has confirmed that the expert system approach to arrears counselling is valid and that the PISCES system, in particular shows promise.     

Financial Innovation in the Management of Catastrophe Risk

Like the preceding article, this article argues that the high costs of reinsurance present the opportunity for hedging instruments to be offered to primary insurers that are both competitive with current reinsurance and that offer investors high rates of return. But the combination of high reinsurance premiums and the vast capacity of the capital market for diversification is not sufficient to ensure the success of these new instruments. If new instruments such as catastrophe options and catastrophelinked bonds are to compete successfully with reinsurance, they must provide a cost-effective means of resolving incentive conflicts between the primary insurer and the ultimate risk bearer that are known as "moral hazard." Without an effective solution of this moral hazard problem, the use of past insurance loss data to estimate the potential returns for purchasers of catastrophe bonds and other such instruments will be misleading and unreliable.
As the author demonstrates, both traditional reinsurance and each of the new catastrophe hedging instruments presents insurance companies and other hedgers with the challenge of managing a different combination of moral hazard, credit risk, and basis risk. For example, traditional catastrophe reinsurance is subject to significant credit risk and moral hazard, but little if any basis risk. By contrast, both catastrophe options and bonds can be designed in ways that reduce moral hazard and credit risk, but at the cost of taking on some basis risk. The risk manager's task in such circumstances is to design an instrument that embodies the optimal, or cost-minimizing, trade-off among these three sources of risk.     

Capitalization of the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Overview

The 1990s witnessed an unprecedented decline in leverage ratios in the United States property-liability insurance industry. The premiums-to-surplus ratio, the most commonly used leverage ratio in the industry, fell from its historical average of 2.0 to less than 1.0 by the end of 2000; and the industry-wide capital-to-asset ratio increased from an historical average of about 25% to 35%. The international reinsurance industry also experienced significant capital increases and leverage declines during the 1990s (Cummins and Weiss, 2000).¹ These unusual trends raised widespread concerns that the property-liability insurance industry had become over-capitalized (The Economist, 1999; Bowers, 2001; Seifert, 2001). To investigate the growth in capitalization and its potential causes, the Conference on Capitalization in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry was held at the Wharton School in September 2000 under the joint sponsorship of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center and AON. Selected papers from the conference comprise this issue of the Journal of Financial Services Research (JFSR).